





Environmental marketing has grown dramatically in response to consumer
preferences for environmentally sensitive goods. The availability of adequate
information on the environmental attributes of goods could enable consumers
collectively, through their purchasing decisions, to persuade manufacturers to
adopt environmentally superior product designs. In this Article, the author
analyzes the legal and policy implications of contemporary environmental
marketing and demonstrates how current statutes, nonbinding FTC guidelines,
and common law remedies fail to ensure the accuracy and usefulness of
environmental information in the marketplace. The Article also identifies
pressures which could undermine the integrity of independent environmental
certification programs. In addressing these issues, the author examines broad
questions of administrative rulemaking and adjudication, federalism,
commercial speech, and the interplay of common law, statutory, and market
remedies. Ultimately, the author argues for federal legislation that would
increase government oversight of environmental marketing, and for a
coordinated approach to evaluating the environmental attributes of consumer
goods.
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Introduction
Green marketing is an international phenomenon of the 1990s. Recent
surveys indicate that many U.S. consumers are willing to pay extra for products
and packaging with reduced environmental costs.' Green buying represents
a way that citizens, on a personal level, can make a contribution to society.2
Polls show that when consumers choose products with environmental labels,
they hope to minimize problems of air quality, water quality, and solid waste
disposal.3 According to a founder of a new U.S. company that tests and
1. In a 1990 poll conducted by Gerstman & Meyers, Inc., 78% of consumers surveyed indicated that
they would pay at least 5% above current market price for products with environmental attributes, and 47%
indicated a willingness to pay up to 15% above market price. GERSTMAN & MEYERS, INC., CONSUMER
SOLID WASTE: AWARENESS, ATITUDE, AND BEHAVIOR STUDY iII 8 (1991). Although consumer responses
to purchasing behavior and price range questions are often imprecise, these figures nevertheless reflect
"green buying" preferences.
2. Although consumer consumption is never environmentally beneficial, products and processes
requiring fewer raw materials and generating fewer harmful wastes are environmentally preferable to others.
3. See Scott Hume & Patricia Strnad, Consumers Go 'Green,' ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 25, 1991, §
1, at 3. In the Gerstman & Meyers nationwide survey, 78% of respondents indicated that they select
products or participate in recycling programs to help mitigate the problem of consumer solid waste.
GERSTMAN & MEYERS, INC., supra note 1, at 6. In a 1990 nationwide poll by Abt Associates, 51% of
adults surveyed indicated that they purchase or avoid products for environmental reasons. ABT ASSOCIATES
INC., CONSUMER PURCHASE BEHAVIORS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RESULTS OF AN EVENT-BASED STUDY
17 (1990). The same poll revealed that during a six-month period in 1990, 36% of adults surveyed had
selected at least one product due to its perceived environmental soundness, 27% had purposely avoided a
product due to its perceived environmental impact, and 9% had avoided a product because of concerns about
the producer's environmental practices. Id. As part of a 1990 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll, 38% of
consumers surveyed indicated that they regularly changed the types of products they bought and used
because of environmental concerns. Hearings on Environmental Labeling: Hearings on S. 615 Before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991) (testimony of the Environmental Defense Fund) [hereinafter Environmental
Defense Fund Senate Testimony] (citing a national poll by P. Hart and R. Teeter). For a compendium of
recent public opinion surveys pertaining to "green buying" behavior, see OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND
EVALUATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER
MARKET app. at A-I (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET].
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certifies products for environmental attributes, "our [company's] objective is
to help American consumers vote with their pocketbooks on environmental
issues."4
Green buying could potentially serve as an effective market-driven means
of promoting genuine environmental improvements in product design.5 Two
significant problems, however, jeopardize the future of the environmental
consumer movement. First, the marketplace is responding to buyer preferences
with a flurry of diverse and sometimes fraudulent green claims.6 The
profitability of environmental marketing has prompted manufacturers to use
arbitrarily terms such as "biodegradable," "recyclable," and "ozone friendly"
in their product labeling and advertising. Broad, unsubstantiated claims of
environmental friendliness are applied to products containing harmful
ingredients or additives.
Shortcomings in the current legal and regulatory system have allowed
manufacturers to make misleading and unsubstantiated claims with virtual
impunity. Green marketing is more problematic than certain other forms of
advertising because consumers generally cannot substantiate environmental
claims on their own. Although people can compare the taste of Coke and Pepsi,
and observe their laundry after washing with Tide or Cheer, they generally
cannot verify recycled content claims or statements about the ozone layer. In
the absence of regulations that would standardize the environmental marketing
lexicon, consumers are unable to distinguish substance from hyperbole.7 The
resulting consumer confusion can translate into apathy. Although the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has issued general nonbinding guidelines that may
help educate certain advertisers about the contours of permissible practices,
stringent and legally binding regulations are the only route to effective industry
compliance.8
A second source of consumer confusion is that the advertised environmental
4. Andrew Maykuth, New Label to Tag 'Environmentally Friendly' Products, PHILADELPHA INQUIRER,
June 15, 1990, at A2 (quoting Denis Hayes, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and current
Director of Green Seal, Inc., a U.S. nonprofit environmental certification company).
5. Incentive-based, market-driven means of accomplishing environmental goals can serve as valuable
supplements to traditional command-and-control regulatory programs. In addition to green buying, other
consumer-pocketbook approaches that have gained momentum in the past decade include consumer boycotts
and social investment funds. The Calvert Social Investment Fund, the Social Investment Forum, and the
Socially Responsible Banking Fund of the Vermont National Bank represent such incentive-based programs.
ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET, supra note 3, at 16-17.
6. A study by Marketing Intelligence Service, Ltd. concluded that "green" products constituted 9.2%
of all new U.S. products introduced in the first half of 1990, compared to 0.5% in 1985. This represents
an almost 20-fold increase in five years. 1990 Green Product Introductions Soar, GREEN MARKETALERT,
Oct. 1992, at 8.
7. In a 1990 survey of 1,514 consumers conducted by Advertising Age and the Gallup Organization,
47% of respondents indicated they were "not confident" that environmental advertising provided accurate
product information. Surveys Find Consumers Distrustful of Corporate Environmental Practices, GREEN
MARKETALERT, Mar. 1991, at 5. A Good Housekeeping Institute/Roper Organization survey found that
approximately 43% of consumers believed that most commercial environmental claims were invalid. Id.
8. See infra notes 114-40 and accompanying text.
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benefits of products are often undercut by undisclosed environmental harms.
For example, fluorescent light bulbs consume less energy than incandescent
bulbs, but contain toxic mercury.9 Cloth diapers generate less solid waste than
do disposable diapers, but consume more water during their useful lifetime.'0
Complexities such as these suggest the potential value of third-party"
certification programs that test products for a number of environmental attrib-
utes. Government environmental certification programs are in the experimental
phase in Europe, Canada, and Japan.' 2 Private organizations recently have
initiated certification programs in the United States. 3
Third-party environmental certification, however, is fraught with problems
of its own.'4 Private operation of such programs may generate credibility
problems. 5 Proliferation of competing certification programs and product
evaluation criteria could amplify consumer confusion, the very problem these
programs were designed to combat. 6
Furthermore, some private environmental certifiers have articulated an
interest in a comprehensive product evaluation technique known as "cradle-to-
grave" or "life-cycle" analysis. '7 Life-cycle assessments account for the energy
and materials consumed, and the wastes released to the environment, in the
9. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-E-541, GREEN PRODUCTS By DESIGN
60 (1992).
10. FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES, LTD., ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S
DISPOSABLE AND CLOTH DIAPERS 1-22 (1990).
11. The use of the term "third-party" in this article refers to any neutral body that is independent of
manufacturers, retailers, or other participants in the "stream of commerce." Third-party cetifiers can be
private, governmental, or quasi-governmental. Companies that issue certification marks for environmental
soundness are often referred to as environmental certifiers, environmental endorsers, third-party "seal-
of-approval" organizations, or eco-labelers. The terms "endorsement" and "certification" are generally
interchangeable in this context.
12. See, e.g., LORI K. CARSWELL & JULIA J. LANFGEL, APPLIED DECISION ANALYSIS, INC., ENVIRON-
MENTAL LABELING IN THE UNITED STATES: BACKGROUND RESEARCH, 'ISSUES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1-49 (Apr. 22, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ; ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SERVICES,
LTD., ECO-LABELS: PRODUCT MANAGEMENT IN A GREENER EUROPE (1989).
13. In 1989 and 1990, two private environmental certification companies were established in California.
See infra notes 332-39 and accompanying text. Green Seal, Inc., is a non-profit organization that has
developed a multiple-attribute product evaluation system similar to the evaluation system used under
Canada's program. Interview with Denis Hayes, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and current
member of the Board of Directors of Green Seal, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Jan. 25, 1992); see generally GREEN
SEAL, A PROPOSAL FOR SUPPORT OF A CONSUMER EDUCATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM (1990); Randolph B. Smith, Group to Award Environmental Seals of Approval, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 1990, at B4. Another company, Scientific Certification Systems, Inc., originally Green Cross,
certifies products for attributes such as recycled content and degradability, and has announced plans to
undertake "product life-cycle inventories." Marc Silver, Seals for the Times, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 12, 1990, at 81.
14. See infra notes 340-50, 369-73 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of private operation of environmental certification
programs, see infra notes 332-50 and accompanying text.
16. See Laurie Freeman, Ecology Seals Vie for Approval, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 29, 1991, at 30.
17. For a discussion of the possibilities and the limitations of life-cycle analysis, see infra notes 374-401
and accompanying text. For an account of the current status of the life-cycle methodology, see SOCIETY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGISTS AND CHEMISTS (SETAC), A TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIFE-CYCLE
ASSESSMENT (1991) [hereinafter SETAC].
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course of producing, using, and disposing of consumer goods. An ideal
assessment would encompass the entire life cycle of a product, from the
extraction and processing of raw materials through manufacturing,
transportation, distribution, use, reuse, recycling, and final disposal. 8 In theo-
ry, life-cycle analysis could be a highly effective tool for increasing citizen
awareness of the ecological implications, of consumption. Unfortunately, the
current methodology is dependent upon assumptions and inadequately precise
for making consistent and reliable interbrand product comparisons. 9
Part I of this Article surveys the shortcomings of the current U.S. legal and
regulatory framework for environmental advertising. 20 Because environmental
advertising policy involves an intricate weave of environmental priorities and
consumer protection principles, it raises complicated jurisdictional issues.
Solutions to the green marketing problem implicate the missions of both the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the FTC. Jurisdictional issues also
arise between the federal government and the states. The two competing values
of national uniformity and state autonomy pervade the discussion of
environmental marketing regulation.
Part II calls for new federal legislation authorizing EPA to issue legally
binding environmental marketing regulations to help correct the information
inefficiencies in the green marketplace. The proposed statute would mandate
enforcement assistance by the FTC. The concluding section of Part II rebuts
advertisers' First Amendment objections to mandatory definitions for envi-
ronmental labeling terminology, and illustrates why a federal statute may be
less vulnerable than state laws to constitutional challenges.
Part III analyzes the shortcomings of the current legal framework for
environmental certification, highlighting the problems that will arise if certifiers
fail to adopt separate product niches, coordinate their standards, and maintain
equitable cost structures. The problem of developing credible certification
programs differs from the environmental advertising problem discussed in Part
II, and requires a different solution. First, in contrast to environmental
advertising, in which hundreds of companies have been making green claims
for several years, environmental certification is currently in its earliest growth
phase, with only a few U.S. companies participating. Establishing a full-fledged
program to regulate certification would therefore be premature. Due to the
18. Id. at I.
19. See infra notes 383-401 and accompanying text.
20. Regulating environmental claims made by manufacturers differs significantly from regulating
third-party certification programs. Manufacturers make environmental claims on their own packaging and
advertisements; third-party certifiers evaluate the products of many manufacturers. Third-party certifiers
seek to reward only that fraction of a given industry that attains a designated level of environmental
performance in product or packaging design. See infra text accompanying notes 320-24. To the extent that
advertising and certification differ, structural or regulatory solutions to the problems they create must be
developed independently.
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limited number of participating firms, government guidelines and vigilant
scrutiny by public interest groups could help promote accountability.
Part IV recommends measures to encourage uniformity and credibility
among certifiers. Part V discusses the advantages and shortcomings of product
evaluation methodologies currently used in environmental certification. If
companies fail to maintain rigorous standards while simultaneously providing
affordable prices, government oversight, funding, or a joint public-private
program may become appropriate.
The goal of any new government measures should not be to discourage
environmental advertising and certification, but to ensure the integrity of these
enterprises. If American consumers are to vote with their pocketbooks, they
need to be given an accurate assessment of the products they elect to buy.
I. Current Regulatory Framework for Environmental Marketing
A. Misrepresentation in the Marketplace: The FTC Act and Environmental
Advertising
Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), the principal
federal vehicle for restraining deceptive advertising, prohibits "[u]nfair methods
of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce."'" To bring an action under this section, the FTC need not show
intent, reliance, actual injury, or damages. In spite of the colloquial reference
to "false advertising," the FTC is not required to prove falsity or even actual
consumer deception, but simply to prove the likelihood of deception.22 The
potential class of deceived consumers includes those "acting reasonably under
the circumstances."23 Any representation triggering FTC action must be "mate-
rial," or likely to affect consumer choices.' Section Five also authorizes the
FTC to take action against unsubstantiated advertising claims, defined as claims
21. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). Section 12 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988), regulates deceptive
advertising practices regarding food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and is enforced in the same manner as
§ 5.
22. JEFF 1. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LEGAL CONCEPT 28 (1990).
The term "deceptiveness" is best suited to convey the notion that actual deception need not be proven under
the FTC Act. Id. at 13. This can be contrasted to the federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, which
requires proof of actual consumer confusion prior to prosecution. Lanham TradeMark Act, §§ 1-66, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
23. Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984), Cliffdale represented a narrowing of the
previously unlimited class of potentially deceived consumers described in Aronberg v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
24. American Home Products Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 168 (1981), aftd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982).
The Tenth Circuit defined materiality in 1943: "It is sufficient to find that the natural and probable result
of the challenged practices is to cause one to do that which he would not otherwise do." Bockenstette v.
FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943). According to Cliffdale, "a material representation, omission, act
or practice involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of,
or conduct regarding, a product." 103 F.T.C. at 165.
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made without a "reasonable basis."25 FTC enforcement activities can result
in various remedial measures.26 The most commonly used enforcement tool
in deceptive advertising cases is the cease and desist order, whereby the
Commission may impose fines after a second offense.27
Since the 1970s, the FTC has prosecuted misleading environmental
advertising on a case-by-case basis.2" For example, in 1973, the Commission
ordered Ex-Cell-O Corporation to cease and. desist from making
biodegradability claims on behalf of its plastic-lined Pure-Pak milk cartons.29
One year later, the agency took action against Standard Oil of California for
exaggerating the capacity of a gasoline additive to reduce emissions.30 The
FTC brought cases in the 1980s against air and water filter companies for
overstating the purification capabilities of their products.3' More recently,
Zipatone, Inc. was ordered to cease and desist from asserting that Zipatone
Spray Cement contained "ecologically-safe" propellants. 32  In 1991, the
Commission enjoined Jerome Russell Cosmetics from representing that its hair
sprays, which contained ozone-depleting chemicals, were "ozone safe. '3 3 Later
25. Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999 (1984).
26. These measures include advisory opinions, consent orders, cease and desist orders, civil fines, and
less frequently, restitution and damages. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(m) (1988 & Supp. 1992). The Commission
may also seek equitable relief, including injunctions and corrective advertising. STEPHANIE W. KANwrr,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REGULATORY MANUAL SERIES § 6.01 (1992).
27. When the FTC has reason to believe that an advertiser has violated § 5 and that Commission action
would be in the public interest, it may issue a complaint and notice order. Before a complaint is issued,
however, a party is generally given an opportunity to consent to a formal cease and desist order, or to agree
informally to discontinue the practice. An expression of consent is a declaration that the advertiser will
curb future practices. It is not an admission of a past violation. If the case is not settled by a consent order
or informal agreement, the Commission issues a complaint, and a public adjudicative proceeding is held
before an administrative law judge (AU). After receiving testimony, the AU submits an initial decision
and order. If the ALJ determines that the act or practice in question has violated § 5, the advertiser may
appeal the order to the full Commission and then to a U.S. Court of Appeals. If the order is not appealed,
or if the Commission or court affirms, the initial decision becomes final 60 days after service. Misleading
advertising practices generally are punishable by civil fines only upon violation of a cease and desist order.
First violations are rarely punished, except where the Commission proves a violation of a binding rule, or
a knowing violation of a cease and desist order that has been issued against another advertiser. DAVID G.
EPSTEIN, CONSUMER PROTECTION 17-21 (1976).
28. For an outline of recent federal and state legal challenges to environmental advertising claims, see
ABT ASSOCIATES, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS IN THE UNITED STATES 49-62
(draft of July 10, 1992) (prepared for the Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter EPA DRAFT
REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES].
29. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36 (1973). The company had included the following statements in its
advertising: "Pure-Pak cartons are completely biodegradable. We made sure of that. If they're incinerated,
for instance, they go up as harmless carbon dioxide and water vapor. Or if they're used as land fill, they
disintegrate. Even the plastic film breaks down." Id. at 38. Referring to these representations, the company
concluded: "That's our story. We think it's a nice story, too. Because it ... has a happy ending." Id.
30. Standard Oil Co. of Ca., 84 F.T.C. 1401 (1974), affd as modified, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978).
31. New Medical Techniques, Inc., 110 F.T.C. 125 (1978) (consent order); Sunbeam Corp., 107 F.T.C.
226 (1986) (consent order); Associated Mills, Inc., 106 F.T.C. 5 (1985) (consent order); Young &
Rubicam/Zemp, Inc., 105 F.T.C. 317 (1985) (consent order).
32. Zipatone, Inc., F.T.C. No. C-3336, 1991 FTC Lexis 326, (July 9, 1991) (consent order). Zipatone
spray products allegedly contained the ozone-depleting chemical 1,1,1 - Trichloroethane.
33. Jerome Russell Cosmetics U.S.A., Inc., F.T.C. No. C-3341, 1991 FTC Lexis 408 (Aug. 21, 1991)
(consent order). Jerome Russell products also allegedly contained l,l,1-Trichloroethane.
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in 1991, the FTC signed a cease and desist order against American Enviro
Products for advertising that Bunnies Disposable Diapers degraded rapidly in
landfills.' Without adequate substantiation, the manufacturer had informed
consumers that the diapers would provide a net "landfill benefit" and would
decompose within three to five years, "before your child grows up."35
A central problem of this case-by-case approach is that it fails to demarcate
clear boundaries between deceptive and permissible practices. Case-by-case
adjudication by the FTC is selective, incremental, and highly contextual.36
Final orders cover only a limited number of acts and practices, and consent
agreements provide little interpretive guidance for future cases, except in the
rare instances when Commissioners provide concurring or dissenting opin-
ions.37 The current surge of unsubstantiated and misleading green marketing
claims has indicated that case-by-case enforcement is too unwieldy a club to
provide ample deterrence of deceptive advertising.3"
An unintended consequence of the FTC's application of the reasonable
consumer standard is that it has essentially granted immunity in the gray area
34. American Enviro Products, Inc., F.T.C. No. C-3376, 1992 FTC Lexis 122 (Mar. 18, 1992) (consent
order). The Attorneys General of ten states had initially brought actions against American Enviro Products
for its biodegradability claims in 1990. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
35. American Enviro Products was enjoined from making further claims and from advertising any
environmental benefits without scientific documentation. American Enviro Products, Inc., F.T.C. No.
C-3376, 1992 FTC Lexis 122, at compl. Exhibit A (Mar. 18, 1992). In early 1992, the FTC ordered First
Brands Corporation to refrain from making unsubstantiated biodegradability and photodegradability claims
about plastic bags. The agency also prohibited the company from using general terms such as
"environmentally friendly" unless the terms were prominently defined on product labels and supported by
scientific evidence. First Brands Corp., F.T.C. No. C-3358, 1992 FTC Lexis 27 (Jan. 2, 1992). In 1992,
the Commission issued a consent order against Tech Spray for advertising that its electronic
equipment-cleaning products were "ozone friendly" when they contained ozone depleting substances. Tech
Spray, Inc., FTC No. C-3377, 1992 FTC Lexis 118 (Mar. 25, 1992). The FTC also issued a consent order
against RMED International for claiming that its Tendercare disposable diapers would biodegrade in landfills,
and for making an unsubstantiated claim of overall environmental benefit. RMED Int'l. Inc., F.T.C. No.
C-3382, 1992 FTC Lexis 139 (May 14, 1992).
36. Hearings on Environmental Labeling: Hearings on S. 615 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental
Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1991)
(testimony of Deborah Becker, Vice President, Environmental Policy, Kraft General Foods, Inc.).
37. Id. at 15. The pertinent testimony reads as follows:
[Tlhe case-by-case approach does not always result in guidance that can be readily understood. The
vast bulk of the Commission's administrative workload takes the form of consent agreements. In all
such cases, there is no Commission opinion that can be relied upon to provide a thorough explanation
of the underlying evidence, the legal theories that were pursued successfully or unsuccessfully, the
remedies that were considered and accepted or rejected, and so on. Instead, there is a brief, sometimes
cryptic, complaint, and a consent agreement. The analysis to aid public comment frequently does little
more than recite the terms of the complaint and consent, and certainly will not disclose any of the
nonpublic evidentiary information that may be critical to an understanding of the Commission's
decision to proceed with the case and its interpretation of the law. Unless there is a dissenting or
concurring opinion from a Commissioner, these consent agreements provide very little, if any,
interpretive guidance to industry.
Id. at 14-15.
38. A study by Marketing Intelligence Service indicated that products making green claims constituted
12.6% of all new U.S. product introductions in 1991. Green New Product Review, 1991, GREEN MARKET-
ALERT, Feb. 1992, at 3.
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cases. For example, manufacturers often make unqualified claims that their
products are "recycled."39 Survey evidence indicates that when consumers
purchase recycled products, they believe they are helping to mitigate the solid
waste problem' and therefore assume that "recycled" products contain a
significant percentage of recycled materials.4 ' The FTC has thus been
confronted with the onerous challenge of determining just how much recycled
content should be present to avoid misleading the reasonable consumer.
Representations may also be misleading if they are true only in limited cir-
cumstances. 42 For example, unqualified claims that suggest potentialities, such
as "recyclable" or "compostable," may be misleading if undeveloped regional
markets and infrastructure limit or prevent the use of these disposal options.3
Moreover, the benefits of degradability may be illusory where products are
incinerated or disposed of in landfills."4 Modem landfills are designed to
maintain anaerobic conditions that prevent degradation in order to reduce local
groundwater contamination.' To the extent that they decompose, degradable
products may release toxic or other harmful additives.
4 6
As a result of its inability to draw appropriate lines in the adjudicative
setting, the FTC has been limited to prosecuting only the most egregious
violations. Evidentiary obstacles, combined with serious understaffing problems
at the FTC,47 have generally limited enforcement actions to violations by a
few highly visible companies.
39. The implicit message of a recycled content claim is that the recycled content is substantial. For
a discussion of the possible deceptiveness of implicit messages, see RICHARDS, supra note 22, at 28 ("[I1f
the conveyed meaning differs from the actual product attribute, the result is deceptiveness. Deceptiveness,
therefore, may be caused by message falsity or consumer miscomprehension or a combination of the two.").
40. See ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., CONSUMER PURCHASE BEHAVIOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RESULTS
OF AN EVENT-BASED STUDY 2, 8 (1990); OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. EPA 530-SW-89-066, PROMOTING SOURCE REDUCTION AND
RECYCLABILITY IN THE MARKETPLACE 36, A-14 (1989).
41. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 13.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 14.
44. An EPA study indicated that 73% of U.S. municipal solid waste was deposited in landfills in 1988.
DEP'T. OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB.
No. EPA 530-SW-90-042, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990
UPDATE 55 (1990).
45. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, COMMENTS AND PROPOSED GUIDES OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC COMMENT ON ISSUES CONCERNING ENVIRON-
MENTAL MARKETING AND ADVERTISING CLAIMS 15, 16 (1991) (submitted to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion).
46. Id.
47. The FTC's Division of Advertising Practices, which is responsible for prosecuting all deceptive
advertising cases, currently employs thirty attorneys. Telephone Interview with Vivian Clark, Director of
Attorney Recruitment, Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 14, 1992).
Vol. 10: 147, 1993
Certified Green
1. FTC Guidelines and Safe Harbors
In July 1992, the FTC issued guidelines designed to educate advertisers
about the contours of permissible environmental marketing practices.4" The
guidelines help frame various issues associated with environmental advertising
and identify possible catalysts for prosecutorial action. For example, they
uniformly discourage the use of unqualified environmental claims.49 The
guidelines also recognize the need to distinguish claims related to products from
those related to packaging," and to discourage broad claims of general envi-
ronmental benefit.5
Although the FTC guidelines represent a praiseworthy achievement, serious
shortcomings in their structure and substance will limit their ability to deter
false and misleading environmental advertising practices. For example, one of
the stated goals of the guidelines is to create a "safe harbor" for marketers who
want "certainty about how to make environmental claims."52 What the
guidelines fail to create, however, is certainty for consumers. The guidelines
48. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (1992) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). The guidelines discuss certain commonly occurring environmental marketing terms
including "degradable," "compostable," "recyclable," "recycled content," "source reduction," "refillable,"
and "ozone safe." They also prescribe standards for making comparative statements in environmental
marketing claims. Id. at 36,365-68.
49. For example, the FTC guideline addressing compostability states:
It is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or by implication, that a product or package is compostable.
An unqualified claim that a product or package is compostable should be substantiated by competent
and reliable scientific evidence that all the materials in the product or package will break down into,
or otherwise become part of, usable compost (e.g., soil-conditioning material, mulch) in a safe and
timely manner in an appropriate composting program or facility, or in a home compost pile or device.
Claims of compostability should be qualified to the extent necessary to avoid consumer deception.
An unqualified claim may be deceptive:
(1) If municipal composting facilities are not available to a substantial majority of consumers or
communities where the package is sold;
(2) If the claim misleads consumers about the environmental benefit provided when the product
is disposed of in a landfill; or
(3) If consumers misunderstand the claim to mean that the package can be safely composted in
their home compost pile or device, when in fact it cannot.
Id. at 36,366. Likewise, the discussion of "refillable" discourages the unqualified use of the term:
It is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or by implication, that a package is refillable. An unqualified
refillable claim should not be asserted unless a system is provided for:
(1) The collection and return of the package for refill; or
(2) The later refill of the package by consumers with producr subsequently sold in another
package. A package should not be marketed with an unqualified refillable claim, if it is up to the
consumer to find new ways to refill the package.
Id. at 36,368.
50. Id. at 36,364.
51. "Unqualified general claims of environmental benefit are difficult to interpret, and depending on
their context, may convey a wide range of meaning to consumers." Id. at 36,365.
52. "The guides are composed of general principles and specific guidance on the use of environmental
claims. These ... are followed by examples that generally address a single deception concern .... In many
of the examples, one or more options are presented for qualifying a claim. These options are intended to
provide a 'safe harbor' for marketers who want certainty about how to make environmental claims. They
do not represent the only permissible approaches to qualifying a claim." Id. at 36,364.
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provide safe harbors by presenting examples of how to qualify claims to avoid
prosecution. 3 These safe harbors are far broader than the typical safe harbor
provisions found in the tax code and other federal statutes. 4 Because the
qualifications are open-ended and subject to wide ranges of interpretation, they
do little to solve the FTC's traditional line-drawing problems. Put simply, the
options for qualifying claims can swallow the guidelines.5 Unlike several
stringent state environmental labeling laws and recently proposed federal
legislation,56 the guidelines contain no quantitative requirements or minimum
prerequisites for the use of environmental marketing terms.57 Nor do they
unequivocally require disclosure of certain important facts, such as the
percentage of recycled content in a product. Because of their generality, the
53. id. For a discussion of ways that advertisers could potentially qualify their "recycled content"
claims in a manner that technically comports with the guidelines yet circumvents the FTC's broader goals
of preventing consumer deception, see discussion infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
54. The vague language of the guidelines stands in sharp contrast to the safe harbor provisions of the
federal tax laws and other statutes, which are narrow, precisely defined, and contain rigid minimum
requirements which clearly delineate the boundaries of permissible behavior. For example, sections of the
tax code dealing with business deductions establish rigid requirements for profit-making enterprises, which
are accorded greater tax deductions than are nonprofit entities. Businesses that comply with the following
requirements will not be prosecuted for tax evasion, creating a safe harbor within the confines of the narrow
rule:
If the gross income derived from an activity for 3 or more of the taxable years in the period of 5
consecutive taxable years which ends with the taxable year exceeds the deductions attributable to such
activity ... then ... such activity shall be presumed for purposes of the chapter for such taxable year
to be an activity engaged in for profit.
26 U.S.C. § 183(d) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
55. The guideline pertaining to biodegradability provides an example of a qualification "swallowing"
the guideline. 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,365. The guideline requires unqualified claims of biodegradability to
be substantiated by scientific evidence that the entire product or package will "completely break down" and
decompose into "elements found in nature" within a reasonably short period of time after customary
disposal. Id. An accompanying example implies, however, that if degradability claims are "adequately"
qualified, the product may not be required to break down into "elements found in nature." Id. This essen-
tially means that the product may contain artificial, perhaps even toxic, additives. According to the
guideline, a product advertised as "photodegradable" is sufficiently qualified if it is accompanied by a
substantiated claim that the product "will break down into small pieces if left uncovered in sunlight." Id.
Although the claim may be deemed truthful under the guidelines, it may offer little or no environmental
benefit.
The introductory section of the FTC guidelines contains a general recommendation that advertisers
should not overstate the environmental attributes of their products, 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,365, however, the
provision is so broad that its application is unclear and its deterrent effect is likely to be inadequate.
56. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of "minimum threshold" standards, see infra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
Illustrating the difference between the FTC approach and more stringent alternatives, the guidelines
recommend that recyclability claims should be qualified "to the extent necessary to avoid consumer
confusion about the limited availability of collection facilities and collection sites." For example, where
recycling collection sites and facilities may not be available to a "substantial majority" of consumers or
communities but have been established in a "significant percentage" of communities nationally, recyclability
claims may be adequately "qualified" with the statement: "Check to see if recycling facilities exist in your
area." 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,366. The guidelines should be contrasted to H.R. 3685, proposed in the 102d
session of Congress, that would prevent advertisers from using recycling emblems and making recyclability
claims unless the advertised product had achieved a minimum national recycling rate of thirty-five percent
by the effective date of the guidelines. The proposed law would raise the minimum rate to sixty percent
by the year 2000. H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(a) (July 7, 1992).
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guidelines will do little to reduce the FTC's enforcement burdens."
2. Limitations of Voluntary Measures
The second fundamental weakness of the FTC program is that it is nonbind-
ing.59 Whereas a violation of a legally binding rule would constitute an
automatic violation of Section Five,60 the new guidelines offer no substantial
improvement on case-by-case adjudication. If an advertiser contests an
enforcement action, the FTC must still prove that the practice in question would
deceive the reasonable consumer and thus violate the FTC Act.6' This
significant enforcement burden will cause the agency to continue to prosecute
only the most visible and egregious violators, while those less visible are
unlikely to be deterred.6"
In addition to the need for narrowly drawn and legally binding definitions
for environmental marketing terms, other shortcomings of the current regulatory
structure hamper effective enforcement of the FTC Act. For example, although
58. The guidelines, however, may enable FTC staff attorneys to prove more easily to the Commission
that a deceptive practice has occurred. Prior to prosecution, FTC staff attorneys are required to convince
commissioners that a particular case merits the consumption of the agency's resources. The process of FTC
prosecution begins with an FTC staff attorney undertaking a preliminary investigation of the advertiser's
claims. Following this investigation, the attorney must be granted permission from the Director of the
Bureau of Consumer Protection to negotiate a consent agreement. If permission is obtained, the attorney
conducts a thorough investigation, hiring experts if necessary, which culminates in a 30 to 80-page report
documenting the deceptive or unsubstantiated nature of the advertisement and recommending acceptance
of the consent agreement. If a company refuses to consent, this report recommends the f'lsng of an
administrative complaint. The Bureau of Economics reviews the report and advises the Commission of the
costs and benefits of the proposed consent agreement or complaint. If the consent agreement is authorized
and the targeted company refuses to settle, a majority of commissioners must vote to permit prosecution.
If this vote is obtained, the Commission will issue a complaint and a notice order against the advertiser,
and litigation will follow. Telephone Interview with Ernest Eisenstadt, Office of the General Counsel,
Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 16, 1991).
59. The guidelines state: "Because the guides are not legislative rules under § 18 of the FTC Act, they
are not themselves enforceable regulations, nor do they have the force and effect of law." 57 Fed. Reg.
at 36,364.
60. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 15-16.
61. For a discussion of the litigative efficiency of rules over voluntary guidelines, see infra notes 114-19
and accompanying text.
62. Some commentators have described the history of earlier FTC guidelines in other areas of
commerce, and their recognized inability to deter "bad actors:"
[T]here was considerable dissatisfaction with the guide program as previously implemented by
the Commission [in the 1950s and 1960s]. One of the major criticisms of the program was that
the guides lacked sufficient force to compel the bad actors in the industry to comply with the
standards set forth in the guides. The impact of the guides was further diminished by the
necessity of introducing evidence in any enforcement action to support the conclusions reached
in the guide. Those willing to risk noncompliance were least affected by the guides, hence the
program merely disadvantaged the responsible businesses vis-&-vis their unscrupulous competitors.
As a consequence, guides failed to protect consumers from the worst members of an industry---
those businesses whose sharp practices do the most damage to consumer confidence in efficient
market functioning. Thus compelled to find a more potent industrywide enforcement tool, the
FTC established the legislative rulemaking program of trade regulation rules (footnotes omitted).
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Beth Martin, FTC Rulemaking Through Negotiation, 61 N.C. L. REV. 275, 283-84
(1983).
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the false advertising codes of some states contain citizen suit provisions, 3 the
FTC Act does not give citizens a right to bring actions against advertisers or o
a right to compel the FTC to take enforcement action." Enforcement initiative
and discretion is left entirely to the FTC. This arrangement is problematic,
because the FTC is wary of taking actions that it considers to be in the realm
of environmental policy, and therefore beyond its mandate to prevent consumer
deception.65
The result of inadequate federal regulatory capability is that consumers will
continue to be confused by the growing array of green claims in the market-
place, and thus manufacturers making genuine improvements in their products
will not be able to reap the potential rewards of their efforts. Because the
FTC' s guidelines cannot preempt state and local regulations, states and localities
will continue to enact their own more stringent standards.66 Industry will
confront an expanding constellation of conflicting local and regional require-
ments.
B. Shortcomings of Private Remedies
In theory, certain private alternatives could supplement FrC deterrence of
misleading advertising practices. For example, on limited occasions, private
parties have invoked antitrust statutes to discourage misleading advertising. The
case law suggests, however, that such antitrust suits are rarely successful. 67
63. E.g., KENNETH A. PLEVAN & MIRIAM L. SIROKY, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 344
(1988).
64. Holloway v. Bristol Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that plaintiffs claiming
injury from false advertising by Excedrin had no private cause of action under the FTC Act). According
to Holloway, "the Federal Trade Commission Act creates no private right of action." Id. at 19.
65. See infra notes 141-59 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
67. Although in 1980 the Eighth Circuit found antitrust liability to attach in an advertising case, the
court emphasized the importance of advertising to the competitive process, and grounded its decision on
the fact that the advertiser had undertaken a "full frontal attack" consisting of an intentional and pervasive
campaign designed to eliminate competitors. International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc.,
623 F.2d 1255, 1266-68 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980). Because the antitrust laws
are designed to promote competition, and because advertising is a cornerstone of the competitive process,
the court recommended a conservative posture on antitrust liability for false and misleading advertising:
"[Blecause competition is the object sought to be preserved by the antitrust laws, we must be careful in
drawing a line between fair competition, unfair competition and competition that is so unfair as to rise to
the level of an unreasonable restraint of trade." 623 F.2d at 1267. Before imposing liability, the court
required proof that the competitor would have succeeded "but for" the antitrust violation. Id. at 1272.
In National Assoc. of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Lab., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988),
the Second Circuit examined a putatively false and misleading letter stating that the product of a brand-name
pharmaceuticals manufacturer was therapeutically superior to its competitor's generic drug. Although the
court recognized the competitor's standing to sue under the Sherman Act, it emphasized its hesitancy to
honor antitrust claims against false advertisers: "While '[tlhere is no redeeming virtue in deception....
there is a social cost in litigation over it."' Id. at 916 (citing 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD I. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW § 738(a) (1978)). The court, again quoting from AREEDA & TURNER, further noted that
[blecause the likelihood of a significant impact upon the opportunities of rivals is so small in most
observed instances-and because the prevalence of arguably improper utterance is so great-the courts
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Common law tort actions, such as negligent misrepresentation,68 could poten-
tially provide consumers with a more appropriate vehicle for redressing harms
caused by reliance on misleading advertising claims.69
Proving damages, however, is a significant obstacle to recovery in actions
for negligent misrepresentation. Courts are particularly reluctant to compensate
for minor damages in tort.7 ° In most cases, damages from misleading advertis-
ing are nonphysical and minor. Individual buyers of products promoted for their
environmental attributes would have little incentive to shoulder the expense of
litigation unless they had suffered physical injuries or extensive property
damage from use of the products. Even if such damage were to occur, problems
in proving reliance and causation would likely be insurmountable for plain-
tiffs.7'
In negligent misrepresentation cases that result in economic loss,72 the
plaintiff's burden is significantly higher than in cases of physical injury. The
defendant must have a pecuniary interest in the transaction, and the plaintiff
would be wise to regard misrepresentations as presumptively de minimis for § 2 purposes."' 850 F.2d at
916 (citing AREEDA AND TURNER at § 738(a)). Thus, antitrust actions are likely to be an ineffective means
of ensuring truth in environmental advertising.
On some occasions, private companies have invoked Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a), to seek injunctions against competitors that allegedly benefit from the use of misleading advertising.
E.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., v. New York Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Lanham
Act provides certain advantages over the antitrust statutes in that plaintiffs may obtain injunctions against
competitors without proving that the alleged misrepresentations actually diverted sales from their own
products. Johnson & Johnson v. Carter Wallace, 631 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1980). The case law indicates
that plaintiffs must offer something more than a "mere subjective belief' that they are likely to be injured
by the misleading advertising. Coca-Cola Company v. Tropicana Products, 690 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir.
1982). Proof of unfair advertising practices usually requires consumer survey data documenting the
misleading effect of the representations on potential buyers. id. at 317.
68. For an account of the evolution of the tort of negligent misrepresentation, see Hale v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 121 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Ct. App. 1975).
69. An action for intentional misrepresentation, or deceit, is also available, but the scienter requirement
poses an additional burden on plaintiffs. For a discussion of the scienter element in the action for deceit,
see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (5th ed. 1984).
70. Id. § 30.
71. Recovery under breach of warranty or strict liability misrepresentation theories is possible but
equally unlikely. Damages are likely to be found de minimis, as in negligent misrepresentation suits. Strict
liability misrepresentation actions would be more appropriate for physical injury cases. See id. at § 107.
72. Section 552 of the Second Restatement of Torts outlines the elements of negligent misrepresentation
which causes economic loss:
§ 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
theirjustifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (I) is limited to the
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he
intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or
knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1976).
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must prove the defendant's objective to induce reliance."3 While the plaintiff
in a physical injury case is merely required to show that reliance upon the
misrepresentation was foreseeable,74 the plaintiff in an economic loss case
must prove her membership in the limited class of persons for whose benefit
the representation was supplied.75 In both instances, proving causation is
difficult; the injured party must prove that reliance on the advertisement caused
the damage.76 This is burdensome because the consumer may have bought the
product for a variety of reasons independent of the alleged misrepresentation.
Because most consumer claims against environmental advertisers would
involve only minor damages, effective recourse under the common law depends
largely on the availability of a class action remedy. Some state courts have
supported mechanisms for facilitating consumer class actions.77 These mech-.
anisms include class funds for compensating plaintiffs and fluid recovery, a
remedial process that involves a lower standard of proof for individual damag-
es. 78 Despite state efforts, claims procedures generally remain ill-suited to
consumer cases in which class size is frequently extensive and damages per
member are relatively small.79 The result is that consumer class actions are
characterized by low claims rates."0 The burden of proving reliance is an
additional deterrent to class actions for damages resulting from false or
73. Id.
74. Section 311 of the Restatement delineates this requirement:
§ 311. Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical
harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where
such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 311 (1976).
75. Id. § 552.
76. KEETON ET AL., supra note 69, § 108.
77. E.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 484 P.2d 964, 968 (1971) ("'Modem society seems increasingly
to expose men to ... group injuries for which individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress,
either because they do not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each
is left to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and fragmentary
enforcement, if there is any at all."') (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., and Maurice Rosenfeld, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941)).
78. In California v. Levi Strauss & Co., the court described the fluid recovery process:
The implementation of fluid recovery involves three steps . . . . First, the defendant's total
damage liability is paid over to a class fund. Second, individual class members are afforded an
opportunity to collect their individual shares by proving their particular damages, usually
according to a lowered standard of proof. Third, any residue remaining after individual claims
have been paid is distributed by one of several practical procedures that have been developed by
the courts.
715 P.2d 564, 571 (1986).
79. See Gall Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and
Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 1988 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 749 (1988).
80. For example, in Levi Strauss & Co., the class consisted of nearly seven million households with




The federal courts are largely unsympathetic to consumer class actions. In
Snyder v. Harris,"' the Supreme Court restricted the aggregation of small
damage claims to reduce federal caseloads.82 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
established that class members identifiable through reasonable effort must
receive personal notification, and also required plaintiffs to bear the costs of
such notification.8 3 The amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity cases
serves as an addition deterrent to consumer plaintiffs."
In sum, suits by individuals based on common law claims are unlikely to
constrain deceptive environmental advertising because courts are likely to
determine that damages are de minimis. In the absence of an environmental
marketing statute authorizing citizen suits and statutory damages, class actions
against environmental advertisers will be thwarted by difficulties in aggregating
claims, notifying parties, and proving reliance. The FrC's permissive regulatory
scheme, the patchwork nature of state laws, and the formidable barriers to
private actions underscore the need for a cohesive and rigorous regulatory
structure for environmental marketing.
II. Measures to Ensure Responsible Environmental Marketing
The examples in Part I suggest that the current legal and regulatory system
is ill suited to prevent manufacturers from confusing consumers with misleading
environmental terms. Inadequately protected by voluntary guidelines and the
private litigation process, consumers need better mechanisms for policing
environmental marketing and monitoring the enforcement of laws prohibiting
deceptive advertising. To accomplish this goal, Congress should enact a new
statute authorizing EPA to develop rigorous and legally binding standards
defining and specifying the use of environmental marketing terms. Because this
program would be prescriptive and include sanctions for noncompliance, I will
refer to it as the "stick" approach. The second approach to enhancing the
accuracy of consumer information about products in the marketplace is the
"carrot" approach, which rewards manufacturers, by way of a certification, for
81. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). In Holloway v. Bristol-Myers, 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), the D.C.
District Court refused to allow consumer plaintiffs to aggregate their claims to meet the 1969 federal
jurisdictional requirement of $10,000: "This Court does not have jurisdiction of an action for damages as
claimed here where the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000 ... and jurisdiction may not be
obtained by aggregating the claims of all other persons of the class whom plaintiff Holloway would
represent." Id. at 22.
82. The Court allowed for aggregation "only (1) in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to aggregate
two or more of his own claims against a single defendant and (2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs
unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest." Snyder, 394
U.S. at 335.
83. 17 U.S. 156, 173-79 (1974).
84. The 1988 amendments to the federal diversity statute increased the federal jurisdictional amount-in--
controversy requirement to $50,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1990).
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designing products and packaging that are relatively environmentally benign.
This approach will be discussed in Parts III, IV and V.
A. Contemporary Approaches to Environmental Advertising Regulation
Several states, including California, New York, Rhode Island, New Hamp-
shire, and Maine, have enacted legally binding environmental advertising
standards;85 other states currently are considering such measures.8" Cali-
fornia's legislation requires products advertised as "ozone friendly," "biode-
gradable," "photodegradable," "recyclable," and "recycled" to satisfy statutory
definitions of these terms.87 Rhode Island, New York, Connecticut, Wisconsin,
and New Hampshire also define various terms, including "recycled,"
"recyclable," and "reusable," and regulate the use of recycling emblems. 8
Despite these commendable measures, the aforementioned consequence of
the state by state approach is that it puts in place a patchwork of inconsistent
standards that ultimately may thwart the attempts of advertisers to comply. As
an example of interstate regulatory disparities, California, New York, and
Rhode Island each define "recycled" differently. California requires all "recy-
cled" products to contain a threshold percentage of post-consumer material.8 9
New York's legislation defines "recycled" on a product-by-product basis,
establishing separate thresholds for twenty-three different product categories.9"
Rhode Island's regulations do not specify a threshold percentage of recycled
content, but simply require disclosure of relative amounts of pre-consumer and
post-consumer material. 9
Recognizing the problems that could result from an expanding kaleidoscope
of state standards, an array of groups have voiced support for nationwide
definitions of environmental advertising terms. A task force of ten State
85. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17580 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2141
(West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-N (1989); N.Y. CoMp. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 368 (1990);
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION, RHODE ISLAND DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,
RECYCLING EMBLEM REGULATIONS (1990) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND RECYCLING REGULATIONS]. For
a compilation of governmental and private actions pertaining to environmental marketing regulation, see
EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 72-79, tbl. 5.1. For a general discussion of
state enforcement activity, see Joann S. Lublin, 'Green' Marketing Gets Tougher as States Crack Down
on Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1990, at BI I.
86. Massachusetts, Illinois, Iowa, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have introduced environmental marketing
bills. EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 74-77.
87. According to California's law, a product labeled "recycled" must contain "at least, ten percent, by
weight, post-consumer material .... CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West 1992).
88. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149-N (1989); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368 (1990); Office
of Environmental Coordination, RHODE ISLAND RECYCLING REGULATIONS, supra note 85 § 3 (1990); EPA
DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 72-79.
89. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e) (West 1992).
90. For example, New York's law requires paper towels to contain 80% secondary material, including
40% post-consumer material, by 1994. Glass products are required to contain 50% secondary material,
including 35% post-consumer material. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.4 (1990).
91. RHODE ISLAND RECYCLING REGULATIONS, supra note 85, § 5 (1990).
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Attorneys General endorsed a resolution urging the development of uniform
national standards for environmental marketing claims.92 The Coalition of
Northeastern Governors and the Northeastern Recycling Council developed
model regulations to be adopted by individual states.93 Industry groups have
also supported national uniformity, but several have urged voluntary rather than
binding measures. For example, in 1990, the National Food Processors Associa-
tion and a coalition of eleven trade associations filed a petition requesting that
the FTC adopt a voluntary program.94
The FTC guidelines do not resolve the problem of the growing diversity
of standards. Because they are nonbinding, they cannot preempt state or local
statutes or regulations:
Because the guides are not legislative rules under Section 18 of the FTC
Act, they are not themselves enforceable regulations, nor do they have
the force and effect of the law. The guides themselves do not preempt
regulation of other federal agencies or of state and local bodies govern-
ing the use of environmental marketing claims. 95
Although some states may embrace certain elements of the guidelines, most
of the state regulations enacted to date are far more stringent than the FTC
standards. Those states choosing to employ labeling requirements as a means
of providing incentives for manufacturers to improve their products are unlikely
to follow the more lenient FTC approach.
The first federal proposal for a national, rigorous, and legally binding struc-
ture for environmental marketing was the Environmental Marketing Claims Act
of 1990, first introduced as S. 3218 by Senators Lautenberg of New Jersey and
Lieberman of Connecticut96 and reintroduced as S. 615 in 1991. 9' The bill
would have withdrawn the FTC's authority to define environmental marketing
terms and would have instead authorized EPA, with advice from an independent
advisory board, to define and govern the use of the most commonly occurring
terms, such as "recyclable," "recycled content," "degradable," "compostable,"
"ozone neutral," "source reduced," "refillable," "reusable," and "nontoxic." 91
92. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter GREEN
REPORT I].
93. NORTHEAST RECYCLING COUNCIL, REGIONAL LABELING STANDARDS (1990). The Northeast
Recycling Council is represented by officials from Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
94. NATIONAL FOOD PROCESSORS ASSOCIATION, PETITION FOR INDUSTRY GUIDES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT (Feb. 14, 1991).
95. Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363, 36,364 (1992).
96. S. 3218, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
97. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
98. Id. § (6)(b)(7).
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The proposed statute would have established minimum threshold requirements
for several of these terms.99 Manufacturers'using regulated terms would have
been required to certify that their claims comported with the Act."° Violators
of the law would have been liable for civil penalties, 1 1 with criminal penal-
ties for knowing or willful violations. 102 Representative Sikorski of Minnesota
introduced companion legislation in the House.0 3 Later in 1991, Representa-
tive Swift of Washington introduced H.R. 3865, which also called for EPA
regulatory authority, but provided for enforcement by the FTC.1c °  A
subsequent version of H.R. 3865, introduced in July 1992, contained rigorous
minimum threshold definitions similar to S. 615.1°5 Like the Swift Bill, a
recent Senate bill, S. 976, would have assigned regulatory authority to EPA
with enforcement assistance by the FTC. 1°
B. The Importance of Specificity
Any future environmental marketing legislation or regulations should pro-
vide definitions that are as specific as possible, directing advertisers to make
precise claims about the ingredients or environmental effects of their products.
Vague standards are inadequate for creating meaningful distinctions among
product labels. The proposed Environmental Marketing Claims Act would have
directed EPA to verify that each environmental marketing claim is related to
a "specific" environmental impact to ensure that it is not false, misleading or
deceptive, and that it has been scientifically substantiated.0 7
To make requirements for increased specificity more effective, policymakers
may need to devise ways to prevent manufacturers from using modified termi-
nology to circumvent federally defined terms. The task force of State Attorneys
General has recommended that any statute that defines words include within
its scope "any variation or synonym of any of those words."' 08 Another ap-
proach was adopted in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990,09
which authorizes the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to establish new
99. Id.
100. Id. § 7(a).
101. Failure to comply with the regulations or a related administrative order, or the use of a mark
without certification or for which certification was denied would result in civil penalties of up to $25,000
per day. Id. §§ 8, 9(a)(1).
102. Id. § 9(b).
103. H.R. 1408, 102d Cong., lst Sess. (1991).
104. H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(a) (1991).
105. H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(a) (1992).
106. S. 976, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 307(b) (1991). The bill was introduced by Senator Baucus.
107. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(2) (1991).
108. Letter from the Task Force of State Attorneys General to Senator Lautenberg (June 29, 1990)
(commenting on draft legislation regulating environmental marketing claims), in GREEN REPORT 1, supra
note 92, app. H.
109. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West Supp. 1992)).
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nutrition labeling regulations, develop minimum standards for health related
claims, and define "descriptors" such as "free," "low," "lite," and "reduced."
The new food labeling law prohibits the use of descriptors that have not been
defined by the FDA and bars any health claims unless pre-approved by the
agency."' The law further provides that the FDA's regulations may cover
"similar terms which are commonly understood to have the same meaning." "'
Any person may petition the FDA for permission to use synonymous terms," 2
which the agency may incorporate into its final regulations upon determining
that they are not misleading." 3
C. The Need for Legally Binding Regulations
Federal environmental marketing standards embodied in legally binding
regulations are superior to voluntary guidelines in several fundamental respects.
First, they are more easily enforced. As noted above, a violation of a legally
binding rule governing environmental advertising would constitute a violation
of the statute under which the rule had been promulgated, either the FTC Act
or some new environmental marketing legislation. Voluntary guidelines,
however, serve merely to inform advertisers of the agency's potential statutory
interpretation. Because a violation of an FTC guideline is not a de facto viola-
tion of the FTC Act, the enforcement agency must prove that the advertising
alleged to have violated the guideline would have deceived the reasonable con-
sumer." 4 In other words, a guideline leaves the agency with the burden of
proving in every contested case that a violation of the guideline is a violation
of the law." 5 This slows enforcement considerably and gives companies an
110. 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(r)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992); see also Malcolm Gladwell, Uniform Food
Labels Proposed: FDA Wants to End Confision over Nutrition, WASH. POST, July 13, 1990, at Al, A8.
111. Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 3(b)(1)(A)(ix), 104 Stat. 2353, 2361 (1990).
112. 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(r)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1992).
113. Section (6)(a), 104 Stat. at 2362-3. Senator Lautenberg's original environmental labeling bill,
S. 615, similarly would have allowed states to petition the EPA to initiate rulemaking proceedings for
additional labeling terms and other regulations. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (c)(4)(A) (1991).
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
115. KA wrr, supra note 26, § 6.01. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged the enforcement efficiency of
binding rules over guidelines in reaffirming the FTC's rulemaking authority in the context of octane posting
standards in 1972:
With the issues in Section 5 proceedings reduced by the existence of a rule delineating what is
a violation of the statute or what presumptions the Commission proposes to rely upon, proceedings
will be speeded up. For example, in an adjudication proceeding based on a violation of the octane
rating rule at issue here, the central question to be decided will be whether or not pumps owned
by a given refiner are properly marked. Without the rule, the Commission might well be obliged
to prove and argue that the absence of the rating markers in each particular case was likely to
have injurious and unfair effects on consumers or competition. Since this laborious process might
well have to be repeated every time the Commission chose to proceed subsequently against
another defendant on the same ground, the difference in administrative efficiency between the
two kinds of proceedings is obvious.
National Petroleum Refiners v. Federal Trade Comm'n. 482 F.2d 672, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For additional discussions of the efficiency of binding rules, see National Labor Relations Bd. v.
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incentive to delay compliance by intentionally drawing out litigation." 6 Under
its system of voluntary guidelines, the notoriously understaffed FTC will
continue to prosecute only blatant violations by the most visible firms.
Furthermore, because binding regulations are subject to extensive procedural
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 17
courts generally defer to agency discretion on substantive questions."' Vol-
untary guidelines carry less authority in court." 9
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 779 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that failure to make full
use of rule-making power is attributable at least in part "to administrative inertia and reluctance to take a
clear stand") (quoting Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, HARV. L. REv. 921,972 (1965)); American Cyanamid Co. v. Food and Drug Admin.,
606 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (arguing that presence of numerous factual issues impedes the exercise of
summary judgment proceedings in the absence of a rule). See generally Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative
Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L. J. 919 (1948) (outlining ways in which rules,
better than guidelines, provide for efficient litigation).
116. In National Petroleum Refiners, the D.C. Circuit outlined the possibility for intentionil delay in
the absence of binding rules:
[Wlhen delay in agency proceedings is minimized by using rules, those violating the statutory
standard lose an opportunity to tum litigation into a profitable and lengthy game of postponing
the effect of the rule on the current practice. As a result, substantive rules will protect the
companies which willingly comply with the law against what amounts to the unfair competition
of those who would profit from delayed enforcement as to them. This, too, will minimize useless
litigation and is likely to assist the Commission in more effectively allocating its resources ...
* [Riecognition and use of rule-making by the Commission is linked to the goals of agency
expedition, efficiency, and certainty of regulatory standards that loomed in the background of the
1914 passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
482 F.2d at 691 (upholding the FTC's rulemaking ability for issuing octane posting requirements).
117. Section 553 of the APA states, in relevant part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless
persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice
thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include--
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rulemaking proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportuni-
ty to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with
or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented,
the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication of service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30
days before its effective date ....
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
118. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron
stands for the proposition that courts should uphold agency rules unless they are enacted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, or represent an abuse of agency discretion: "Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the [underlying] statute."
Id. at 844.
119. Courts generally give guidelines, or interpretive rules, some deference. See, e.g., Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (stating that interpretive rules constitute "a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance"). Nonbinding agency
pronouncements, however, are given considerably less deference than substantive or legislative rules. E.g.,
Frank Diehl Farms v. Secretary of Labor, 696 F.2d 1325, 1329 (11 th Cir. 1983); Shell Oil Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 491 F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Beyond the efficiency rationale, binding regulations would provide
advertisers with greater notice of potential FTC action. Because courts do not
consider voluntary guidelines to be final agency actions, judicial review is
unavailable until the agency brings an enforcement action. Unlike guidelines,
binding rules are considered ripe for review upon promulgation. 2° Providing
advertisers with superior notice would help prevent misleading practices, and
thus reduce the transaction costs of redressing wrongs.'
Industry representatives and others supporting voluntary guidelines have
argued that guidelines are faster and easier to implement than regulations, and
thus will help environmental standards keep pace with scientific understanding
and technological change.'22 In practice, however, this claimed advantage is
illusory. Agencies generally subject proposed guidelines to comment procedures
similar to those required for regulations. Moreover, agencies can promulgate
regulations quickly when they are committed to doing so.'23 Congress can
assist by drafting legislation to prevent delays in the rulemaking process. For
example, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990'" contains a
hammer clause specifying that if the FDA has not issued final regulations
within two years after the enactment of the statute, the agency's initial proposed
regulations will automatically become final.'25 This kind of provision can
expedite administrative procedures and dissolve stalemates that may arise
among interest groups. Congress can also place time limits on deliberations
surrounding the enactment of amendments, allowing agencies to adapt binding
120. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (outlining the legal test for ripeness).
121. For a discussion of the greater notice offered by rules, see National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (rulemaking, unlike adjudication, "gives
notice to an entire segment of society of those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming ... [and] an
opportunity for persons affected to be heard"). For a scholarly discussion of the advantages of rules
regarding notice, see David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921, 941-42,947-58 (1965) ("[Tlhere are times when all concerned
may suffer from an agency's decision, whether conscious or made from force of habit, to rely on means
other than rulemaking for the development of policy. An informal statement, not subject to judicial review,
may leave only uncertainty in its wake .... "). Another difference between rules and guidelines in terms
of notice is that courts generally prevent agencies from diverging substantially from their established
regulatory programs. See, e.g, Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370
(1932).
122. See, e.g., Letter from Glenn Gamber, Director of Program Management, National Food Processors
Association, to Michael Dershowitz, Attorney, Division of Advertising Practices, Federal Trade Commission
(July 12, 1991).
123. For example, a former Chief Counsel to the FDA estimated that a final rule could be promulgated
in six months. Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt 11, former Chief Counsel, Food and Drug
Administration (Aug. 19, 1991).
124. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A.) § 343 (West Supp. 1992).
125. The Act states in pertinent part:
If the Secretary does not promulgate final regulations under paragraph (1)(B) upon the
expiration of 24 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the proposed regulations issued
in accordance with paragraph (1)(A) shall be considered as the final regulations upon the
expiration of such 24 months. There shall be promptly published in the Federal Register notice
of the new status of the proposed regulations.
Id. § 3(b)(2).
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standards quickly to changed circumstances.
The ultimate advantage of mandatory rules is that they will maximize indus-
try compliance. Misleading statements by even a small number of advertisers
can generate substantial confusion among consumers, thereby depriving them
of opportunities to reward those manufacturers that market environmentally
superior products. If the marketplace were dominated by a few large firms,
voluntary guidelines could conceivably promote adequate self-regulation.' 26
A wide array of firms, however, are currently making green claims on product
labels, thus reducing the likelihood of universal compliance.'27 The reduced
transaction costs of enforcement under a binding rule would allow for more
frequent prosecution and broader deterrence of noncompliant firms.
The FTC's environmental marketing guidelines differ from most other
voluntary FTC programs in a key respect. Almost all of the agency's other
nonbinding guidelines have applied to single industries. 2 Voluntary
guidelines may be effective for single industries because conscientious trade
associations, or natural competitive pressures, can encourage vigilance by rival
firms. The recent environmental marketing guidelines, by contrast, apply 'to
several industries. Although five other FTC guideline programs apply to
multiple industries,'29 these programs are narrow in scope, pertaining either
126. Because federal prosecutors tend to pursue the most visible cases, see RICHARDS, supra note 22,
at 31, companies with smaller geographical reach or less pervasive advertising campaigns are rarely targets
of federal enforcement actions, and therefore have few incentives to comply with warning guidelines. It
is often easier for large firms to cooperate with governmental strictures because they can realize economies
of scale with respect to the direct costs of compliance. As one commentator has noted:
One corollary of the proposition concerning costs of compliance is that usually larger firms
will have a higher level of compliance since they can realize the economies of scale that typically
exist with respect to the direct costs of compliance. Compliance typically involves some invest-
ment--for example, in legal resources for redrafting a standard form contract--and as the number
of transactions affected by this investment increase, the cost per transaction will be less.
Consistent with this reasoning is the common experience of administrators of consumer protection
legislation that small firms have the highest levels of non-compliance.
William C. Whitford, Structuring Consumer Protection Legislation to Maximize Effectiveness, 1981 Wis.
L. REV. 1018, 1025 (1981).
127. See EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 42, tbl. 3.5. See also Maykuth,
supra note 4, at A2.
128. Twenty-nine of the FTC's 36 existing guidelines apply to single industries. See, e.g., Tire Adver-
tising and Labeling Guides, 16 C.F.R. § 228 (1992); Guides for Advertising Fallout Shelters, 16 C.F.R. §
229 (1992); Guides for Advertising Shell Homes, 16 C.F.R. § 230 (1992); Guides for Shoe Content Labeling
and Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 231 (1992); Guide for Avoiding Deceptive Use of the Word "Mill" in the
Textile Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 236 (1992); Guides for the Dog and Cat Food Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 241
(1992); Guides for the Decorative Wall Paneling ndustry, 16 C.F.R. § 243 (1992); Guides for the Watch
Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 245 (1992); Guides for the Ladies' Handbag Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 247 (1992); Guides
for the Beauty and Barber Equipment and Supplies Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 248 (1992); Guides for the
Household Furniture Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 250 (1992); Guides for the Labeling, Advertising, and Sale of
Wigs and Other Hairpieces, 16 C.F.R. § 252 (1992); Guides for the Feather and Down Products Industry,
16 C.F.R. § 253 (1992).
129. Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, 16 C.F.R. § 233 (1992); Guides Against Bait Advertising, 16
C.F.R. § 238 (1992); Guides for the Advertising of Warranties and Guarantees, 16 C.F.R. § 239 (1992);
Guide Concerning Use of the Word "Free" and Similar Representations, 16 C.F.R. § 251 (1992); Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1992). '
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to a single activity3° or to blatantly fraudulent practices. For example, the
FTC guidelines pertaining to product endorsements are limited to clearly unethi-
cal practices, such as claims of expert endorsement in the absence of expert
evaluation.' One could infer from the narrowness of these multiple industry
guidelines that the FTC's voluntary approach is ill-suited to address the broad
subject matter and numerous linguistic subtleties of green marketing.
History indicates that legally binding rules are preferable to guidelines as
a means of requiring companies to make affirmative disclosures. The FTC has
issued several binding regulations requiring disclosures in the past, often under
the direction of Congress. Most of this regulatory activity occurred during the
1960s, prior to the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, which formalized and restricted the FTC's rule-
making power.'32 The FTC promulgated binding rules requiring fiberglass
manufacturers to warn of potential skin irritations, 33 quick-freeze aerosol
spray manufacturers to disclose the dangers of inhalation,"3 and sellers of
apparel to furnish instructions for care.'35 Under the statutory instruction of
Congress, the FTC issued binding regulations requiring gasoline sellers to
indicate octane ratings on gasoline pumps,136 textile vendors to provide
130. For example, the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing are limited to a specific type of fraudulent
bargain in which normal retail prices are misrepresented. 16 C.F.R. § 233 (1992). The Guides Against
Bait Advertising are directed to a single practice, "bait and switch," whereby a seller promises a customer
one type of good and delivers another. 16 C.F.R. § 238 (1992).
131. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1992). The endorsement guidelines also admonish against other blatantly
unethical practices such as certifying products in the absence of certification expertise, and endorsing
products in the absence of familiarity with the allegedly endorsed items. Id. For a discussion of the
endorsement guidelines in the context of third-party certification, see infra notes 270-86 and accompanying
text.
132. For a discussion of the formalization of the F-TC's rulemaking process, see infra notes 169-171
and accompanying text.
133. 16 C.F.R. § 13.6 (1992).
134. Id. § 417.6.
135. Id. § 423.1.
136. Octane Posting and Certification, 16 C.F.R. § 306.11 (1992). The extraordinary detail of the
octane posting requirements illustrates the power that the FTC has to issue more comprehensive disclosure
rules, pursuant to congressional prodding. These disclosure rules provide a stark contrast to the FTC's recent
environmental labeling guidelines. Under the octane posting regulations, all octane labels must meet the
following rigid specifications:
(a) Layout. The label is 3" wide x 2 1/2" long. The illustrations appearing at the end of
this rule are prototype labels that demonstrate the proper layout. Helvetica type is used throughout
except for the octane rating number which is in Franklin Gothic type. Spacing of the label is 1/4"
between the top border and the first line of text, 1/8" between the first and second line of text,
1/4" between the octane rating and the line of text above it. All text and numerals are centered
within the interior borders.
(b) Type size and setting. The Helvetica series is used for all numbers and letters with the
exception of the octane rating number. Helvetica is available in a variety of phototype setting
systems and by linotype. The line "MINIMUM OCTANE RATING" is set in 12 point Helvetica
Bold, all capitals, with letterspace set at 10 1/2 points. The line "(R+M)/2 METHOD" is set in
10 point Helvetica Bold, all capitals, with letterspace set at 10 1/2 points. The octane number
is set in 96 point Franklin Gothic condensed with 1/8" space between the numbers.
(c) Colors. The basic color on all labels is process yellow. All type is process black. All
borders are process black. Both colors must be non-fade.
The Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 10: 147, 1993
information on product labels, 137 and appliance marketers to disclose energy
efficiency data. 38 The FTC adopted a legally binding program for cigarette
labeling in 1964 after a voluntary program, initiated in 1955, proved
ineffective. 139 In fact, because of the lack of conclusive legal effect of volun-
tary measures in adjudicative hearings, the FTC declared many of its nonbind-
ing guidelines obsolete in the 1970s. "
D. A Call for EPA Regulatory Authority
Implementing effective environmental advertising policy is extremely
challenging because it requires an intricate weaving of environmental policy
and consumer protection principles. The convergence of these two policy areas
presents the FTC with a significant regulatory dilemma. The fundamental
problem for the FTC is that it may be impossible to prevent deceptive
environmental advertising in a meaningful way without concurrently promoting
environmental policy goals. Only the former goal is within the agency's
perceived mandate. The Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection
has articulated the agency's position on the scope of its authority:
(d) Contents. The contents are shown in the illustration. The proper octane rating for each
gasoline must be shown. No marks or information other than that called for by this rule may
appear on the label.
16 C.F.R. § 306.11 (1992).
137. E.g., Rules and Regulations Under the Wool Products And Labeling Act of 1939, 16 C.F.R. §
300 (1992); Rules and Regulations Under the Fur Products Labeling Act, 16 C.F.R § 301 (1991); Rules
and Regulations Under the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 16 C.F.R § 303 (1992).
138. Rules for Using Energy Costs and Consumption Information Used in Labeling and Advertising
for Consumer Appliances Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 16 C.F.R. § 305 (1992).
139. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking, 16 C.F.R. § 408 (1991). See also 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964) (statement of basis and purpose
of trade regulation rule).
140. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 12,171 (1977); 43 Fed. Reg. 44,483 (1978). The author of one of the
leading FTC regulatory manuals has commented on the shortcomings of the Commission's nonbinding trade
practice rules and guides when compared to binding trade regulation rules:
In 1919 the FTC began the practice of encouraging "trade practice submittals," which were
an attempt to eliminate by common consent of those engaged in a given industry, practices which
are unfair in the opinion of the industry as a whole [citation omitted]. in 1955, the agency began
to issue industry "guides," for the same purposes, that is, as advisory statements intended to
promote voluntary compliance within a particular industry or with respect to common practices.
It was not until 1962 that the commission abandoned the case-by-case approach and began to
contemplate issuing trade regulation rules with the force of substantive law to regulate practices
throughout an industry ....
[Unlike legally binding rules, the nonbinding] trade practice rules had no conclusive legal
effect in adjudicative hearings; the FTC had to allege that the respondent violated § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) or another statute administered by the agency,
since a violation of the trade practice conference was not in and of itself illegal. Because of this,
and with its increasing reliance on trade regulation rules which do have the force of substantive
law, the FTC declared them obsolete. Many such [voluntary] rules were eliminated in 1976 and
1977 [citations omitted] and the commission officially rescinded 34 in the fall of 1978.
KANWiT, supra note 26, § 6.01.
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In reviewing all types of green claims, we are interested in what those
terms mean to consumers. These issues, however, also implicate
environmental policy concerns, and may not be appropriately resolved
solely by reference to FTC deception principles....
.. There may be legitimate environmental policy reasons to favor one
approach over another, but the Commission is expert in identifying and
preventing deception, not in establishing environmental policy for solid
waste disposal .....
.. That is not to say that legislators, or agencies responsible for setting
environmental policy, can not [sic] legitimately establish standards that
will force manufacturers to change the products in one way or another,
but I am saying that I am not convinced that the FTC should have that
function--or that the staff and the Commission have all the expertise
needed for that function.'
41
The debate over minimum threshold requirements illustrates the FTC's
reluctance to become involved in environmental policy issues. 42 The primary
issue is whether new standards for environmental advertising should incorporate
minimum requirements to encourage improvements in manufacturing behavior,
or whether they should simply require disclosure of existing percentages of
component materials or other information. As an example, recycled content
regulation can take various forms. Several state laws and proposed federal stan-
dards require a threshold level of recycled content to be met before a related
advertising claim can be made. 43 Some state regulations require minimum
threshold amounts of post-consumer material, to ensure that the recycled content
is not simply waste swept from the shop floor,'" or even waste traded among
manufacturers, 45 but rather material collected from a consumer recycling
141. Barry J. Cutler, Remarks Before the Soap and Detergent Association's 64th Annual Meeting and
Industry Convention 3-7 (Feb. 1, 1991).
142. It is important to distinguish between minimum threshold and minimum content requirements,
because the terms are often inappropriately interchanged. "Minimum threshold" is the appropriate term
to use in the advertising context. A minimum threshold provision requires a product to meet a designated
threshold, i.e. of recycled materials, only if a manufacturer chooses to make an advertising claim relating
to its content. Minimum content requirements, by contrast, are command-and-control type regulations
requiring manufacturers to use specified amounts of recycled or other materials in their products.
143. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e) (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs.
tit. 6, § 368.4(a) (1990).
144. Shop waste or industrial scrap is routinely reused in the production process and therefore should
not be factored into any recycled content claims. Industrial scrap refers to clean, uncontaminated by-pro-
ducts of a given process that can be, and regularly are, looped directly back into on-site manufacturing
processes with minimal processing. In the paper industry, this is also known as "mill broke" or "waste
paper." See, e.g., EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28 at 98.
145. Some postcommercial industrial waste that would otherwise have been discarded is instead transp-
orted from one manufacturer or facility for reuse by another. Because the manufacturer has made an
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program.' 46 New and proposed laws also have established minimum threshold
recycling rates for products advertised as recyclable,'47 minimum durability
requirements for allegedly reusable and refillable products, 4 and minimum
percentage waste reduction requirements for comparative claims.' 49 An FTC
Commissioner described the problem that minimum threshold requirements
present for FTC enforcement:
Writing guidelines to define "recycled" or "recyclable" might require
the Commission to travel far beyond its traditional territory. The Com-
mission usually judges whether a claim is deceptive by examining what
consumers think the claim means. But some states have proposed
minimum content standards for a "recycled" product claim. If the
Commission followed that approach in advertising guidelines, we would
no longer be deciding what the use of the term "recycled" means to
consumers, but what "recycled" should mean. 50
Arguably, the FTC has overstated the degree to which more stringent stan-
dards would exceed its mandate. FTC deceptive advertising doctrines focus
investment in recycling the material, postcommercial material is often recognized in some manner in recycled
content standards.
146. In California, products advertised as recycled must contain "at least ten percent by weight post-
consumer material." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5(e) (West Supp. 1992). New York's recycled
content standards also specify miimum percentages of pre- and post-consumer materials. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.4(a) (1990). The Northeast Recycling Council, the Environmental Defense
Fund, and the Paper Recycling Coalition have supported standards that would distinguish between pre- and
post-consumer material. EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 107.
147. For example, S. 615, a proposed federal bill, would have prohibited the use of the terms "recycla-
ble" and "compostable" unless the manufacturer had proven that at least 25% of the product would be recy-
cled or composted. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b)(7)(B),(D) (1991). New York's environmental
marketing regulations require that, prior to making recyclability claims, recycling infrastructure for the
material category must be available to 75% of the state's population, or a recycling rate of 50% must be
achieved on a statewide basis within a material category. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.2
(1990).
148. For example, S. 615 stated: "An environmental marketing claim relating to the reusable or
refillable nature of a product or package shall be used only in connection with a product or package that
is reused for the original purpose of the product or package, an average of 5 times or more." S. 615, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § (6)(b)(7)(C); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 6, § 368.4 (1990); OFFICE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATION, RHODE ISLAND DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, RECYCLING
EMBLEM REGULATIONS § 5(a) (1990); Regional Labeling Standards (Northeast Recycling Council) (1990),
cited in EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 118.
149. Comparative claims may compare similar products of different producers or new products to earlier
products of the same producer. A proposed Massachusetts law requires that the term "reduced packaging"
be defined as "packaging verified to have been reduced by 25% or more compared to the same product
five years earlier." The packager must reduce an additional 25% or more within five years to remain in
compliance. Massachusetts Packaging Reduction and Recycling Act of 1991, H.B. 2275, noted in EPA
DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 74, 93.
150. Mary L. Azcuenaga, Deceptive Environmental Claims: How Should the Federal Trade Commission
Clean Up Advertising Pollution?, Address Before the Cosmetic, Toiletry, and Fragrance Association 15
(Nov. 15, 1990).
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upon consumer perceptions of the meaning of manufacturers' claims. 5 ' Stud-
ies indicate that when consumers choose to buy recycled products, many do
so believing that they are helping to mitigate the solid waste problem.'52 It
follows that consumers expect a substantial percentage of any product or
package bearing a recycled content label to be made from recycled materi-
al.153 Although minimum threshold regulations would promote environmental
interests, they would also prevent deception by fulfilling justifiable consumer
expectations. '-
Nonetheless, the FlrC guidelines contain no explicit minimum threshold
requirements for the use of environmental marketing terms. For example, the
guidelines specify no thresholds for recycled content claims, but simply require
that representations on products or packages containing small amounts of
recycled material be "adequately" qualified to "avoid consumer deception about
the amount, by weight, of recycled content."' 55 This imprecise qualification
requirement could allow creative marketers to employ alternative marketing
terms such as "partially recycled" or "mostly recycled" to avoid disclosure of
specific amounts of recycled material.5 6 In addition, while the guidelines do
state that products labeled "recycled" must include material diverted from the
solid waste stream,'57 they allow manufacturers to add together pre- and post-
consumer waste in disclosing the percentage of a product that is recycled
material. 5 Although recycling of pre-consumer materials can be relatively
energy efficient and should be encouraged, a definition such as this depresses
the demand for post-consumer materials and reduces incentives for new
consumer recycling programs.
5 9
151. Deception is ... subjective and it leaves considerable room for doubt. It is a property of human
beings. We look for it within the mind of the consumer, the person who is considering the object."
RICHARDS, supra note 22, at 29 (quoting I.L. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLOW-UP: PUFFERY IN
ADVERTISING AND SELLING 8 (1975)).
152. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 11-13.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 57 Fed. Reg. at 36,367 (1992).
156. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
157. The guideline states:
A recycled content claim may be made only for materials that have been recovered or
otherwise diverted from the solid waste stream, either during the manufacturing process [precon-
sumer], or after consumer use [post-consumer]. To the extent the source of recycled content
includes pre-consumer material, the manufacturer or advertiser must have substantiation for
concluding that the pre-consumer material would otherwise have entered the solid waste stream.
In asserting a recycled content claim, distinctions may be made between pre-consumer and
post-consumer materials.
57 Fed. Reg. at 36,367 (1992).
158. Id.
159. Because post-consumer wastes contain heterogenous contaminants and are more difficult and
expensive to recycle than pre-consumer materials, incentives are needed to maintain post-consumer programs.
A recent report by EPA has underscored the difficulty of recycling post-consumer wastes:
Although preconsumer mateials can contain contaminants such as inks or adhesives, they
generally come to reprocessing mills in large homogenous batches and are therefore easier and
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In contrast to the FTC's lenient approach, California, New York, and New
Hampshire's environmental labeling laws all require products to contain specific
minimum percentages of post-consumer material before recycled content claims
can be made. 160 Several state and local government procurement policies also
include post-consumer content standards as a means of stabilizing markets for
such materials.16'
The most effective mechanism for establishing more rigorous standards for
environmental claims'62 would be for Congress to pass a new law authorizing
EPA to promulgate regulations that would promote environmental improvement.
For example, the proposed Environmental Marketing Claims Act would have
directed EPA to ensure that new regulations reflect both "the best available use
and the best available technology that will encourage higher performance levels
in products and packaging" and "the most recent scientific and practical
knowledge of technological advances and improvements in manufacturing
techniques and waste management."' 63 In the absence of such legislative
direction, EPA does not have the authority to promulgate binding regula-
tions,"N and the FTC continues to be wary of overstepping its consumer
protection mandate. Put simply, the agency with enforcement expertise lacks
the appropriate mission, and the agency with the mission lacks enforcement
authority.
If new regulations are to be in the form of bright-line rules rather than
general nonbinding guidelines, the technical expertise of EPA will be essential
more economical to reprocess in most instances than postconsumer materials. In contrast,
postconsumer materials have reached consumers and, following their intended use, are recovered
for recycling. They can contain a heterogenous assortment of contaminants, such as staples,
rubberbands, adhesives, and inks, and are in most cases more difficult and expensive to recycle
than preconsumer materials. While both types of secondary materials are technically recyclable,
postconsumer materials often require more advanced reprocessing equipment than preconsumer
materials, which have readily been recycled for decades.
EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT AssociATEs, supra note 28, at 96.
160. See supra note 88, 146.
161. EPA DRAFT REPORT BY ABT AsSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 96.
162. There are essentially four levels of rigor for environmental labeling regulations. The first, and
least stringent approach, is the voluntary guideline approach. The second level would involve mandatory
disclosure requirements, whereby companies would be required to report the percentages of recycled or other
pertinent materials in their products. The problem with mere disclosure, however, is that consumers may
not be able to discern the difference between meaningful and trivial percentages, or evaluate the degree to
which the percentages achieved reflect actual technological capabilities. The third level involves establishing
minimum threshold requirements to prevent consumer deception by assuring buyers that their expectations
about environmentally labeled products are well-founded. The fourth level involves higher minimum
thresholds designed to encourage improvements in product design, ratcheted up over time as technology
advances.
163. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1991).
164. In 1990, EPA, the FTC, and the U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs formed a task force to consider
environmental labeling standards. See, e.g., Guidance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and
"Recyclable" and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992,
49,993-94 (1991). EPA is limited to a consultative role on general environmental labeling issues unless Con-
gress expands EPA's jurisdiction in this area.
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for establishing standards and the accompanying testing protocols.'65 EPA
has already begun to develop testing protocols as part of its mandate under the
Toxic Substances Control Act.'66 The development of labeling standards will
become less complex as this effort dovetails with the development of
government and private procurement standards, minimum content requirements,
and other environmental protection initiatives.
EPA has gained some labeling experience through its regulation of pesti-
cides 167 and products containing ozone-depleting substances. 168 In the future,
because the FTC traditionally has maintained an enforcement infrastructure for
deceptive advertising, the most appropriate arrangement would be for EPA to
set the standards for environmental advertising, with advice and enforcement
assistance from the FTC. Congress could specify that any violation of EPA
definitions would constitute an automatic violation of the FrC Act, so that the
FTC's burden of justification in enforcement actions would be eliminated. This
structure would resemble the regulatory structure for food labeling, whereby
the FTC attempts to engage in enforcement activities that are consistent with
FDA standards.
EPA is better suited than the FTC to issue binding regulations because,
unlike the FTC, EPA is not constrained by a rigid and over-formalized rule-
making process.'69 Since the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Act in 1975, the
FTC's rulemaking ability has been hobbled by a series of restrictive
requirements mandating the use of hybrid rulemaking procedures and extensive
preliminary and final cost-benefit analyses of all new rules. 7° It is not
165. Assessing product degradability and compostability, and determining equitable methods for
measuring recycled content and defining recycling rates, for example, are highly technical enterprises. For
an illustration of the debate over the measurement of the percentage of recycled content of paper, see EPA
DRAFT REPORT BY ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 28, at 97.
166. Chemical Fate Testing Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 796 (1991).
167. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) authorizes EPA to enforce
pesticide labeling regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)-(y) (1988).
168. EPA recently issued a rule under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 requiring that products
manufactured with or containing class I substances (chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride,
methyl chloroform) and containers containing class I or class II substances (hydrochlorofluorocarbons
(HCFCs)) bear a "clearly legible and conspicuous" warning statement. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone,
58 Fed. Reg. 8136 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82). The rule also requires that products
manufactured with or containing class 11 substances must contain warnings after May, 1993 if the EPA
Administrator determines that safe alternatives are available, and that products manufactured with or
containing class I or class 11 substances must be labeled after Jan. 1, 2015. Id. at § 82.102 (a)-(b). The
warning statements may be included in supplemental printed materials as an alternative to labeling products
directly, as long as the statements are conspicuous and clearly legible to consumers at the time of purchase.
See EPA, Stratospheric Protection Division, Final Labeling Rule, Fact Sheet, Section 611 of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 4 (Feb. 3, 1993).
169. EPA follows the informal rulemaking procedures specified under § 553 of the APA. See supra
note 117.
170. In 1973, the D.C. Circuit affirmed that § 6(g) of the FTC Act authorized the agency to issue
binding regulations. National Petroleum Refiners v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672, 686 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
In 1975, Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
(FTCIA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-48 (1988), affirming the FTC's legislative rulemaking authority but requiring
177
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surprising that the FTC has largely abandoned rulemaking since the 1970s' 71
and that the Commission has issued fewer than ten trade regulation rules in the
past twelve years.
Detailed, binding rules are a prerequisite to establishing minimum threshold
requirements and even to securing accurate affirmative disclosures. EPA's
environmental policy mandate, technical expertise, and regulatory experience
make it well suited to set the standards for environmental marketing.
E. The Preemption Question: Two Competing Visions
As the FTC guidelines explicitly state, voluntary guidelines cannot preempt
state or local environmental laws and regulations.' By contrast, a binding
statute would have preemptive power, if Congress so chooses. 173 Therefore,
one of the most important and challenging decisions for the authors of a new
environmental marketing statue is whether and to what extent the new law
should preempt the regulatory activities of states and localities.
the Commission to graft additional procedures onto the customary informal rulemaking procedures of § 553
of the APA. See, e.g., Koch & Martin, supra note 62, at 279-91; see generally BARRY B. BOYER ET AL.,
TRADE REGULATION RULEMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A REPORT TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1979). The FTCIA established a "hybrid
rulemaking" procedure requiring the agency to incorporate trial-like elements into the rulemaking process.
After publication of a final notice of proposed rulemaking, interested parties are allowed to request a right
of cross-examination during the oral hearing stage of the proceeding. Other interested parties are allowed
to offer rebuttal submissions. Koch & Martin, supra note 62, at 286-87. In 1980, Congress amended the
FTCIA and further modified the FTC trade regulation rulemaking process. Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 57(a)l, 57(b)(1)-(4), 57(c) (1988); Koch & Martin, supra note 62,
at 287-91. The Act requires the FTC to prepare and publish a preliminary regulatory analysis of the
proposed rule, and outline the perceived benefits and detriments of the rule for industry and the public.
The Act also directs the Commission to delineate reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule. The analysis
must include an explanation of the reasons the final alternative was chosen, a summary of the significant
issues raised during the rulemaking proceeding, and the agency's responses. Id. at 288. In addition to these
required procedures, the scope of the review of FTCIA rulemaking is more stringent than that which is
normally applied to § 553 rulemaking under the APA. When examining an FTCIA rule, a reviewing court
will apply a "substantial evidence," rather than an "arbitrary and capricious," standard of review. Id. at
287.
The only means of circumventing these procedures is for Congress to direct the FTC to issue particular
rules following APA procedures. Congress recently directed the agency to follow APA rulemaking
procedures to implement the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-556
(1992).
171. See supra note 140.
172. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
173. Federal legislation will preempt state law if the statute specifies preemption, or if preemption is
implicit in the statute's structure and purpose. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). In
the absence of express preemptive language, congressional intent to preempt state law in a particular area
may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to allow for a
reasonable inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation. Hillsborough County,
Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985). Where Congress has not completely
displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nonetheless preempted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law. This may occur when compliance with both federal and state law is a physical
impossibility, or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v, Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
141 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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Strong arguments exist on both sides of the preemption issue. On the one
hand, blanket federal preemption would provide a consistent regulatory structure
for national and international manufacturers, arguably providing greater
incentives for environmental labeling and ultimate improvements in product
design. On the other hand, several states have been more active and innovative
than the federal government in the area of environmental and consumer protec-
tion, "'74 and arguably should not be prevented from crafting more stringent
environmental labeling regulations.
The problem is that the dual goals of national uniformity and state autono-
my, while both laudable, are not entirely compatible. These two competing
visions are regularly juxtaposed in the current discussion of environmental
labeling regulation. For example, in 1991, a coalition of state prosecutors, led
by the Task Force of State Attorneys General, issued a clarion call for a
national regulatory structure for environmental labeling. 175 At the same time,
however, the Task Force stated that "[t]he states would.., vigorously oppose
any statute or regulation that proposes preemption of states' rights in this ar-
ea.,1 7
6
Some states enjoy a significant advantage over federal regulators in terms
of prosecutorial power. For example, while the false advertising laws of some
states employ administrative cease and desist orders, requiring two adjudications
prior to the imposition of penalties, the laws of other states allow for immediate
civil sanctions. 177 Unlike the federal FTC Act, several state consumer protec-
tion statutes authorize private rights of action, 178 and some authorize class
actions. 179 Moreover, several state laws assert broader jurisdictional power
than does the FTC Act, conceivably allowing these states to regulate nonprofit
organizations. 80 And several states hold manufacturers to a stricter standard
of review for deceptiveness than is required at the federal level. For example,
although the FTC in 1984 stated in Cliffdale that a deceptive representation
must be "likely" to mislead a "reasonable consumer," '' certain states have
174. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
175. GREEN REPORT I, supra note 92, at 20-27; CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL ET AL., THE GREEN
REPORT H 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter GREEN REPORT 111.
176. Id. at 2. In testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Protection, the
Environmental Defense Fund argued in favor of state autonomy:
From the perspectives of both consumer protection and environmental regulation and policy, state
authority to take actions that go beyond the "floor" established by federal agencies i critical to
ensure full enforcement and to account for state and local needs and priorities which may vary
from those perceived by or facing federal agencies.
Environmental Defense Fund Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 17.
177. PLEVAN & SMOKY, supra note 63, at 352-53.
178. Id. at 344-45. These may provide for several forms of relief, including injunctions, damages, and
attorneys' fees.
179. Id. at 346-47.
180. See, e.g., People ex reL Hartigan v. All Am. Aluminum and Constr. Co., 524 N.E.2d 1067, 1070
(111. App. Ct. 1988) (state consumer fraud act does not define "person" in same manner as FTC Act).
181. Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984).
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nevertheless continued to use the earlier Aronberg standard, by which represen-
tations are judged deceptive if they have the "capacity or tendency" to deceive
even "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous." '82
State prosecutors have recently mounted multistate attacks on deceptiveness
in environmental advertising. These concerted efforts can pose a significant
threat to manufacturers that are required to litigate on several fronts simulta-
neously. For example, ten states brought individual suits against American
Enviro Products for its claims concerning the biodegradability of Bunnies
diapers in 1990, a full year before the FTC took action against the compa-
ny. 8 3 Also in 1990, the State of California sought to enjoin Mobil Chemical
Company from knowingly asserting false biodegradability claims about Hefty
trash bags." Six other states ultimately joined in the suit. 85
Despite the advantages of state prosecution, a nationwide regulatory struc-
ture is essential to send a uniform message to advertisers and to provide
minimum standards for those states with less active enforcement records.
Various positions on preemption have begun to crystallize in proposed federal
legislation. The Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991, S. 615, would
not have preempted more stringent state environmental marketing standards:
Nothing in this act shall be construed so as to prohibit a State from
enacting and enforcing a standard or requirement with respect to the use
of an environmental marketing claim that is more stringent than a
standard or requirement relating to an environmental marketing claim
established or promulgated under this Act.
8 6
By contrast, the most recent House bill, H.R. 3865, would have explicitly
preempted state standards for which a federal counterpart existed.'87
182. Telephone Interview with Albert Shelden, Deputy Attorney General, Consumer Law Section, State
of California (Jan. 6, 1992). The FTC's pre-Cliffdale standard was enunciated in Aronberg v. Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942) ("The law is not made for experts but to protect the public,
that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases,
do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general impressions."). In Cliffdale,
the Commission limited the relevant class of consumers from "that vast multitude which includes the
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous" to only those consumers "acting reasonably under the
circumstances." 103 F.T.C. at 164-65. Cliffdale also required that the representation be "likely" to deceive
consumers, id., replacing the earlier view that an advertisement need only have the "tendency or capacity"
to deceive. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 151 (1942).
183. See, for example, the Assurance of Discontinuance signed October 12, 1990 by American Enviro
Products, Inc. and the Attorneys General for California and nine other states.
184. People v. Mobil Chem. Co., No. 625073 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 21, 1990).
185. Allanna Sullivan, Mobil Settles Suit Over Claims Made for its Hefty Bags, WALL ST. J., June 28,
1991, at A4.
186. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13(c) (1991).
187. The bill reads in pertinent part:
Effective on the date of promulgation of such regulations, no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect any standard, criteria, or definition with respect to a type
of environmental marketing claim unless such standard, criteria, or definition is identical to the
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Perhaps Congress could enact a statute that would establish a federal
structure but leave some autonomy to the states. Here again, an example from
the food labeling experience may be instructive. The Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act of 1990 created an innovative structure that requires federal
preemption but grants exemptions to petitioning states for regulations that "(1)
would not cause any food to be in violation of any applicable requirement
under Federal law, (2) would not unduly burden interstate commerce, and (3)
[are] designed to address a particular need for information which need is not
met by [federal requirements]."' 88 Because the FDA has not yet held an ex-
emption proceeding, the efficacy of this structure is difficult to predict. If a
similar structure is implemented for environmental labeling, it should designate
or establish a reviewing body and develop an appropriate standard of review
to ensure that petitioning states are afforded a genuine opportunity to receive
an exemption.
One additional compromise between state and federal authority would be
to refrain from issuing federal definitions for terms connoting potentialities or
capabilities, such as "recyclable," "degradable," and "compostable," and leave
such definitions to the states, at least until such time as accurate data on
national recycling rates become available." 9 State environmental labeling laws
currently employ diverse definitions of such terms. For example, New York
regulations limit the use of the term "recyclable" to materials for which at least
"seventy-five percent of the population, of the State" has access to recycling
facilities, and the "Statewide recycling rate" is at least fifty percent." 90 New
Jersey prohibits manufacturers from claiming that their beverage containers are
recyclable unless the state determines that practical and economically feasible
recycling systems for the containers are available. 9 ' Because unqualified
claims of "recyclable" and "compostable" are arguably misleading when
consumers lack access to requisite facilities, such terms may require state-level
standard, criteria, or definition with respect to that type of claim in the regulations.
H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(a) (1992).
The proposed bill would have allowed states to enact and enforce standards not regulated under the
Act: "After the date of promulgation of such regulations, nothing in this section shall be construed as
prohibiting a State from enacting and enforcing standards, criteria, or definitions with respect to a type of
environmental marketing claim that is not regulated by the Administrator under such regulations." Id.
188. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(b) (West Supp. 1992).
189. For a discussion of the obstacles to the full development of recycling markets, see OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT NEXT FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE?
(1989). Aluminum cans are one product for which a relatively uniform national recycling rate has been
attained.
190. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.2(k) (1990).
191. Mandatory Statewide Recycling Program Act of 1987, N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:lE-99.18(a)
(West 1991). Rhode Island defines recyclability on a regional basis:
If a material can wear the recyclable emblem in at least five of the Northeast Recycling Council
region states (ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, RI, NY, PA, NJ, DE), which represent at least 75% of the
population in the Northeast Recycling Council region, the material can wear the recycling emblem
in Rhode Island even if it is not recyclable in Rhode Island .....
RHODE ISLAND RECYCLING REGULATIONS, supra note 85, § 5(c) (1987).
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specificity.'92 Prior to the development of uniform national recycling markets
and infrastructure, federal definitions may be insufficiently fine-tuned to provide
accurate consumer information. 9 '
F. Enforcement
If new federal environmental marketing legislation is enacted, states should
be authorized to share enforcement authority.'94  Joint federal-state
enforcement would have two significant advantages. The obvious advantage
is that it would supplement the federal prosecutorial workforce. Another
advantage is that it could indirectly prompt federal activity. The threat of
multiple state litigation might induce manufacturers to urge federal agency
action as a preferable alternative.'95
Any new federal statute should also contain a citizen suit provision. The
current vehicle for prosecuting environmental advertising, the FTC Act, contains
no provision for citizen enforcement.'96 New legislation should fill this gap
by allowing any person to commence a civil action against any person or entity
alleged to be in violation of the rules, or against the appropriate federal agency
to compel its administrator to carry out the duties'assigned to the agency under
the statute. 97 A citizen suit provision could liberate class plaintiffs from
amount-in-controversy thresholds, notification requirements, and other current
192. The Northeast Recycling Council has proposed local, state, and regional options for the use of
a recycling emblem:
- AT POINT OF PURCHASE: a shelf emblem states that an approved recycling program
exists for that material category in the community where the product is labeled;
- STATEWIDE EMBLEMS: manufacturer must meet at least one of the following criteria
in at least five NERC [Northeast Recycling Council states that, taken together, represent at least
75 percent of the region's population:
(1) 75 percent of the communities or 75 percent of the population in the state have
approved recycling programs for this material category; or
(2) the material category has achieved a greater than 50 percent recycling rate state-
wide; or
(3) the brand-specific package or product has achieved a statewide recycling rate of
more than 50 percent (by weight) for that product or package.
Northeast Recycling Council, Regional Labeling Standards (1990), reprinted in EPA DRAFr REPORT BY
ABT AssOCIATES, supra note 28, at 104. -
193. As an example of the problems that could result from unqualified federal "recyclable" claims,
the appearance of the term "recyclable" on materials not acceptable in one state's program could lead
consumers to place nonrecyclable material in local collection facilities, impeding an otherwise successful
recycling program. Environmental Defense Fund Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 18.
It should also be noted that environmental priorities will vary among states. For example, California
has a strong interest in water conservation, Mississippi faces landfill leachate problems, and Oregon must
resolve forest conservation issues.
194. The proposed Environmental Marketing Claims Act would have granted enforcement power to
the states. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1991).
195. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 64.
197. The Environmental Marketing Claims Act would have provided a citizen suit provision. S. 615,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. § II(a) (1991).
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barriers to federal actions.' A statutory damages provision could be enacted
that would offset the current low-damages deterrent to recovery in negligent
misrepresentation suits.'99
An additional aspect of enforcement that should not be overlooked is the
administrative verification of manufacturer compliance. The federal regulatory
scheme should include testing protocols along with new standards. Although
the proposed Environmental Marketing Claims Act would have required
manufacturers to certify their claims to the EPA Administrator,2°° it did not
specify the mechanisms for such certification. One possible approach would
be to advise manufacturers to hire third-party certifiers to verify that claims
comport with legislated definitions. This could encourage greater accuracy than
would self-certification by manufacturers.
G. First Amendment Advantages of a Federal Statute
Certain manufacturers and industry groups, particularly those opposed to
the more stringent minimum-threshold labeling laws enacted by several states,
have raised First Amendment defenses and statutory challenges. For example,
Mobil Chemical Corporation raised First Amendment arguments in defense of
its degradability claims concerning Hefty trash bags.2' In February 1992, a
coalition of industry trade associations and the California and U.S. Chambers
of Commerce brought a suit challenging California's environmental marketing
statute,2 0 2 in part claiming that it restricted nondeceptive speech 20 3 and was
198. The current amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases is $50,000. See supra note
84.
199. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
200. S. 615, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1991).
201. Defendant's Answer at 4, State v. Mobil Chem. Co. (Dist. Ct. Minn. July 2, 1990).
202. Somewhat ironically, four of these organizations, along with other trade groups, had petitioned
the FTC in 1991 to issue guidance pertaining to deceptive environmental advertising. NATIONAL FOOD
PROCESSORs ASS'N., supra note 94, at 1. In the 1991 petition, coalition members acknowledged that the
use of the term "recycled" can be misleading unless a substantial portion of the product is made from
recycled materials. Id. at 3. The coalition further acknowledged that unqualified "recyclability" claims
can be deceptive if recycling facilities are largely unavailable. Id. at 6. The groups had expressed support
for "industry guides", similar to those recently enacted by the FTC, for which compliance would be entirely
voluntary. The groups opposed restrictions that would have the force of law.
203. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Association of National Advertisers
v. Lundgren (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1992) (hereinafter Complaint] (co-petitioners included the Grocery Manufac-
turers of America, the Soap and Detergent Association, the National Food Processors Association, the
Society of the Plastics Industry, the American Paper Institute, the California Chamber of Commerce, and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
Count One of the complaint stated, in part:
Section 17508.5 impermissibly restricts plaintiffs' members' non-commercial speech intended,
inter alia, to educate consumers about the availability of recycling to control solid waste, to induce
them to petition their governments to establish local recycling programs, and to otherwise speak
on matters of disputed policy and public concern. In doing so the statute violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 17508.5 impermissibly restricts plaintiffs' members' truthful and non-deceptive
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unconstitutionally vague. 2°4
'Interesting questions in the environmental labeling debate are whether, and
to what extent, the First Amendment could have an impact on statutory defini-
tions of environmental marketing terms, or on the penalties prescribed by statute
for labeling violations. The profitability of green marketing suggests that
advertisers may be more likely to bring First Amendment suits against
environmental labeling laws than against other kinds of labeling regula-
tions.20 5 Although precedent indicates that such First Amendment claims are
unlikely to succeed, certain doctrines, such as the vagueness doctrine, are less
settled and could affect certain aspects of the drafting of new statutes. 2°6 The
case law indicates that state laws may be more vulnerable to vagueness
challenges than are federal laws. The-statutes of states with the largest markets
for environmentally sensitive products, such as California, are likely to attract
more legal challenges than are those of other states.2"7 Although state labeling
laws are likely to survive these challenges, First Amendment suits, whether well
intentioned or designed merely to impede legislative efforts, may provide an
additional incentive for enacting federal environmental labeling legislation. 208
commercial speech regarding important environmental characteristics of consumer products and
consumer product packaging. In doing so the statute violates the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 23-24; see also Jennifer Lawrence & Steven Colford, Coalition Sues California on Green Ad Rules,
ADVERTISINa AGE, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1.
204. Count 2 of the complaint stated, in part:
Section 17508.5 fails to define clearly the scope of prohibited conduct which may result in
criminal penalties. Because of its failure to do so the Statute is unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Complaint, supra note 203, at 25. The plaintiffs asserted that the statute's definition of "ozone friendly"
was allegedly vague because it prohibited the unconditional use of "any like term" which connoted the same
meaning as "ozone friendly." The statute defines "ozone friendly" as follows: "'Ozone friendly,' or any
like term which connotes that stratospheric ozone is not being depleted, means that any chemical or material
released into the environment as a result of the use or production of a product, will not migrate to the
stratosphere and cause unnatural and accelerated deterioration of the ozone." Id. at 15-16. The plaintiffs
also asserted vagueness claims on the grounds that the statute prohibited the use of "recyclable" claims
unless a product could be "conveniently" recycled ... in every county in California with a population of
over 300,000 persons." Id. at 19-20. According to the plaintiffs, the term "conveniently" was subjective
and therefore failed to provide fair notice.
205. See, e.g., Miranda Ewell, "Green Marketing" Law in Court, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept.
18, 1992, at 3B.
206. In the recent decision pertaining to California's environmental labeling law, Association of Nat'l
Advertisers v. Lundgren, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California upheld the statute
on First Amendment grounds but struck down one portion as unconstitutionally vague. No. 92-0660 MHP,
slip. op. at 28-29 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992). According to the court, the statutory definition of "recyclable,"
which prohibited the use of claims unless a product could be "conveniently" recycled in every populous
California county, did not provide fair notice to advertisers. Id.
207. Id.
208. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
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1. Labeling Laws and Legal Precedent
Apart from the vagueness question, discussed below, the First Amendment
should not present a major barrier to environmental labeling statutes at either
the state or federal level. The durability of existing labeling rules suggests that
courts generally defer to regulatory limitations on commercial speech that fall
short of comprehensive bans on advertising. 9
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act provides an example of a rigor-
ous federal labeling law that contains more stringent restrictions than any yet
proposed in the environmental advertising context. 10 In some provisions, the
Act essentially compels speech by requiring manufacturers who advertise
certain health claims to disclose detrimental ingredients along with those
claims.2 ' As discussed earlier, the Act also prohibits the use of "descriptors"
such as "free," "low," and "lite," as well as other nutrient claims, unless the
use comports with FDA definitions.212 Congress has further directed the
agency to pre-approve any synonyms for these terms." 3
Other federal labeling requirements are similarly stringent. For example,
the Department of Agriculture (USDA) maintains a longstanding practice of
pre-approving all aspects of meat labels." 4 USDA regulations prohibit use
of the word "fresh" for products containing any sodium nitrate, potassium
nitrate, potassium nitrite, or preservative salts.2"5 The agency has specified
precise requirements for the use of "spring lamb" and other phrases describing
meat products.216 The Organic Foods Production Act authorizes the USDA
to enact mandatory production standards and pre-approve all foods labeled
209. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
210. 21 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West Supp. 1992).
211. The Act prohibits claims of "low cholesterol" or high dietary fiber if a food contains high levels
of fat, unless the label prominently discloses the level of the fat in immediate proximity to the
low-cholesterol or high-dietary-fiber claim. Id. § 343(r)(2)(A)(iii). Notice of the fat content must be printed
in no less than half the size of the cholesterol claim. Id. The Act also prohibits claims that a food is high
in dietary fiber if the food is also high in total fat, unless the level of fat is prominently disclosed in
immediate proximity to the dietary fiber claim. Id. § 343(r)(2)(A)(v).
212. Id. § 343(r)(2)(A)(i).
213. 56 Fed. Reg. 60,432 (1991). The Grocery Manufacturers of America is one group which has
submitted a proposed list of synonyms for FDA approval. The proposed synonyms for "very low" included
"dab," "dash," "touch," "smidgen," "tinge," and "pinch." Id. at 60,431-32. interestingly, although the
Grocery Manufacturers of America appears to be cooperating with the FDA's preapproval requirements for
food labeling, it is among the industry groups that sued the State of California to challenge its environmental
labeling law.
214. USDA regulations specify that "[nlo labeling shall be used on any product until it has been
approved in its final form by the Administrator." 9 C.F.R. § 317.4(a) (1992).
215. Id. § 317.8(b)(6).
216. The agency prohibits the use of the terms "spring lamb" or "genuine spring lamb" unless animals
have been slaughtered "during the period beginning in March and terminating not beyond the close of the
week containing the first Monday in October." Id. § 317.8(b)(4).
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"organic." '217 The FTC prohibits the use of the term "re-refined," as well as
synonyms, to describe motor oil, unless contaminants acquired through previous
use have been removed by a refining process. 218 The Magnuson-Moss Act
requires detailed affirmative disclosures for product warranties, 219 and the
FDA extensively regulates all aspects of drug-labeling. 21
Since the Supreme Court first recognized some measure of First Amend-
ment protection for commercial speech in 1976,221 the Court has repeatedly
emphasized that this protection is more limited than the protection of non-
commercial speech.22 Several aspects of traditional First Amendment doctrine
217. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990,7 U.S.C. § 6501.(1990). The law authorizes the Secretary
of Agriculture to establish an organic certification program and permits the states to implement identical
or more stringent programs, subject to USDA approval. In order to be sold or labeled as an organically
produced agricultural product, the product: (1) must not have been produced or handled with synthetic
chemicals; (2) must not be produced on land to which any prohibited substances, including synthetic
chemicals, have been applied in the 3 years immediately preceding the harvest of the product; and (3) must
be produced and handled in compliance with an organic plan agreed to by the producer and handler of such
- product and a USDA or federally-approved state certifying agent. Id. § 6504.
218. 16 C.F.R § 406.3(c) (1991). The regulations also require that lubricating oil containers be labeled
on their front face panel:
In view of all the circumstances, the Commission concludes that in order for the disclosure
required by this part to be clear and conspicuous, it should be placed on the front or face panel
of each container. If the container has more than one panel similarly designed as a front or face
panel the required disclosure should be placed on each such panel.
Id.
219. Regulations under Rule 701 of the Magnuson-Moss Act establish standards for disclosure of
written warranty terms for consumer products costing more than $15, and require that such warranties clearly
and conspicuously disclose the following items of information in a single document:
(I) The identity of the party to whom the written warranty is extended ...
(2) a clear description and identification of products, or parts or characteristics... covered
. .. [and] excluded by the warranty;
(3) a statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure
to conform with the written warranty...
(4) the point in time or event on which the warranty term commences, if different from the
purchase date...
(5) a step-by-step explanation of the procedure which the consumer should follow in order
to obtain performance of any warranty obligation...
(6) information respecting the availability of any informal dispute settlement mechanism
elected by the warrantor...
(7) any limitations on the duration of implied warranties .... accompanied by the statement:
"Some States do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty lasts, so the above
limitations may not apply to you.".
(8) any exclusions of or limitations on relief such as incidental or consequential damages,
accompanied by the following statement: . . . "Some States do not allow the exclusion or.
limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not
apply to you."
(9) a statement in the following language: 'This warranty gives you special rights, and you
may also have others which vary from State to State."
16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (1992).
220. 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-201.317 (1992).
221. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court excluded commercial speech from First Amendment protection entirely.
See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that the First Amendment imposes "no
... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising").
222. For example, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748, the court noted: "Since
advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
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may not apply in the commercial context.223 For example, courts have consis-
tently excluded overbreadth analysis from commercial speech cases,224 and
the doctrine of prior restraint has been held inapplicable as well.225
Well-conceived environmental labeling regulations would likely meet the
four part test established by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp., v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. of N. Y.226 First, Central Hudson and its progeny
have established that deceptive commercial speech is beyond the reach of the
First Amendment.22 7  Marketing terms implying general environmental
benefits, such as "environmentally friendly," are arguably deceptive per se. All
consumer goods incur environmental costs.
Second, the Court will give considerable deference to the regulation of
potentially misleading speech. In a 1979 case, Friedman v. Rogers, the Supreme
Court upheld a complete ban on the use of trade names in optometrists' adver-
tisements because of the "possibilities for deception."228 A regulator's effort
to draw the line between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising is part of a
greater mission to prevent deceptive speech. Preventing such speech would
regulation." Id. at 771, n.24. Likewise, in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court emphasized
the importance of regulating commercial activity in spite of speech-related components: "By definition,
commercial speech is linked inextricably to commercial activity.. .. 'The State does not lose its power
to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that
activity."' Id. at 10-11 n.9 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
223. As the Court asserted in Friedman, 440 U.S. at 1: "Our decisions dealing with more traditional
First Amendment problems do not extend automatically to this as yet uncharted area." Id. at 10 n.9.
224. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court excluded the doctrine of overbreadth: "Since Ithel
overbreadth doctrine has been described by this Court as 'strong medicine,' which 'has been employed.
. sparingly and only as a last resort,' we decline to apply it to professional advertising, a context where
it is not necessary to further its intended objective." 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504
n. 11 (1981); Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980);
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n. 9 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 462
n. 20 (1978). The Court reaffirmed the Bates position on overbreadth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, stating that "commercial speech, the offspring of economic
self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation."' 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980).
225. The Court stated in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy that the hardiness of commercial speech "may
make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker" and "may also
make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints." 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
226. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The four-part test established in Central Hudson consists of the following:
(1) commercial speech is unprotected if it is misleading or if it concerns unlawful activity: "The government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it," id. at 563 (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979)); (2) if the speech is not misleading, the regulation must
be premised on a substantial governmental interest, id. at 566; (3) the regulation must "directly advance
the governmental interest asserted"; and (4) be "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest,"
id.
227. Id. at 563.
228. 440 U.S. at 13; see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68 (1976)
("[Rlegulatory commissions may prohibit businessmen from making statements which, though literally true,
are potentially deceptive."). According to Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, "much commercial speech is
not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a
State's dealing effectively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not
prohibit the State from insuring that the streams of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely."
425 U.S. at 771-72 (citations omitted).
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clearly qualify as a substantial governmental interest. If a legislature assigns
the line-drawing task to an executive agency, the holding in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. indicates that the courts would
defer to the agency and its expertise.229
Third, labeling laws that explicitly aim to promote environmental policy are
likely to withstand First Amendment challenges.2 30 According to Central
Hudson, the government may regulate commercial speech for purposes other
than limiting false or misleading information as long as the interest is sub-
stantial. 3' The Supreme Court has refused to strike down commercial speech
regulation on the grounds of insubstantial governmental interest,232 and has
shown considerable deference to a wide range of legislative goals.233 In a
1989 case, Board of Trustees v. Fox,13 1 the Court held that curbing speech
to accomplish a legitimate governmental goal is permissible as long as the
regulator can show a reasonable connection between the law and its stated
purpose.2 35 Fox established that the means-end fit requirement of Central
Hudson, though somewhat more than a rationality test, does not require a direct
advancement of the governmental interests asserted.2 36
229. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
230. For example, the Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991 represented an effort to promote
environmental policy. The stated goals of the bill were to prevent the use of "fraudulent, deceptive, and
misleading environmental marketing claims" as well as to "encourage both consumers and industry to adopt
habits and practices that favor natural resource conservation and environmental protection." S. 615, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(5) (1991). Likewise, the FDA's goals in regulating nutrition claims went beyond
the prevention of consumer deception. According to FDA Commissioner David Kessler:
The goal is simple: a label the public can understand and count on--that would bring them
up-to-date with today's health concerns. It is a goal with three objectives: First, to clear up
confusion; second, to help us make healthy choices; and third, to encourage product innovation,
so that companies are more interested in. tinkering with the food in the package, not the words
on the label.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA BACKGROUNDER 1 (Nov. 1991).
231. 447 U.S. at 564.
232. The Court has generally based invalidations on grounds of inadequate means-end fit between
regulations and governmental goals. Even this requirement, however, has been substantially limited by
Board of Trustees, University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989). See infra note 236.
233. For example, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Ass'n. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986), the Court upheld a complete ban on casino advertising aimed at Puerto Rican residents without
challenging the legislature's stated interest in protecting Puerto Rican citizens from pecuniary losses. Id.
at 344. The Court dismissed the challengers' argument that the legislature could have promulgated
additional speech designed to discourage gambling, stating that "it is up to the legislature to decide whether
or not such a 'counterspeech' policy would be as effective." Id. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987), the Court deferred to a legislative interest in
promoting U.S. Olympic Committee activities, upholding a statute banning the unauthorized use of the term
"Olympic" to promote athletic events. Id. at 539.
234. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
235. According to Fox, the regulation must provide more than ineffective or remote support for the
governmental purpose. 492 U.S. at 480. Later in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), the
Court determined that, as long as the fit is reasonable, it will defer to the legislature's choice of the measure
to be employed. Id. at 79
236. The Court described the test as follows:
What our decisions require is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends"-- a fit that is not necessary perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest
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Finally, environmental labeling restrictions are clearly a "less restrictive
means" of achieving an explicit governmental interest. According to Central
Hudson, commercial speech regulations must be "no more extensive than
necessary" to serve the government interests asserted." '237 Fox made it clear
that "least restrictive" alternatives are not required in commercial speech
cases.23 Where the Court has overturned regulations restricting speech in the
past, these regulations generally have banned certain forms of advertising
entirely. For example, in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, the Court struck down a law prohibiting all pharmacists from
advertising the prices of prescription drugs.239 In Central Hudson, the Court
struck down an outright ban on all advertising by an electric utility.' In so
doing, however, the Court recommended several intrusive alternatives which
it considered to be "no more extensive than necessary" for accomplishing the
government's purpose of promoting energy conservation. One "less restrictive"
option was a system of prescreening and pre-approval of advertising
campaigns." Other suggestions included imposing format and content restric-
tions on electric utility advertisements and compelling certain disclosures. 2
The intrusiveness of these alternatives suggests that the Court is likely to
tolerate significant regulatory incursions into commercial speech.
Labeling laws that establish minimum thresholds for recycled material in
products labeled "recycled" are far less restrictive than command-and-control
minimum content laws that require manufacturers to meet or exceed designated
percentages of recycled material in their products. u3 A number of states
already have examples of such command-and-control laws on their books.
California imposes certain minimum content requirements for various materials
such as glass,' newsprint, 45  plastic containers, 26  and fiberglass. 1 7
served;" that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but.., a means narrowly tailored
to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers
to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed.
492 U.S. at 480 (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341
(1986) quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
237. 447 U.S. at 569-70.
238. 492 U.S. at 480. For a discussion of the weakening of the "less restrictive means" test as applied
to commercial speech, see GERALD GUNTHER, Commercial Speech Since Central Hudson, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1184, 1188-89 (12th ed. 1991).
239. 425 U.S. 748, 749-52 (1976).
240. 447 U.S. 557, 558. In three cases, the Court has struck down flat bans on various forms of
advertising by attorneys. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 497 U.S. 91
(1990); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council,
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
241. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 n.13.
242. For example, the Court recommended regulations requiring "that the advertisements include
information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under the current conditions
and for the foreseeable future." Id. at 571.
243. See supra note 142 for a brief description of the difference between minimum content and
minimum threshold laws.
244. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 14549 (West 1992).
245. Id. § 42756.
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Unlike minimum content laws, labeling laws encourage, but do not force,
changes in manufacturing behavior. Manufacturers are required to comply with
labeling requirements only if they choose to make environmental claims for
their products. Therefore, although labeling requirements are a less direct means
of achieving environmental goals than are minimum content requirements, they
are far less restrictive and possess a sufficient nexus between goals and means
to pass constitutional muster.
2. The Specificity- Vagueness Paradox
One of the practical problems posed by drafting environmental 'labeling
regulations is that the regulatory program may become more susceptible to
facial vagueness challenges as definitions become more specific. The reason
for this is that, to prevent advertisers from circumventing requirements by using
synonyms for regulated terms, drafters may need to incorporate general
language that will encompass like terms not specifically defined in the
regulations."' For example, as noted earlier, the FDA's Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990 specifies that regulated terms may include "similar
terms which are commonly understood to have the same meaning" as those
described in the statute."' Courts should be aware that labeling laws may
need to include general language such as this to be effective. Otherwise, draft-
ers of environmental labeling regulations could face a dilemma whereby any
rigorous definitions could be evaded by advertisers using synonymous terms,
and any blanket language would be met by vagueness challenges. 250
The rationale behind vagueness claims is that the wording of an ambiguous
statute does not provide fair notice of potential legal action. 25  Vagueness
challenges to statutes authorizing the imposition of criminal sanctions receive
closer scrutiny than those authorizing civil sanctions because the consequences
246. Id. § 41970.
247. Id. § 19500.
248. See supra note 204 for an account of the vagueness claims in the lawsuit against California's
environmental labeling statute.
249. Pub. L. No. 101-535, § (3)(b)(1)(A)(ix), 104 Stat. 2353, 2361 (1990).
250. In Ass'n. of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lundgren, No. 92-0660 MHP, slip. op. (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992),
the district court adopted a reasonable position on this issue. Although the court struck one portion of
California's statute on vagueness grounds, it rejected plaintiffs' other vagueness claim regarding the statute's
prohibition on the unqualified use of "'ozone friendly'.... 'or any like term'... 'which connotes that
the stratospheric ozone is not being depleted."' Id. at 28 (emphasis added). According to the decision,
the definition of "'ozone friendly' is comprehensible on its face. The phrase 'or any like term' is not
ambiguous; it clearly refers to the modifying phrase 'which connotes that the stratospheric ozone is not being
depleted."' Id. at 28.
251. The case law pertaining to noncommercial speech indicates that a statute is unconstitutionally
vague when "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 607 (1973) (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). However,
the chilling effect caused by an overly vague statute must be both real and substantial before a court will
set it aside. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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of ambiguity are more severe. 2
The status of the vagueness doctrine is unsettled in the commercial speech
context. The Supreme Court has indicated that the judicial test for vagueness
is at its most lenient when purely economic regulations are challenged.5 3 The
Court applies a more stringent test for regulations that could threaten a constitu-
tionally protected right, such as free speech. 2 A Because commercial speech
falls somewhere between an economic activity and a fully protected fundamen-
tal right, the appropriate vagueness analysis is uncertain.
Precedent suggests that a federal environmental labeling statute may be less
vulnerable to vagueness challenges than would state laws. Federal courts
generally defer to Congress as a "co-equal branch" '255 by narrowly construing
federal statutes in an effort to uphold their constitutionality.25 6 Recent case
law indicates that a similar narrowing construction may not be required for state
statutes. 7 Also, federal legislation generally is accompanied by a substantial
body of legislative history which could serve to clarify ambiguous statutory
252. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982);
see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982) (stating that a statute which provides for criminal
penalties must "define the criminal offense with sufficient definitiveness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforceme-
nt"); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ("[N]o man shall be held criminally responsible
for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.") In Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers
v. Lundgren, the court based its vagueness ruling largely on the fact that the California labeling law provided
immediate criminal penalties for violations: "Due to the potential for criminal sanctions, including
incarceration, the absence of any standard for 'conveniently recycled' wrecks this portion of section 17508.5
on the shoals of vagueness." No. 92-0660 MHP, slip. op. at 29 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992).
253. According to Hoffman Estates, "economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test
because its subject matter is often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands
to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed,
the regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry,
or by resort to ah administrative process." 455 U.S. at 498 (footnotes omitted).
254. "Perhaps the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law
is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law
interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply."
Id. at 499.
255. The Supreme Court has declared that "[wlhen we are required to pass on the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress, we assume, the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform,
... yet we are bound to approach our task with appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch
..... Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1979) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148
(1923)).
256. See, e.g., St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1980) ("A
statute is to be construed, if such a construction is fairly possible, to avoid raising doubts of its constitution-
ality"); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1970) ("On the other hand, we must
remember that when the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question ... it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.") (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 98 (1944) ("This Court has consistently favored that interpretation which supports [a federal
statute's] constitutionality.").
257. For example, in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), the Court noted that "[alccording to
petitioners, [the statute in question] must be considered to be state legislation, which brings it within the
sweep of prior decisions indicating that federal courts are without power to adopt a narrowing construction
of a state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent .... It is well settled that
federal courts have the power to adopt narrowing constructions of federal legislation." Id. at 330-31.
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terms. State legislation, by contrast, generally lacks extensive documenta-
tion.258
The ultimate effect of vagueness challenges at the state level may depend
on the nature of state severability rules. Where severability is applied, if a
statute can stand alone in the absence of unconstitutional portions, reviewing
courts will remove those portions without striking down the statute as a
whole.259
Although most labeling laws are likely to withstand vagueness challenges,
drafters can take precautions by favoring civil over criminal sanctions, and more
specifically, by avoiding criminal sanctions for first offenses or unknowing
violations. The judicial practice of adopting narrowing constructions for federal
statutes suggests that a federal labeling law would be less susceptible to time-
consuming First Amendment suits than would state laws. This factor could
serve as an additional incentive to enact a new federal environmental labeling
statute.
11. Current Statutory and Legal Framework for Third-Party Environmental
Certification
Parts I and II discussed one problem currently confronting consumers in
the green marketplace: manufacturers are making misleading claims about recy-
cled content, degradability, and other environmental attributes of their products
and packaging. Federal legally binding standards are needed to give meaning
to environmental advertising claims. Only accurate information will allow
consumer choice to stimulate genuine environmental improvements in product
design, manufacture, and packaging. I have characterized the necessary
regulatory program as the "stick" approach.
Parts III, IV, and V address a second problem that erodes consumer confi-
dence in assessing the environmental compatibility of products: the value of
information about benign product attributes is frequently undercut by the
nondisclosure of harmful tradeoffs. For example, even if an advertiser truthfully
258. In Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. Lundgren, the court noted the lack of legislative history accompa-
nying California's environmental marketing statute as one factor in its determination that the term "conve-
niently recycled" was unconstitutionally vague:
[Tihe statute offers no guidance as to what recycling programs satisfy the 'conveniently recycled'
requirement. Section 17508.5(d) refers to section 40810 of the Public Resources Code which
unambiguously defines 'recycled.' However, an equally lucid explication of 'conveniently' is
wanting. Nor is there any legislative history extant to provide the court with guidance.
No. 92-0660 MHP, slip. op. at 28-29 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992).
259. For example, in California, a portion of a statute may be severed from the rest of the statute if
the remainder "is complete in itself and would have been adopted by the legislative body had the latter
foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute." Santa Barbara School District v. Superior Court, 530 P.2d
605, 618 (1975) (quoting In re Bell, 122 P.2d 22, 28 (Cal. 1942)). In Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v.
Lundgren, the court severed the unconstitutional phrase while upholding the statute as a whole. No. 92-0660
MHP, slip. op. at 30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992).
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asserts that a package is made from 30% post-consumer recycled material, the
package may nevertheless be made with chlorinated bleaches or contain toxic
additives. Consumers are unable to evaluate the multiple environmental impacts
of the goods they purchase.
Because manufacturers are unlikely to possess the motivation or expertise
to assess the full environmental implications of their products, certain foreign
governments and private U.S. companies have developed certification programs
that test products for a broad range of environmental attributes. If operated
effectively, these programs could provide incentives for manufacturers to
develop products that excel in a number of different areas.260 Ultimately, these
certification programs could also provide a systematic format for prioritizing
and evaluating the relative significance of positive and negative environmental
attributes. Because this type of program aims to reward manufacturers who
develop environmentally exemplary products, I have referred to this as the
"carrot" approach. Due to trademark registration restrictions and fairness
considerations, incentive-based environmental certification programs should be
implemented by neutral third parties, that is to say, parties independent of
manufacturers, retailers, and any other organizations in the traditional stream
of commerce.
Part III illustrates that the current legal and regulatory framework for
environmental certification is inadequate to ensure that certifiers will develop
credible programs and maintain rigorous standards. Solutions to the problem
of developing effective certification programs, however, are different from the
solutions to the environmental advertising problems discussed in Parts I and
II. First, in contrast to environmental advertising, environmental certification
is currently in its earliest growth phase, with only a few U.S. companies partici-
pating. The introduction of a comprehensive regulatory program would therefore
be premature and perhaps ultimately unnecessary if the number of certification
firms remains small. Second, because a certification program might reward only
a small fraction of manufacturers of a given product, industry pressure could
ultimately reduce the strength of any governmental product evaluation
standards.
Nevertheless, certain steps should be taken to ensure credibility and rigor
in certification programs. As a result of shortcomings in the current regulatory
framework, citizen watchdog groups should be vigilant and private certifiers
should self-regulate. Voluntary guidelines, industry self-regulation, and scrutiny
by public interest groups could be more effective in third party certification
260. In addition to incorporating minimum threshold requirements for several environmental attributes,
certifiers can establish requirements for production processes as well. For example, to gain certification,
a product may need to be: (I) made from recycled materials; (2) degradable; (3) ozone safe; (4) conserva-
tively packaged; and (5) produced without chlorinated bleaches. In other words, third-party certification
can account for production processes and packaging as well as the attributes of finished products.
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than in the advertising context. If the above measures fail to ensure that private
certifiers develop credible programs, however, government oversight or a joint
government-private program may become appropriate.
In addition to the need for new mechanisms to encourage openness and
integrity in standard-setting and comparative evaluation techniques, two of the
greatest challenges at the present time are selecting an optimal ownership and
organizational structure and developing an appropriate methodology for product
evaluation. Part IV examines alternative structures and recommends certain
procedural safeguards for enhancing the effectiveness of U.S. certification firms.
Part V examines the value and limitations of life-cycle analysis, and illustrates
certain practical constraints that make the current technique too dependent upon
assumptions to serve as an accurate and reliable basis for consumer product
comparisons."' The concluding section of Part V describes a more circum-
scribed and practical approach to product evaluation for environmental certifica-
tion.
A. Evaluating the Evaluators: Certifier Liability and the FTC Act
Because third-party environmental certification is in an embryonic phase,
the FTC has not intervened in its activities. The agency has occasionally
monitored other kinds of third-party certification organizations. Jurisdictional
questions and the limits of the agency's mandate, however, may deter the FTC
from ensuring that certifiers maintain rigorous product evaluation standards.
1. Good Housekeeping, Bad Certification
An early case against a non-environmental third-party certifier illustrates
that the FTC is capable of influencing certain aspects of certifier behavior. In
1941, the FTC issued a cease and desist order against Good Housekeeping for
failing to back its seal of approval with adequate product testing.2"2 The Com-
mission also alleged that the wording of the consumer guaranty stated in Good
Housekeeping wrongfully caused consumers to believe that the guaranty was
unlimited.263 The FTC required that any limitations on the guaranties be "ex-
plicitly stated in immediate conjunction with all such representation of guaran-
ty. ' '2" Since 1941, Good Housekeeping has narrowed its promises to avoid
261. See infra notes 374-401 and accompanying text.
262. In re Hearst Magazines, Inc., 32 F.T.C. 1440 (1941). The agency ordered the company to refrain
from using seals connoting product evaluation, unless testing actually had occurred. "In truth and in fact,
all the articles advertised in Good Housekeeping magazine, and all the articles carrying the various seals
authorized by Good Housekeeping magazine, have not been tested and approved by any scientific laboratory
.... .Id. at 1448.
263. Id. at 1457.
264. Id. at 1463.
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legal and regulatory action. The Good Housekeeping seal is now a shadow of
its former self; it has become a limited warranty, promising nothing more than
a consumer refund for defective products. 65
The FTC's vigilance over Good Housekeeping may have limited relevance
for environmental certifiers, however, particularly if certifiers are organized on
a nonprofit basis. The FTC does not have clear authority to regulate nonprofit
organizations. 66 As the certification industry grows, companies are likely to
265. As a -result of the FTC's 1941 cease and desist order, the seal of approval's "Tested and
Approved" language was replaced by a "Guaranty Seal" which made no reference to testing, but promised
instead "Replacement or Refund of Money ... if Not as Advertised Therein." See FRANK LUTHER Mor,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MAGAZINES VOLUME V: SKETCHES OF 21 MAGAZINES 1905-1930 137-43 (1968);
Celebrating 80 Years of the Good Housekeeping Seal, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Feb. 1990, at 8. By 1962,
the guaranty had narrowed still further: "If Product or Performance Defective, Replacement or Refund to
Consumer." Id. at 10. In response to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Legislation of 1975, which required
companies to disclose the limitations of warranties, Good Housekeeping modified its seal to read: "A
Limited Warranty to Consumers, Replacement or Refund if Defective." Id.
266. The FTC Act's original mandate was to protect against unfair methods of competition "in
commerce." See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 13. The law was later amended to apply to activities
"in or affecting interstate commerce." Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-48 (1988); see also Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
13 F.2d 673, 684 (8th Cir. 1926) (extending FTC jurisdiction to a nonprofit organization that affects
interstate commerce). Although it can be argued that this definition could include some nonprofit activities,
the definition of "corporation" in Section 4 seems to exclude nonprofits:
"Corporation" shall be deemed to include any company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, or
association, incorporated or unincorporated, which is organized to carry on business for its own
profit or that of its members, and has shares of capital or capital stock or certificates of interest,
and any company, trust, so-called Massachusetts trust, or association, incorporated or unincorpo-
rated, without shares of capital stock or certificates of interest, except partnerships, which is
organized to carry on business for its own profit or that of its members.
15 U.S.C. § 44 (1988).
FTC jurisdictional determinations are made on an ad hoc basis: "Congress did not intend to provide
a blanket exclusion from FTC jurisdiction of all nonprofit corporations, for it was also aware that corpora-
tions ostensibly organized not-for-profit, such as trade associations, were merely vehicles through which
a pecuniary profit could be realized for themselves or their members." Community Blood Bank of the
Kansas City Area v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 1969). "The limiting language
of § 4 indicates an intention that the question of the jurisdiction over the corporations or other associations
involved should be determined on an ad hoc basis." Id. at 1018.
The case law leaves little guidance as to what level of profit-making activity would subject an organiza-
tion to the statute. In Community Blood Bank, the Eighth Circuit held that a hospital association and a blood
bank association were solely charitable enterprises and thus were exempt from the FTC Act. Id. at 1022.
In Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 919 (1976), the Seventh Circuit upheld the FTC's determination that a not-for-profit corporation
which was organized to promote the interests of the egg industry came within the jurisdiction of the FTC
Act: "[Tlhere is sufficient evidence to support the District Court's finding that Ithe National Council for
Egg Nutrition] was organized for the profit of the egg industry, even though it pursues that profit indirectly."
Id. at 488. Among the factors the FTC examined were: the stated purpose of the organization, sources of
funding, nature of publications, relationships with profit-oriented groups, and character of membership.
National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89, 177 (1976). In 1980, the Second Circuit affirmed the
FTC's ruling that jurisdiction could be asserted over "'nonprofit organizations whose activities engender
a pecuniary benefit to its members if that activity is a substantial part of the total activities of the
organization, rather than merely incidental to some non-commercial activity."' American Medical Ass'n,
94 F.T.C. 701, 983 (1979), affd, modified and enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd by an equally
divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The FTC has further stated that "an organization may come within
the coverage of Commission jurisdiction even though it only indirectly or partially promotes profit for its
members." Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191, 284 (1983). Nevertheless, it appears
,
from these
cases that to fall within the gambit of FTC jurisdiction, the nonprofit corporation must be engaged in
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adopt nonprofit status. To register their certification marks under the federal
trademark statute, private environmental certifiers will need to establish that
they do not participate in the production or sale of certified products.267 Be-
cause nonprofit organizations are more likely to qualify for trademark registra-
tion and are less vulnerable to credibility challenges, nonprofit status is recom-
mended.268
Even if environmental certifiers are covered by the VFC Act or certain state
advertising laws that apply to nonprofit organizations,2 69 it is unlikely that
any regulatory body could monitor multivariate certification effectively. The
widespread use by certifiers of multiple product evaluation criteria would make
governmental verification considerably more difficult than it already is in the
context of single-variable claims. It would be difficult for monitoring bodies
to detect overstatements without having an intimate understanding of, and
opportunity to observe, the multiple tests involved. The FTC took action against
Good Housekeeping to address a general failure to test guaranteed products.
Compliance-monitoring bodies in the future will have to make considerably
more subtle and technical determinations concerning the adequacy of the many
tests employed by environmental certifiers.
2. FTC Endorsement Guidelines
There is some additional precedent for FTC monitoring of third-party en-
dorsement organizations. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the FTC issued
guidelines for the use of endorsements and testimonials in advertising. 270
activities with some significant pecuniary benefit to the organization or its profit-making affiliates.
267. See Florida Citrus Comm'n, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 497 (1968).
268. See infra text accompanying note 361.
269. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
270. See Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§
255.0-255.-(1991). Provisions relevant to expert certification groups include the following passages: (1)
"Endorsements must always reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser.
Furthermore, they may not contain any representations which would be deceptive, or could not be substanti-
ated if made directly by the advertiser." 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (1991). (2) "The endorsement may neither
be presented out of context nor reworded so as to distort in any way the endorser's opinion or experience
with the product." 16 C.F.R. § 255.3(a) (1991). (3) Expert endorsements may be given only by qualified
experts. 16 C.F.R. § 255.3(a) (1991). (4) Expert endorsements must be supported by an actual exercise
of expertise, including an examination or testing of the product at least as extensive as someone with the
same degree of expertise would normally need to conduct in order to support the conclusions presented.
16 C.F.R. § 255.3(b) (1992). (5) Claims of product superiority must be based on a finding of superiority.
16 C.F.R. § 255.3(b) (1992). (6) "lAin organization's endorsement must be reached by a process sufficient
to ensure that the endorsement fairly reflects the collective judgment of the organization." 16 C.F.R. § 255.4
(1991). (7) "Ilif an organization is represented as being expert, then, in conjunction with a proper exercise
of its expertise in evaluating the product under § 255.3 ... it must utilize an expert or experts recognized
as such by the organization or standards previously adopted by the organization and suitable for judging
the relative merits of such products." 16 C.F.R. § 255.4 (1992); see generally Hall et al., Use of Testimonials
and Endorsements in Advertising, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 823 (1980); Consuela Lauda Kertz & Roobina
Ohanian, Recent Trends in the Law of Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and
Nontraditional Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (1991); Whitney F.
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These guidelines cover endorsements by experts, organizations, and celebrities.
Although some U.S. environmental certifiers consider the guidelines a vehicle
for promoting certifier integrity,27 ' close analysis suggests that the guidelines
will do little to ensure that certifiers maintain rigorous standards.
The guidelines provide a general command that endorsements must "always
reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser. 272
Commercial connections between the endorsers and the sellers of advertised
products must be disclosed.273 The case law is limited and no formal rules
of liability have been enunciated. Most reported cases have concerned celebrity
and consumer endorsements rather than endorsements by experts. 274 In each
reported case, the endorsers were required to refrain from making representa-
tions unless "reasonable inquiries" had been made into their accuracy.275
The guidelines hold experts and organizations to somewhat higher standards
than they do individuals, such as actors and athletes, but the standards are not
stringent enough to ensure that certifiers will maintain rigorous evaluation
criteria. For example, the guidelines concerning organizational endorsements
merely require that endorsements are reached by a process "sufficient to ensure
that the endorsement fairly reflects the collective judgement of the organiza-
tion. 27 6 Such a requirement addresses situations in which only a few mem-
bers of a group are independently granting endorsements that are not representa-
tive of the thinking of the organization as a whole.277 If an organization tests
products and is represented as an expert in the field of testing, it must use
qualified experts and "standards previously adopted by the organization and
suitable for judging the relevant merits of such products.."278 Expert endorse-
ments must be supported by an examination of the product "at least as exten-
Washburn, Note, FTC Regulation of Endorsements in Advertising: In the Consumer's Behaf?. 8 PEPP. L.
REV. 697 (1981).
271. See, e.g., GREEN SEAL, INC., GREEN SEAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF INITIAL PRODUCT CATEGORIES
TO BE TESTED FOR NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING PROGRAM 2 (1990).
272. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (1992).
273. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (1991).
274. For example, in Cooga Mooga, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978), modified, 98 F.T.C. 814 (1981), the
FTC ordered actor Pat Boone to discontinue endorsing an ineffective mail order treatment for acne. The
FTC later prevented a dermatologist from endorsing another unproven acne cream. Glass, 95 F.T.C. 246
(1980). Similarly, the FTC ordered former astronaut Gordon Cooper to refrain from making unverified
endorsements of an automobile fuel economy device. Cooper, 94 F.T.C. 674 (1979). See also Ramson
v. Layne, 668 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 (N.D. Il. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss in case involving Lloyd
Bridge's endorsement of a mortgage broker's flawed investment scheme); Diamond Mortgage Corp. of
Illinois, 1990-2 Trade Cas. 69,190 (N.D. I1. 1990) (holding that Lloyd Bridges violated the FTC's
guidelines by endorsing a flawed investment scheme); Cliffdale Associates, 103 F.T.C., at 110 (1984)
("satisfied" consumers made unverified testimonials about the fuel economy of the "BallMatic Gas Saver
Valve.").
275. See, e.g., Cooga Mooga, 92 F.T.C. at 321; Glass, 95 F.T.C. at 252-53; In re Cliffdale Associates,
103 F.T.C. 110, 171 (1984).
276. 16 C.F.R. § 255.4 (1991).
277. See, e.g., Kertz & Ohanian, supra note 270, at 612-13.
278. 16 C.F.R. § 255.4 (1991).
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sive as someone with the same degree of expertise would normally need to
conduct in order to support the conclusions presented. ' 279 These vague re-
quirements afford no meaningful basis for differentiating between rigorous and
lenient certification standards.
The FTC's endorsement guidelines may be helpful in situations involving
clear-cut ethical breaches. For example, they can be applied to cases in which
individual consumers or celebrities endorse products about which they have no
knowledge. In addition, they may be relevant to situations in which certification
is issued in the complete absence of any testing or evaluation. For example,
in a recent case, National Ass'n of Scuba Diving Schools,28 ° the FTC entered
into a consent agreement with the National Association of Scuba Diving
Schools for issuing seals of approval that bore the words "integrity," "safety,"
"instruction," and the association's name, to scuba diving products in the
absence of testing or evaluation." Finally, the guidelines may apply when
manufacturers or advertisers inaccurately claim that their products have been
endorsed by organizations that are expert in the relevant field. For example, the
FTC recently determined that Black & Decker's statement that its iron was
endorsed by the National Fire Safety Council was misleading because the
putative endorsing organization did not have the expertise to test for appliance
safety. 82
The FTC guidelines would be of little use against certifiers, however, unless
certifiers claim to be certifying when they are not, lack relevant experts on their
staffs, or unless a few members of a certification firm misrepresent the position
of the firm as a whole. Most bona fide certifiers, propelled by their own
business interests, presumably will undertake at least reasonable inquiries into
the truthfulness of their endorsements. Furthermore, the endorsement guidelines
will not apply to certifiers that the courts determine to be nonprofit organiza-
tions.283 Finally, the endorsement guidelines are simply that-guidelines. They
are not regulations and do not have the force of law. 2 An endorsement can
be found deceptive only if the FTC can establish that it is "an unfair or decep-
279. 6 C.F.R. § 255.3(b) (1991).
280. [1979-83 Transfer Binderl Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 21,921 (July 30, 1982).
281. Id.
282. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,755 (Jan. 10, 1990); see also
Biopractic Group, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 845 (1984) (concerning company's assertion in advertisement that "Ice
Therapy" was praised by doctors, physical therapists, health organizations, professional athletic teams, and
Olympic track teams); Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aftd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984)
(concerning advertisement asserting that doctors recommend Bufferin more than other pain relievers). It
is also a misrepresentation to advertise approval by a government agency when such approval has not been
given. See, e.g., Estee Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1804 (1983) (concerning an alleged FDA recommendation of
fructose-based foods).
283. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
284. For a discussion of the shortcomings of guidelines, rather than regulations, in the endorsement
context, see Washburn, supra note 270, at 736-37.
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tive act or practice" within the meaning of Section Five of the FTC Act.285
Arguably, nonbinding guidelines such as these may be more effective for
third-party certification than for environmental advertising, because, as men-
tioned above, there are currently only a few firms conducting environmental
certification. Nevertheless, the endorsement guidelines will be of little use in
promoting effective practices among environmental certification firms unless
the FTC drafts new sections specifically tailored to these enterprises.286
B. The Antitrust Issue in Standard-Setting and Certification
In the absence of intentional efforts to exclude particular certification appli-
cants or competitors, successful antitrust cases against environmental certifiers
are likely to be rare. Courts generally have denied antitrust claims against
product evaluators, such as safety certifiers, unless the standards are overtly
discriminatory or the conduct of the evaluator is highly unreasonable.2 87 For
example, in Ecos Electronics Corp. v. Underwriters Lab., the Seventh Circuit
denied an antitrust claim against Underwriters Laboratories, stating that to assert
a successful claim a plaintiff "must show either that it was barred from
obtaining approval of its products on a discriminatory basis from its competi-
tors, or that the conduct as a whole was manifestly anticompetitive and unrea-
sonable." '288
The Supreme Court has occasionally found antitrust liability in the tradi-
tional standard-setting context.289 For example, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co.,290 the Court reinstated a gas burner produ-
cer's antitrust complaint of wrongful refusal of certification where the refusal
effectively excluded the plaintiff's gas burners from the market, and the certifi-
er's tests were conducted "arbitrarily and capriciously" and under the influence
of competing companies. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc.,291' a manufacturer of plastic electrical conduits brought a Sherman anti-
trust action against the National Fire Protection Association for allegedly
285. Washburn, supra note 270, at 736-37, 741-42.
286. Recommendations for third-party environmental certification that could be translated into FTC
requirements are discussed in infra notes 367-68 and accompanying text. State enforcement agencies will
be needed to supplement any federal activities.
287. It should be noted that the Lanham Act, the trademark statute, provides for cancellation of a
certification mark if the certifier arbitrarily discriminates against products that meet the criteria established
for licensing under the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(e) (1988).
288. Ecos Elec. Corp. v. Underwriters Lab., 743 F.2d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1210 (1985) (quoting Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1984)).
289. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); American Soc'y of Mechanical
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982), reh'g. denied, 458 U.S. 1116 (1982); see
generally Tedd Blecher, Product Standards and Certification Programs, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 223 (1980).
290. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
291. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
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conspiring with a producer of steel conduits to exclude plastic conduits from
its fire safety standards. Although the Supreme Court held the standard-setting
organization liable, 92 the Court acknowledged the procompetitive advantages
of standard-setting in the absence of collusion: "It is this potential for procom-
petitive benefits that has led most lower courts to apply rule of reason analysis
to product standard-setting by private associations. '293
Environmental certification can be contrasted to traditional standard-set-
ting294 and to safety certification2 95 in that environmental certification of
a product is not a prerequisite to market entry. The market effects of envi-
ronmental certification are likely to be difficult to ascertain. In addition, because
uncertified products will not be excluded from the market, manifestly anti-
competitive harm will be difficult to prove. It is possible that anticompetitive
effects could become more pronounced in the future, however, if corporate and
government procurement policies and state and federal regulations incorporate
the environmental standards established by certifiers.296
C. Limitations of Tort Remedies: Negligent Misrepresentation and Third-Party
Certifiers
In theory, consumers and other parties could challenge environmental certi-
fiers for misrepresenting product performance, and competitors or public interest
groups could challenge certifiers for making endorsements based on incomplete
or inappropriate testing procedures.297 Although there is no case law on
negligent misrepresentation in the environmental certification context, cases
involving safety certifiers and general quality certifiers may indicate how courts
would treat such claims. These cases provide only a partial analogy, however,
because they involve physical injuries, an unlikely consequence of
environmental advertising or certification.
292. "Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture,
distribute, or purchase certain types of products." id. at 500.
293. Id. at 501.
294. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 354 U.S. 656 (1961); Allied Tube &
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
295. Ecos Elec. Corp. v. Underwriters Lab., 743 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1986).
296. The Court's holding in Allied Tube was based largely on the fact that the National Fire Protection
Association's standards for electrical equipment safety were regularly adopted by state and local govern-
ments, private safety certifiers, insurers, and contractors:
A substantial number of state and local governments routinely adopt the Code into law with little
or no change; private certification laboratories, such as Underwriters Laboratories, normally will
not list and label an electrical product that does not meet Code standards; many underwriters will
refuse to insure structures that are not built in conformity with the Code; and many electrical
inspectors, contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls outside the Code.
486 U.S. at 495.
297. Consumers would be unlikely to have sufficient knowledge of certification methodologies to raise
negligence claims for inadequate testing procedures.
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For example, in Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp.,29 8 a
federal district court applied Virginia law to hold Underwriters Laboratories
liable for certifying a fire extinguisher that exploded upon use.299 In Hanberry
v. Hearst Corp.," the plaintiff filed suit against the publishers of Good
Housekeeping over an injury allegedly caused by a defective pair of shoes
which bore Good Housekeeping's "Consumer Guaranty Seal." The magazine
backed the seal with the following statement: "We have satisfied ourselves that
the products and services advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and
the advertising claims made for them in our magazine are truthful." '' The
California Court of Appeals rejected causes of action for breach of warranty
arid strict liability,3"2 but held Good Housekeeping liable in negligent
misrepresentation. 30 3 According to the Hanberry court: "Implicit in the seal
and certification is the representation [that] respondent has taken reasonable
steps to make an independent examination of the product." 3" The court stated
298. 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
299. Id. at 118.
300. 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1969).
301. Id.
302. The court reserved warranty and strict liability actions for manufacturers and suppliers: "[Llia-
bility for individually defective items should be limited to those directly involved in the manufacturing and
supplying process, and should not be extended through warranty or strict liability to a general endorser who
makes no representation it has examined or tested each item marketed." Id. at 524. Although strict liability
is common in defective product cases, it is far less common in cases involving services. A fundamental
difference between defective product and defective certification cases is that certifiers test only for class
defects or attributes. As a result, certifiers generally test samples of products and are not responsible for
the integrity of individual items. Charles F. Rechlin, Note, Liability of Certifiers of Products for Personal
Injuries to the User or Consumer, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 132, 137 (1970). Efficiency concerns may prevent
courts from holding third-party environmental certifiers strictly liable. Manufacturers are better cost-avoiders
than third-party certifiers because manufacturers possess greater control over production processes. Id. at
141,143. Although certifiers that address consumer audiences ultimately hope to influence production, they
have only an attenuated connection to actual production decisions. Cost-avoiding behavior is also more
efficient for manufacturers because they are responsible only for their own product lines, while certifiers
may be responsible for hundreds of different product lines.
At least one court, however, has been willing to reconsider the Hanberry approach to strict liability.
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Ct. App. 1972). In Kasel, the court dispensed with negli-
gence theory and held a company strictly liable for improperly granting its trademark to a foreign
manufacturer. Id. at 323. Although the trademark licensee was neither manufacturer nor seller, the court
reasoned that it was a "link in the marketing enterprise which placed a defective product within the stream
of commerce," and thus should be held liable. Id. (emphasis added). The court suggested that Hanberry's
rationale should be reevaluated: "Where it can be established that defendant by its avowed testing was the
responsible inducement for the purchase by plaintiff, we see no reason to hold that defendant was not a
necessary instrument in the stream of commerce." Id. at 323-24.
Although this decision may reflect a growing tendency to apply strict liability to all parties playing
a significant marketing role, strict liability is less suited to environmental certifiers than to manufacturers
or safety certifiers because environmental certifiers have a less immediate impact on product design.
Because society recognizes that third-party certifiers can play a valuable role in providing objective
information to consumers, courts will be unlikely to apply strict liability to any kinds of certifiers on a
regular basis. For a discussion of the important role of third-party evaluators in providing objective
information to consumers, see Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Market for Consumer Product Evaluations: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (1985).
303. 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
304. Id. at 522. "Since the very purpose of respondent's seal and certification is to induce consumers
to purchase products so endorsed, it is foreseeable certain consumers will do so .... " Id.
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that it was influenced more by public policy than by whether the cause of
action could be "comfortably fitted into one of the law's traditional categories
of liability.""3 5 Arguably, the court would have been less sympathetic to the
plaintiff in the absence of physical injury.
Parties raising negligent misrepresentation claims against environmental
certifiers would face the same causation, damages, and reliance problems as
plaintiffs face in misrepresentation suits against advertisers, as discussed in Part
1.3°6 Plaintiffs would often need to prove that the representation was general
enough to constitute a broad affirmation of quality, rather than a more limited
environmental endorsement." 7 Suits against third-party certifiers, however,
would face more obstacles than would suits against manufacturers. In cases of
economic loss, plaintiffs would need to prove membership in the limited class
for whom defendants intended reliance.0 8 This is not a simple determination;
states have adopted highly divergent views on third-party liability in cases of
economic loss.309 Additionally, plaintiffs would need to show that the certifier
305. Id. at 521.
306. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
307. A helpful way to understand the characteristics of third-party environmental certifiers is to contrast
them with safety certifiers such as Underwriters Laboratories (UL). The UL safety guarantee is more
vulnerable to successful misrepresentation actions. UL's direct influence on product manufacturing makes
it more susceptible to "stream of commerce" arguments than environmental certifiers, whose logos are
directed to consumers. See Justin T. Beck, Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.: Liability of Product Certifiers, 5
U.S.F. L. REV. 137, 143 (1970) (explaining that marketing of fire extinguishers is virtually impossible
without UL certification). Manufacturers are often required by federal, state, and local regulators to design
their products to meet UL specifications. The Public Gives UL its Seal of Approval, Bus. WK., Sept. 18,
1965, at 92. Insurance companies often refuse to insure products without the UL logo. Id. By contrast,
the Good Housekeeping Seal or an environmental logo might help manufacturers boost their sales but is
not a production requisite. Finally, since the UL seal is a safety seal, misuse of the logo is more likely to
lead to physical injuries than misuse of an environmental logo. Consumer actions challenging safety labels
are therefore likely to be more successful than those challenging environmental labels; harm is arguably
more foreseeable and causation of injuries more direct.
Other factors, however, may increase the potential exposure of environmental endorsers relative to
safety certifiers. First, in cases involving safety certification, the lower burdens of proof might cause an
injured plaintiff to pursue a strict liability action against a manufacturer or seller rather than a negligence
action against a product certifier or endorser. In cases involving environmental certification, attention is
likely to shift to the endorser in the absence of a product defect.
Also, safety certifiers such as UL test for a single criterion, safety, and tests are either passed or failed.
As one commentator remarked: "When [UL] puts its stamp on a product, it is saying just one thing. The
product is safe. The label does not guarantee high quality." Id. By contrast, if an environmental certifier
falls to accompany its logo with specific statements documenting the nature of the tests undertaken, the seal
could be construed to represent the all-encompassing claim: "This is an environmentally sound product."
Such an interpretation could open the endorser to greater potential liability.
308. See supra note 72.
309. For analyses of the widely ranging judicial perspectives on the liability of service providers for
economic losses of third-parties, see Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountant's Liability,
1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 213; Willis W. Hagen, I1, Accountant's Common Law Negligence Liability to
Third Parties, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 181; Frank J. Macchiarola, The Accountants' Liability Controver-
sy, 1988 COLM. Bus. L. REV. 177; John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental
Tort Reform, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 1929 (1987).
Historically, privity between parties was a requirement for a successful action against certifiers of
quality. In the landmark English case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842), the court held that a defendant coach inspector who had represented the safety of vehicles was not
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had a pecuniary interest in the transaction,310 a showing that could perhaps
be difficult to make, particularly if the certifier were a nonprofit
organization.3"' Another consideration is that certifiers would be likely to
accompany their logos with specific statements (for example, "made from 50%
recycled material" and "this product uses no chlorinated bleaches") to clarify
the basis for the endorsement and to reduce potential tort liability.3"2
IV. Toward a Reliable Environmental Certification Program
Part III provided examples of jurisdictional and technical impediments to
FTC monitoring of private environmental certifiers, and outlined various
obstacles that consumers and competitors would face in litigation against
certification firms.
Because of the shortcomings in the legal and regulatory framework, environ-
mental certifiers must proceed with care. This Part highlights the problems that
responsible to an injured third party. In 1922, Judge Cardozo broke with precedent in Glanzer v. Shepard,
135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922), extending the tort of negligent misrepresentation to a weigher of beans whose
faulty calculations resulted in economic loss to the known plaintiff, despite the absence of privity of contract.
This case is distinguishable from Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), where Judge Cardozo
denied liability because the plaintiff was among an "indeterminate class of persons" and therefore the firm
had not induced reliance. Id.
Most of the recent literature on third-party liability of service providers for economic loss pertains to
accountants. Similar principles, however, can be applied to other service providers such as certifiers.
According to one commentator, there are four dominant judicial positions on accountants' negligence liability
to third parties. The first is the near equivalence of a privity requirement enunciated in Glanzer and
Ultramares, whereby an accountant will be liable for negligence only to parties who are in a "contractual
relationship or its equivalent." Id. at 543. The second is the standard of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 72, § 552, under which a service provider will be liable if the misrepresentation is relied
upon by persons whose reliance is actually foreseen or who are members of a limited class for whose benefit
the accountant knows the information was intended. Id.; see Rusch Factors Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85
(D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). The third is the "reasonably foreseeable third
party" rule of Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), and International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). This approach reflects the more
traditional view of negligence liability as enunciated in Patsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928). The final approach is the foreseeable injury standard of Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt
& Co., 335 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983), whereby liability will attach for foreseeable injuries resulting from
accountants' negligent acts unless substantial public policy reasons dictate otherwise. See Hagen, supra,
at 183-201.
310. See supra note 74.
311. The fact that Good Housekeeping Magazine benefitted financially from its endorsements influenced
the Hanberry court to find liability, even though this finding was unnecessary in a physical injury case. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 74, § 311.
312. The Hanberry court chose, however, to ignore words on the Good Housekeeping Seal that limited
the promise to a refund for defective products. Despite the words, the overall effect of the seal was to
mislead: "Respondent cannot successfully contend appellant failed to state a cause of action in tort for
personal injury because it has limited its liability by inserting in its seal the words, 'If the product or
performance is defective, Good Housekeeping guarantees replacement or refund to consumer."' Hanberry
v. Hearst, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1969). The court determined that the breached promise was
not the promise to replace defective shoes, but the general claim that the shoes were "good ones." Id. The
court therefore found that the seal was an overall quality seal, guaranteeing safety as well as other attributes.
Good Housekeeping could not avoid liability for its general guarantee by a statement purporting to limit
the amount of damages.
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will arise if private certifiers fail to adopt separate product niches, coordinate
their standards, and maintain affordable prices. It also examines alternative
organizational structures and recommends certain strategies that could help
certifiers surmount existing barriers to effective operation. If private certifiers
fail to take the necessary precautions, and if private certification is nevertheless
considered to be effective in promoting product improvements, governmental
guidance or a joint public-private certification program may be desirable in the
future.
A. Alternative Structures for Environmental Certification
If environmental certification proves to be an effective catalyst for inno-
vation in product design, U.S. policymakers will need to decide whether to
develop a governmental program, or whether to let private organizations run
certification programs as they do now.313 A third alternative is a public-
313. An outline of selected options for the structure of a third-party environmental certification program
is presented below:
Model I - A government or quasi-governmental seal of approval program based on Germany's Blue
Angel or Canada's Environmental Choice model. The governmental body would select product categories
and develop evaluation standards.
Benefits
a) Government involvement would lend credibility to the program and allow for uniformity in
standards.
b) Governmental funding could help compensate for high start-up costs, creating lower testing and
licensing fees for manufacturers.
c) A centralized governmental program could help lay the groundwork for an international labeling
effort.
Drawbacks
a) Governmental agencies may be subject to industry influence or "capture," which could affect the
standard-setting process.
b) Implementing standards via the cumbersome federal regulatory machinery could thwart efforts
to keep pace with technological change. (Standards should evolve every few years to adapt to new markets
and technological capabilities.)
c) Program support would fluctuate with political tides.
d) A government-run program based on multiple-attribute evaluations could be an over-centralized
mechanism for influencing private production decisions. For this reason, the government's role might be
more effective in the context of warning labels rather than positive seals of approval.
Model 2 - Unregulated private programs. (This is the present structure of environmental certification
in the United States.)
Benefits
Competition between environmental certification organizations could stimulate innovative approaches
and techniques.
Drawbacks
a) Proliferation of organizations and standards could result in consumer confusion and discourage
participation by manufacturers.
b) High start-up and compliance monitoring costs could translate into high fees for participants,
which could discriminate against small firms. Alternatively, certifiers might compensate for high costs
through lowering of standards and overzealous certification.
c) Harassment suits by manufacturers denied certification could further reduce scarce financial
resources.
Model 3 - Government regulation or endorsement of private programs.
Benefits
Regulation could help promote credibility, while private management could enhance operational
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private hybrid organization, which would involve seed funding by a govern-
mental agency, most likely EPA, combined with private management and
independent selection of product evaluation standards.
1. Governmental Programs
Governmental or quasi-governmental environmental certification programs
are currently operating in the European Community, Canada, Japan, and
Scandinavia. West Germany initiated the world's first program with the Blue
Angel seal in 1978. Canada launched the Environmental Choice program in
1988, featuring the EcoLogo. 14 Canada's Environmental Choice program has
served as a model for at least one U.S. program.315 Japan unveiled the Eco-
adaptability.
Drawbacks
a) Government regulation or endorsement of the standard-setting process would require an intimate
understanding of relevant technologies and product evaluation procedures, which would be extremely
difficult to obtain in the absence of direct governmental standard-setting.
b) Proliferation of certification organizations and logos could continue to confuse consumers.
Model 4 - Government-private hybrid, based on the Canadian crown corporation model. The program
would benefit from government seed funding and government involvement in the appointment of a board
of directors, but would be privately operated. The private entity would determine product categories and
establish evaluation criteria.
Benefits
a) Partial government funding would help compensate for high start-up and compliance monitoring
costs, which could result in lower certification fees for small companies.
b) Government participation in the selection of a board of directors could bestow a measure of
governmental accountability to the program.
c) A public-private hybrid program, like a governmental program, could help lay the groundwork
for an international labeling effort.
d) Private establishment of product categories and evaluation criteria could reduce industrial lobbying
pressures, as private firms would not be subject to rigorous notice-and-comment requirements.
Drawbacks
a) The implicit governmental endorsement of a hybrid program could allow for misrepresentation
with the illusion of credibility, if the private manager fails to maintain rigorous standards.
b) Partial government funding could reduce incentives for innovation.
c) Partial government control could stifle program managers.
314. Telephone Interview with Valerie Douglas, Senior Science Advisor, Secretariat, Environmental
Choice Program (March 21, 1991). The Canadian program receives partial government funding from the
Department of the Environment, with additional funding from licensing agreements with participating
manufacturers. The Secretariat, a small group of civil servants, provides technical expertise to the program,
receiving advice from a nongovernmental Environmental Choice Board representing academia, industry,
and private research organizations. An Independent Coordinating Technical Committee oversees the
selection of product groups and evaluation standards. The Secretariat issues licensing agreements allowing
manufacturers to use the EcoLogo for terms of up to three years. These agreements authorize the Canadian
Standards Association and other independent laboratories to make periodic unannounced factory site visits
to verify ongoing compliance with designated standards. In order to receive an EcoLogo, a product is
required to conform to a number of independently verifiable standards which cover a range of attributes.
Id. For more information on licensing agreements, see CANADIAN STANDARDS AsSOCIATION, INFORMATION
SHEET ON ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE EcoLooo LICENSING (1991). Goods that carry the Canadian EcoLogb
include thermal insulation made from recycled fibers, water-conserving plumbing fixtures, reduced pollution
paints, paper made from recycled fibers, and re-refined motor oil. ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE NEWS RELEASE
2 (June 1992) (on file with author).
315. Green Seal's multiple-attribute approach mirrors the Canadian method. See infra notes 402-405
and accompanying text.
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Mark in 1989,316 and Australia initiated the Green Spot in 1990.31" Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Iceland are planning a coordinated Scandinavian effort
that will use common symbols and labeling criteria.318 The European
Community is similarly planning a unified effort.
319
A governmental program in the U.S. would offer advantages over a private
program in terms of credibility, accountability, and, in some areas, technical
expertise. The requirements of the APA would ensure public observation,
review and comment on proposed standards and procedures. Government
centralization would eliminate the problems associated with certifier
proliferation and would allow for focused improvement of designated product
evaluation techniques. Centralized government control could also facilitate the
development of an international certification program. Perhaps most
importantly, government appropriations would compensate for the high start-up
and compliance monitoring costs that characterize environmental certification.
This would allow for lower prices and thus encourage greater participation by
small manufacturers.
Inherent in the APA's procedural requirements, however, is a trade-off that
may compel further experimentation with nongovernmental structures.3 20
Although the notice and comment procedures of the APA are invaluable to
democratic participation in a variety of contexts, and should be roughly imitated
by private certifiers, they could serve to lower standards in environmental
certification. Certification programs aim to reward a limited number of product
brands for exceptional environmental performance in a variety of areas. It
would be extremely difficult for a governmental program, bound by formal
review and comment procedures, to withstand industry opposition to selection
criteria that could deny certification to a high percentage of products in a given
industry.3 21 A "carrot" program should supplement and exceed the baseline
316. CARSWELL & LANGFEL, supra note 12, at 16.
317. Id. at 22.
318. In the Scandinavian program, product categories and criteria are developed individually by
participating countries and forwarded to the Nordic Council Coordinating Body on Environmental Labeling,
where two delegates represent each country. Final standards are approved by consensus. ORGANIZATION
FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING IN THE OECD COUNTRIES
36 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter OECD REPORT].
319. Id. at 20.
320. See supra note 117 for the relevant portion of APA § 553 which outlines the notice and comment
requirement for agency rulemaking.
321. Canada's government-run Environmental Choice program, while one of the most active programs,
appears to be responding to industry pressure to allow broader participation among manufacturers. The
program originally calibrated its standards to allow for initial certification of only 10% to 20% of a given
industry or of the market in a given product line. OECD REPORT, supra note 318, at 17. The program's
recent revised mandate, however, "responds to the Government's commitment to sustainable development,
which embraces environmental and economic decisionmaking." ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM,
MANDATE STATEMENT 2 (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter MANDATE STATEMENT]; ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE
PROGRAM, REVISED MANDATE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE ADVISORY BOARD (June 1992). Although
the revised mandate states that "[flor the most part, the criteria for meeting a guideline will be established
so that only leaders (those firms producing products which minimize stress on the environment) in the
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requirements of any "stick" program. Arguably, governmental bodies are best
equipped to develop minimum standards and less suited to designing multiple-
attribute, incentive based certification standards.
Beyond these standard-setting concerns, a governmental evaluation program
could be vulnerable to erosion or disbanding in the wake of shifting political
currents. In an age of budget constraints, a full-scale environmental certification
program may represent an unacceptable expenditure of government resources.
Some existing foreign governmental programs have begun to experiment with
increased private involvement.322 Norway's new labeling program will be
managed by an independent non-profit organization,323 and Sweden has
proposed a similar independent management structure for its program.324
A governmental environmental certification program is not expected to be
implemented in the United States in the near future. In 1990, EPA staff mem-
bers drafted a pollution prevention bill that would establish a governmental
program based on the Canadian model, but the bill was never introduced into
Congress.325 An early version of S. 615, the "Eco Label Act of 1990,' '326
proposed an EPA certification program, but the program was not re-introduced
in the subsequent bill. A California bill that proposed a state-run labeling
program was also unsuccessful.
327
2. The Public-Private Hybrid Model
An alternative model is a public-private hybrid program. Such a program
might involve government seed funding and government participation in the
selection of a board of directors, coupled with private standard-setting and
management. Public-private hybrid organizations in the United States include
the National Academy of Sciences, the National Safety Council, the Office of
Legal Services, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. In Canada, this
industry will initially be able to meet the guideline," the statement lists as an additional goal to "ensure that
environmental and economic considerations are integral in product category selection and criteria setting
for product guidelines so as to maximize environmental benefits and avoid significant negative economic
impacts." ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, supra, at 2.
322. Partially as a result of governmental delay and blockage of proposed standards, Canada's
Environmental Choice Board has considered new arrangements that would involve private management.
.See, e.g., Peter McGowan, manuscript prepared for the Environmental Choice Program (1991) (unpublished)
(on file with author). Government officials, however, recently decided to maintain governmental control
over the program. Telephone Interview with David Cohen, Executive Committee, Environmental Choice
Program (May 5, 1991).
323. CARSWELL & LANFGEL, supra note 12, at 18.
324. Id. at 19.
325. Elizabeth Chute, No EPA "Green" Labels Planned, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Oct. 8, 1990, at 1, 29.
326. S. 3218, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. (1990).
327. A.B. 3030, Cal. Assembly, 1989-90 Reg. Sess. (1990). Assemblywoman Beverly Hansen's
legislation designated the California Integrated Waste Management Board to manage the program. In
conjunction with an advisory committee, the Board would design the label, set appropriate standards, and
manage licenses. License fees were to be set on a sliding scale, based on annual gross sales of evaluated
products.
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organizational form is common.328
A public-private hybrid program could help subsidize certification start-up
costs while leaving the product evaluation responsibilities and management
decisions to a nongovernmental body. In the United States, such an institution
would initially be chartered by Congress, with the authorizing legislation
incorporating a public mandate.329 The statute could direct a government
agency such as EPA to appoint several or all members of the new program's
board of directors.3 0 A government appointed board would offer the program
a measure of credibility, public visibility, and an implicit government
endorsement. Beyond selecting the board, the governmental role would be
limited to providing funds and technical expertise. An independent private
entity, either a new certification organization or an existing one, would develop
testing criteria and manage the certification program.
The dual structure of the public-private hybrid model offers several advan-
tages. Private authority over the standard selection and product evaluation
process could help insulate the program from excessive industry pressure.
Government subsidization would facilitate sliding scale fee structures for small
firms, while obviating the need for concomitant overcharging of larger partici-
pants. Norway's program, run by an independent nonprofit organization,
resembles this model in many respects.33'
3. Private Organizations
U.S. environmental certification programs are currently concentrated in the
private sector.332 Green Seal, launched in 1990, is a nonprofit organization
that, like Canada's Environmental Choice program, awards a seal to products
that meet threshold standards for multiple environmental attributes.33 3 Green
Seal has contracted with an independent laboratory to test products and monitor
production facilities. 34 Companies awarded the seal pay a license fee based
on costs of certification and monitoring.335 Another organization is Scientific
328. Such corporations, which number in the hundreds in Canada, include Air Canada, the Bank of
Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Farm Credit Corporation, and the Export Development
Corporation. J. ROBERT & S. PRITCHARD, CROWN CORPORATIONS IN CANADA: THE CALCULUS OF INSTRU-
MENT CHOICE 41 (1983).
329. A report prepared for EPA recommended this as one possible approach. CARSWELL & LANFOEL,
supra note 12, at 53-54.
330. Id. at 50.
331. Many of the members of the Norwegian program's board and technical council are government
officials.
332. Maykuth, supra note 4, at A2.
333. Interview with Denis Hayes, former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and current Director
of Green Seal, Inc., in Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 12, 1991); see also Maykuth, supra note 4, at A2.
334. GREEN SEAL/UL ALLIANCE FACT SHEET I (undated). Green Seal has issued evaluation standards
for six product categories, including tissue paper, writing paper, compact fluorescent lamps, re-refined engine
oil, and water-efficient plumbing fixtures.
335. Interview with Denis Hayes, supra note 333.
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Certification Systems, formerly Green Cross, which initiated an environmental
labeling program in 1989.336 The company verifies manufacturers' claims
pertaining to single attributes, including recycled content and biodegradability,
and has begun to undertake "product life-cycle inventories. '3 7 Although the
program has established certain standards for evaluating single environmental
claims, the recent emphasis is on "product informational labeling," which
consists of documenting comparative results of life-cycle inventories in charts
presented on product labels, in lieu of setting threshold standards for
environmental attributes.3 38 In addition to Green Seal and Scientific
Certification Systems, various retail grocery store chains have attempted to
develop their own programs for environmental evaluation and product
promotion. 3 9
B. Recommendations for Private Management
Those private U.S. organizations that are genuinely independent of the
companies they certify should continue to research, develop and implement
environmental certification programs unless it becomes clear that proliferation
of standards, improper selection of product categories or inadequate conduct
of testing procedures will subvert the integrity of the enterprise. It is possible
that market forces will naturally limit the number of private programs. If
proliferation of groups and standards creates credibility problems, manufacturers
may become unwilling to pay testing and licensing fees and the market will
be unable to support multiple players. Vigilant scrutiny by the media and
environmental groups3" could help maintain the credibility of remaining
programs.
On the other hand, market forces could instead serve to undermine the
quality of environmental certification. Certification is characterized by high
start-up and monitoring costs, and private certifiers could elect to relax their
evaluation criteria or award unwarranted licenses as a means of covering these
costs. Some manufacturers may be willing to pay for negligent or even
336. GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION COMPANY, GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION SYSTEM PROGRAM
OVERVIEW (1991) (corporate brochure); GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION COMPANY, SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION
SYSTEMS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION (1991).
337. Telephone Interview with Linda Brown, Vice-President of Communications, Scientific Certification
Systems, Inc., Feb. 16, 1993.
338. Id.
339. For example, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Loblaw Companies, Ltd. have developed their own
programs. GREEN REPORT 1, supra note 92, at 25.
340. In 1991, a national environmental organization criticized one U.S. certification organization for
allegedly failing to maintain rigorous standards. R. JUSTIN SMrrIH & RICHARD DENISON, ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND, AT CROSS PURPOSES? A CRmCAL EXAMINATION OF GREEN CROSS'S ENVIRONMENTAL
RECORD 39 (Sept. 30, 1991) [hereinafter AT CROSS PURPOSES]; Scientific Certification Systems submitted
a written response in GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION Co., REVIEW OF THE GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM (Oct. 1991).
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fraudulent certification in order to enhance the sales of their products. Such
problems may be difficult to correct because consumers are unlikely to discern
changes in product evaluation criteria, and statutory34' and common law 3 2
consumer protection is presently inadequate.
1. Potential Pitfalls: The HeartGuide Lesson
In the health field, some of the possible pitfalls of private certification be-
came manifest in the American Heart Association's (AHA) effort to create a
HeartGuide seal of approval program. In 1989, the AHA unveiled plans to
award its HeartGuide seal to brands of foods judged comparatively low in fats,
saturated fats, cholesterol, and sodium. The first five product categories that
the AHA chose for comparative testing included margarines, spreads, shorten-
ings, and oils. 343
The program rapidly encountered opposition. Seven state Attorneys General
expressed disapproval of the concept,' and the USDA announced that it
would bar the inclusion of meats in the program.345 The central concern was
that the HeartGuide seal could be attached to products that, although healthier
than similar products of other brands, were nonetheless promoters of heart
disease.3 46 Awarding the seal to a brand of margarine, it was feared, could
send the false message to consumers that the margarine was healthier than an
unlabeled product such as yogurt.347 The simplicity of the logo, a red heart
341. See supra notes 262-96 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 297-312 and accompanying text.
343. Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. TllwlEs, Oct. 25, 1989, at C4.
344. In a letter to James Benson, then Acting Commissioner of the FDA, the Attorneys General stated:
We agree with you that the Heartguide program has laudable goals, but that in its implemen-
tation it presents more problems for consumers than solutions. It could very well lead to an
increase in deceptive health claim advertising by those manufacturers who have paid the AHA
the $15,000 to $600,000 required to participate in the program ....
We will be monitoring closely those advertisements by manufacturers who use the seal to
insure that their advertisements do not deceptively claim or imply that use of the product will
improve the health of the consumer or that because their product has the HeartGuide seal it is
somehow superior to identical products produced by other manufacturers who are not paying to
participate in the AHA program.
Letter from Attorneys General of California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, and
Texas, to James S. Benson, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug Administration (Feb.
2, 1990)..
345. Carole Sugarman, Agriculture Dept. Rejects Heart Association Label: Criteria for Approving Meat,
Poultry at Issue, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1989, at A3.
346. In a letter to the President of the AHA, the Acting Commissioner of the FDA applauded the
objectives but disapproved of the means of the HeartGuide program: "Third party endorsement programs
are not in the best interests of consumers .... They create the implication that an endorsed product is
somehow superior to an unendorsed product which may or may not in fact be the case." Attachment to
letter from James S. Benson, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs, FDA, to Myron L. Weisfeldt,
President, AHA 2 (Jan. 24, 1990).
347. AHA President Myron L. Weisfeldt felt this was an untenable argument: "Very few people that
we have contacted think that ... you can drink a bottle of safflower oil and be healthy, or take a quarter
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embellished with a white check mark, could incorrectly imply that products
bearing seals were recommended over other types of foods. Trade associations
and public interest groups objected to the label's cost, possibly prohibitive for
small companies, and to the AHA's refusal to disclose its evaluation crite-
ria." Eventually, the AHA succumbed to concerted pressure from the FDA
and other groups and terminated the project. 49
Environmental certification programs could confront similar hurdles. For
example, a particular brand of vacuum cleaner might receive an endorsement
due to relative energy efficiency and low noise, while brooms and low-tech
carpet sweepers could fall outside the categories of products tested.
The potential for proliferation of overlapping programs, a major concern
in the area of environmental certification, was realized in the health field. The
American College of Nutrition, the American Medical Women's Association,
and the National Center for Cardiac Information had all developed different
seals of approval for "heart wise" food products.350
2. The Road to Credibility
If private environmental certification is to succeed in the United States, it
must obtain the confidence of manufacturers and the public. Moreover, even
if certifiers can develop a high level of public credibility, they must actively
seek to avoid proliferation of standards. In the event that several groups develop
successful programs, one of the following three scenarios should occur: (1)
environmental certification organizations should coordinate their standards and
evaluation criteria; (2) certifiers should exploit different product or functional
niches; or (3) one group should prevail over the others and become the
dominant environmental certifier. In addition, certifiers must find appropriate
ways to maintain rigorous product evaluation standards while providing fair
prices or sliding fee scales to accommodate small firms applying for
certification.
Certain potential problems of private environmental certifiers, such as the
failure to disclose procedures or to effectively control the use of certification
marks, could be mitigated through voluntary precautionary measures and
pound of margarine, peel off the wrapper and eat it like a banana." Sugarman, supra note 345, at A3.
348. Id. The AlIA responded that if it disclosed the criteria, food companies would avoid the fee by
advertising that they were in compliance with the AHA guidelines, even though they had never applied for
the seal. Id.
349. The program's standards also conflicted with FDA nutritional guidelines--the FDA at the time
was on the verge of launching its own major labeling effort. Natalie Angier, Heart Association Cancels its
Program to Rate Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1990, at Al. The HeartGuide program subsequently struggled
to find ways to salvage its $4 million investment, including a health education and advertising program.
Janet Meyers, HeartGuide Legacy: FDA May Shoot Down Other Seal Programs, ADVERTISING AGE, May
2, 1990, at 60.
350. Meyers, supra note 349, at 60. Burros, supra note 343, at C4.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
monitoring by the FTC, EPA, and state enforcement agencies. The problems
of standards coordination and cost control are inherently more complex and
problematic, and may create the need for a greater governmental commitment
in the future.
Underwriters Laboratories, Good Housekeeping, and Consumers Union are
private product endorsers that have gained credibility over the years. Certain
factors arguably distinguish these organizations, however, from environmental
certification programs as presently planned. For example, Underwriters Labora-
tories was initially funded by the insurance industry in 1893, shortly after
Edison's new electric light bulb allegedly set fire to Chicago's Columbian
Exhibition.35" ' Governments at all levels subsequently endorsed Underwriters
Laboratories standards,"' which were soon woven into industrial and building
codes. 353 Like Underwriters Laboratories, Good Housekeeping also benefitted
from governmental ties at the outset.354
Both the Good Housekeeping Institute and Consumers Union developed in
conjunction with popular magazines.355 Consumers Union derives its income
from its magazine, Consumer Reports, and noncommercial grants, accepting
no license fees. 356 The Consumers Union philosophy is quite different from
that of environmental certification programs; its policy against commercializa-
tion enjoins manufacturers from using the magazine's ratings in advertisements.
Consumers Union disavows any commercial connection with its rated products
in a disclaimer in each issue of Consumer Reports.35 7 Loyal to this stated
policy, Consumers Union has sued manufacturers that have used its ratings for
advertising purposes.51
351. One of UL's first sponsors was the National Board of Fire Underwriters. The Public Gives UL
its Seal of Approval, BUS. WK., Sept. 18, 1965, at 92.
352. Id.
353. For example, Virginia's Fire Safety Regulations accepted UL as one of several "nationally
recognized testing laboratories" for evaluating equipment suitability. Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguish-
er Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109, 117 n.7 (D. Del. 1967).
354. For example, Harvey W. Wiley, former Chief of the U.S. Bureau of Chemistry (precursor to the
FDA), later became the Director of the Good Housekeeping Institute's Bureau of Food, Sanitation and
Health. Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt fl, former Chief Counsel, FDA (Nov. 11, 1991).
355. For a historical account of Consumers Union, see NORMAN ISAAC SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST:
THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS UNION (1983). The multivariate aspect of environmental certification could
be well-suited to presentation in a magazine-type format similar to Consumer Reports. This option should
be carefully considered.
356. Telephone Interview with Betsy Hamilton, Librarian and Archivist, Consumers Union (May 8,
1991); Telephone Interview with Geoff Martin, Senior Project Leader, Environmental Products Division,
Consumers Union (May 8, 1991).
357. The Consumers Union disclaimer states that "[nleither the Ratings nor the reports may be used
in advertising or for any other commercial purpose," and that Consumers Union "will take all steps open
to it to prevent commercial use of its materials, its name, or the. name of Consumer Reports." About
Consumers Union, CONSUMER REP., Mar. 1991, at 139.
358. Consumers Union has generally been successful against companies that misrepresent its reports
and unsuccessful against companies who honestly mention favorable reviews. Compare Consumers Union
of United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044 (2d. Cir. 1983) (reversing a preliminary injunction
against an advertiser that sought to use valid quotes from Consumer Reports) with Amana Refrigeration
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In the environmental certification context, commercialization is central.
Manufacturers place environmental certification logos and emblems directly on
products to enhance sales. Environmental certifiers therefore are dependent on
manufacturers' decisions to participate in their programs. This dependence argu-
ably creates incentives to lower certification standards as a means of increasing
industry participation.
One way to combat market pressure to relax product evaluation criteria is
to require certifiers to disclose their finances, evaluation criteria, and standard-
setting and monitoring procedures." 9 By doing this, certifiers will adopt
procedures similar to those that agencies must use under the APA, but as
private operators they will be able to make final standard-setting decisions
independently. Certifiers should also commit to periodic review of evaluation
criteria to ensure that those criteria will adapt to technological advances.36
Obtaining nonprofit corporate status and tax exempt status could enhance
certifier credibility. Nonprofit status would require documentation of financial
relationships and disclosure of certain reports for public inspection, thus
reducing real or apparent conflicts of interest.36'
Another important requirement is that environmental certification standards
should meet or exceed threshold standards for environmental advertising. If a
new federal environmental marketing statute were enacted in the future, as
recommended in Part II, it should specify that threshold standards for adver-
tisers should serve merely as baseline requirements in the certification context.
For example, H.R. 3865, a federal bill that would have authorized EPA to
develop a legally binding regulatory framework for environmental advertising,
discussed the relationship between standards for advertisers and those for third-
party certifiers: "No person may issue environmental certification and seals of
approval unless such certifications or seals are awarded according to criteria
and standards at least as stringent as the criteria and standards contained in [the
advertising] regulations promulgated under this section. '362 The preemption
issue, discussed earlier in the context of the regulation of advertising terms, 363
is relevant here. If a new federal environmental marketing statute were passed
that did not preempt state laws, a decision would have to be made as to whether
private certification standards should exceed those state standards that are more
stringent than their federal counterparts.
Co. v. Consumers Union of United States, 431 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Iowa 1977) (holding that Amana
infringed Consumers Union's copyright when it misleadingly quoted from one article while ignoring an
unfavorable follow-up piece). See also Advertisers Sideswipe CU's Road-Test Reports, CONSUMER REP.,
Mar. 1991, at 142 (reporting two cases in which commercials made false references to Consumers Union's
evaluations of automobiles).
359. See, e.g., AT CROSS PURPOSES, supra note 340, at 38-39.
360. See, e.g., id. at 38.
361. See, e.g., id. at 39.
362. H.R. 3865, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 403(a) (1992).
363. See supra notes 172-93 and accompanying text.
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Also, certifiers should carefully monitor the use of their certification marks.
Under the Lanham Act, certification marks are to be denied initial registration
or canceled at any time if the certifier "does not control the use of the mark"
or "permits the use of the certification mark for purposes other than to certi-
fy."364 Thus certifiers should withdraw, from manufacturers, licenses to use
certification marks on products that no longer meet required standards and take
aggressive action against companies that make unauthorized use of marks.365
Preventing the misuse of marks by companies whose products do not merit
certification will reduce consumer deception and help certifiers capture their
costs.
Beyond this, manufacturers or sellers of goods should not be in the
certification business. The Lanham Act denies initial registration of certification
marks and cancels current marks of registrants that produce or market "any
goods or services to which the certification mark is applied."3 6 Unregistered
certification marks can be freely imitated, thus losing credibility in the public
eye. This means that grocery and other retail stores that have begun to certify
products as environmentally compatible should discontinue their programs.
Finally, certifiers will need to coordinate their standards, or, alternatively,
specialize in different product markets or different functional niches. One
example of a functional niche is the area of compliance monitoring. If federal
regulations are enacted in the future to standardize manufacturers' advertising
claims, as discussed in Part II, manufacturers might employ third-party groups
to document their compliance with the new regulations. Alternatively,
government monitoring bodies could contract with private certifiers to verify
such compliance.
To arrive at credible business operating procedures for certifiers, such as
greater openness in the standard-setting process and careful trademark practices,
several alternative or complementary steps could be taken. The lowest-cost
364. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D) (1988). The statute also provides for denial of registration or cancellation
if a certifier "discriminately refuses to certify or to continue to certify the goods or services of any person
who maintains the standards or conditions which such mark certifies." Id.
365. The Environmental Defense Fund's critique of Scientific Certification Systems identified examples
of misleading uses of certification logos by manufacturers. The report pointed to a specific occurrence in
which a manufacturer had used characteristics of the Green Cross motif to imply certification of environmen-
tal attributes beyond those actually certified:
The association between all of the environmental claims and the Green Cross logo is reinforced
by the design of the package, in which a green border enclosing a list of environmental claims
is the same shape as, and is linked to, the green border surrounding the Green Cross logo...
• The intimate association of the Green Cross mark and a list of environmental claims suggests
strongly to the casual observer that Green Cross has certified all of these claims, which is not
the case.
AT CROSS PURPOSES, supra note 340, at 18. For a follow up on the initial evaluation of the certification
company, see ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF GREEN CROSS'S
CONFORMANCE WITH EDF's RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS (1992).
366. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(e)(2). See, e.g., In re Florida Citrus Comm., 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 497
(1968) (affirming a refusal to register an "OJ" mark as a result of the Florida Citrus Commission's use of
the mark in promotional campaigns).
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option is industry self-regulation combined with vigilant scrutiny by the media
and public interest groups. Due to the limited number of U.S. certifiers, self-
regulation could be more effective in controlling certifier behavior than in
controlling the numerous and diverse firms involved in environmental advertis-
ing. If a binding regulatory structure is unnecessary or premature, narrowly-
tailored nonbinding guidelines could provide some measure of potency in the
certification context.
Monitoring basic operating procedures for environmental certifiers would
fall squarely within the FTC's dual mandate of preventing consumer deception
and promoting fair competition. New amendments to the FTC's endorsement
guidelines or environmental advertising guidelines could recommend that
certifiers disclose their finances, standards, and standard-setting and verification
procedures. Overseeing certifier control of certification marks would similarly
fall within the FTC's authority. The Federal Trademark Statute explicitly
authorizes the FTC to bring actions to cancel registration of certification marks
when registrants fail to follow specified procedures.367 State enforcement
agencies should also assume an active role in monitoring certifier behavior.
Although the FTC's jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations is not
universal, it would nonetheless be appropriate to provide for environmental cer-
tification in FTC guidelines. First, some certifiers might not elect nonprofit
status.. Second, courts could determine on a case-by-case basis that some
nonprofit or not-for-profit organizations are in fact corporations subject to the
FTC Act.368 Finally, FTC guidelines could serve as models to be incorporated
into those state consumer protection statutes covering nonprofit organizations.
If private certifiers were to adopt uniformly procedures placing them beyond
FTC jurisdiction, state agencies would need to assume a greater share of the
policymaking and enforcement responsibility.
C. Persistent Obstacles in the Private Path
Even if several of the above issues are resolved, other fundamental obstacles
confront the successful development of private certification programs. These
obstacles include market failure conditions and barriers to the effective'
coordination of standards. Ultimately these issues could prompt greater EPA
involvement through regulation, funding, formal approval of product evaluation
methods, or a joint public-private program.
367. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5).
368. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
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1. Coordinating Normative Standards
Environmental certifiers are distinguishable from more traditional standard-
setting organizations that typically draw their standards from the customary
practices of industry. Most standards, such as those used in construction,
originate with trade associations and are eventually written into governmental
rules such as municipal building codes. By contrast, the development of
environmental standards requires a more subjective identification of the
environmental attributes that most benefit society. This is arguably more
controversial than, for example, identifying the appropriate size beam for
making a ceiling structurally sound. Furthermore, as mentioned above,
environmental certifiers may choose to select standards that can be met only
by a small fraction of products in a given industry. Such standards are more
likely to stimulate innovation than those embodying minimum performance
requirements that all products are expected and able to meet.369 Therefore,
although environmental certifiers should incorporate industry expertise and
concerns into standard-setting decisions, they must also maintain a good mea-
sure of autonomy.
Many traditional standard-setting organizations belong to accreditation bod-
ies such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). Such accredi-
tation bodies generally make decisions based on consensus. ANSI's due process
procedures give all interested parties a right to participate equally in the accred-
itation process.37° Such procedures make it unlikely that industry's voice will
be subordinated to broader social goals. If environmental certifiers have a
mutual interest in the coordination of standards, they may need to develop a
new organization or new procedures for accomplishing this goal, either in
conjunction with, or independently of, existing accreditation organizations.
369. For example, the Canadian Environmental Choice Program's revised environmental mandate,
although making several concessions to industry, nevertheless proposed to set initial criteria so that only
the environmental leaders in a given industry will be able to meet the standard. MANDATE STATEMENT,
supra note 321, at 2.
370. ANSI defines due process as follows: "Due process means that any person (organization,
company, government agency, individual, and the like) with a direct and material interest has a right to
participate by: (1) expressing a position and its basis, (2) having that position considered, and (3) appealing
if adversely affected. Due process allows for equity and fair play." AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS
INSTITUTE, PROCEDURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND COORDINATION OF AMERICAN NATIONAL STA-
NDARDS § 1.2 (Sept. 9, 1987) [hereinafter ANSI PROCEDURES]. Consideration must be given to
representatives from "producer," "user," and "general interest" categories. Id. § 1.2.3. Other interests to
be represented, where appropriate, are those of the following: consumer, directly affected public, distributor
and retailer, industrial/commercial entity, insurance company, labor, manufacturer, professional society,
regulatory agency, testing laboratory, and trade associati6n. Id. § 1.2.3 n.l.
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2. Cost Control and Market Failure
Environmental certification is characterized by high start-up and compliance
monitoring costs. Because private environmental certifiers plan to be self-
supporting, cost control will be one of the most challenging hurdles to viability.
Annual license fees for participants in Norway's privately managed program
illustrate the high prices that private programs must charge to recover their
costs. For example, in 1990, Norway's annual license fee for a company with
$5 million in annual product sales was $20,000, compared to a fee of $4,310
for a Canadian (governmental) EcoLogo license.371
The information generated by an environmental certifier has many of the
qualities of a public good. If a private certifier were to maintain reasonable
prices, much of the value of its work could go uncompensated. Indeed, some
economic analysis suggests that evaluation of consumer products by third
parties is undersupplied by the market.372 Consumers who do not buy certified
products nevertheless eventually receive benefits from the information printed
on product labels. Those who provide the information might not be reimbursed
for the environmental benefits that would ultimately ensue if their programs
were successful.
To account for this market failure, certifiers that are unable to recover costs
may be compelled to increase revenues by reducing evaluation standards, or
to reduce costs by eliminating critical components of effective certification,
such as compliance monitoring. Unfortunately, consumers are unlikely to
discern decreases in certification standards, and generally will be unable to
ascertain quality gradations among certifiers. A government subsidy could
therefore help ensure more rigorous certification and follow-up procedures.
3. Allocation Problems
Considerations of equity and allocation may also justify some form of gov-
ernment subsidy for environmental certification programs. The high license fees
characteristic of private certification may otherwise discourage small companies
from participating. Norway's pricing structure reflects a disparity that may
result when an independent program attempts to maintain a sliding-fee scale
for small companies. For example, in order for Norway's program to maintain
a $400 ceiling on its annual license fee for small firms in 1990, the program
was required to charge a $26,000 fee to companies with annual sales above
$6.5 million.373 A subsidy could allow certifiers to reduce license fees for
371. OECD REPORT, supra note 318, at 25.
372. See, e.g., Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Market fir Consumer Product Evaluations: An Analysis and
a Proposal, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1235, 1239-40 (1985).
373. OECD REPORT, supra note 318, at 25.
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small firms without requiring a corresponding increase in annual fees for large
companies.
4. Future EPA Role
Increased governmental participation, possibly in the form of a government-
private hybrid organization, may be appropriate in the future if private certifiers
fail to develop credible programs, offer affordable prices, and maintain rigorous
evaluation standards. Government subsidies could help ensure more
conscientious certification and follow-up procedures. Private management could
provide the independence necessary for maintaining a multivariate, incentive-
based program in the face of industry pressures. Even if EPA does not establish
the product evaluation criteria for environmental certification, it could
nevertheless share its technical expertise with private certifiers. As an
alternative to a joint program, Congress could authorize EPA to develop a
formal approval program for product evaluation methods used by private
programs, thus adopting the role of certifying the certifiers. EPA has already
begun to coordinate research on environmental certification techniques as
discussed in Part V.
If EPA plans to participate in environmental certification in the future, it
should prepare for such involvement by collecting data on the effects of
consumer buying patterns on manufacturing behavior. Such data will be neces-
sary to justify the investment that any future government involvement would
require.
V. Developing an Appropriate Certification Methodology
In addition to determining the appropriate ownership structure and business
operating procedures for environmental certifiers, a critical prerequisite to mean-
ingful certification is the definition and adoption of an effective product
evaluation methodology. Only through the development of a feasible and
reliable methodology will producers and consumers begin to gain a more
holistic portrait of the environmental effects of products and production
processes.
A. The Possibilities and Liabilities of Life-Cycle Analysis
Recent attention has focused on a methodology called cradle-to-grave or
life-cycle analysis, a technique developed from global resource modeling studies
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of the 1960s.3"4 An ideal life-cycle analysis would account for the energy and'
materials consumed and wastes created during all phases of a product's life:
extraction through manufacturing, use, reuse, recycling, and disposal.375 Sev-
eral European environmental certification programs have explored the use of
this technique as a basis for product evaluation. 376 One U.S. group has initiat-
ed a product-evaluation program based on life-cycle analysis.
3 77
Although the life-cycle approach is extremely important conceptually, the
methodology is too dependent upon assumptions to be used as the sole basis
for making interbrand product comparisons. A more limited multiple-attribute
form of product evaluation relying on predetermined, easily verifiable standards
is a more practical alternative to the life-cycle approach.
1. Valuable Paradigm
The aim of the life-cycle technique is to identify and quantify the energy
and materials used and the wastes released to the environment in the course
of producing and using a product, and then to calculate the cumulative environ-
mental impacts of these inputs and outputs over the life of the product. Since
1990, the Society for Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC), a
professional society, has contributed the development of the life-cycle
methodology and its applications. In a recent report, SETAC has outlined the
three components of a full life-cycle assessment.3 78 The most important of
374. Life-cycle analysis was not originally intended to be used in product marketing. It was an
outgrowth of the global modeling studies of the late 1960s that developed in response to concerns over
diminishing raw material and energy resources. SETAC, supra note 17, at 3-4. The energy crisis of the
1970s spawned fuel cycle studies that evaluated the costs and implications of alternative energy sources.
Id. at 3. Concerns over solid waste disposal prompted a renewed interest in raw material use in the 1980s.
Id. at 4. Paralleling developments in Europe, a precursor to life-cycle analysis in the United States was
the "Resource and Environmental Profile Analysis" (REPA) developed by Franklin Associates, Inc. and
Arthur D. Little. Id. EPA is currently conducting research on life-cycle analysis, see infra note 380, as are
research institutes and consulting firms in the United States and Europe, including Franklin Associates,
Battelle Labs, Arthur D. Little, Roy Weston, Inc., Tellus Institute, and Chem Systems, Inc. Telephone
Interview with Dr. James A. Fava, Roy Weston, Inc. (Jan. 5, 1992).
375. This would include an assessment of impacts as well as a quantification of inputs and outputs.
376. See, e.g., ENvIRONMENTAL DATA SERVICES LTD., EcO-LABELS: PRODUCT MANAGEMENT IN A
GREENER EUROPE 31, 46 (1989).
377. Scientific Certification Systems has developed a bar chart or "Environmental Report Card" format
based on life-cycle inventories. See, e.g., GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION Co., GREEN CROSS PRESENTS
DETAILS OF FIRST COMPREHENSIVE EcO-LABEL IN U.S. BASED ON "LIFE CYCLE" ASSESSMENT (press
release, Sept. 6, 1991); GREEN CROSS CERTIFICATION Co., LANDMARK EcO-LABEL STANDARDS UNVEILED
(press release, Aug. 6, 1991). The Environmental Defense Fund issued a response criticizing the proposed
approach. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, COMMENTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND ON
SCIENTIFIC CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS' LIFECYCLE INVENTORY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT CARD
(June 25, 1992).
378. SETAC, supra note 17, at 1-2. SETAC is a non-profit professional society representing
environmental toxicologists, chemists, hazard assessors, and engineers. See id. at xii. SETAC has formed.
a life-cycle assessment (LCA) advisory group to identify the issues associated with conducting LCAs and
to help coordinate and guide the development of the LCA concept and methodology. See ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT METhODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT UPDATE (Oct.
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these components for product evaluation purposes are the inventory analysis
and the impact analysis. The inventory analysis identifies the inputs and outputs
associated with a product or manufacturing process. The impact analysis
evaluates the toxicity and risk associated with the wastes, as well as the general
environmental consequences of the inputs and outputs. 379 EPA has developed
guidelines pertaining to certain components of the life-cycle methodology.380
Although there are weaknesses in the current state of life-cycle methodolo-
gy,31 the life-cycle concept is extremely important and should be promoted.
Only by way of this temporal perspective, encompassing production, use, and
disposal, will citizens obtain a full understanding of the environmental costs
associated with production and economic growth. Life-cycle thinking essentially
represents a paradigm shift that could have a tremendous impact on how
growth-based societies define a "healthy" economy.
In addition to the power of the concept, the life-cycle methodology can have
immediate applications in industry. Because companies can impose consistency
in their data-gathering techniques, managers are in a better position to employ
the life-cycle methodology than are independent analysts attempting to make
interbrand product comparisons. Producers' assessments of the inputs and
outputs associated with their companies' own products can aid in the design
of products with reduced environmental impacts. Rising costs of toxic waste
cleanup, escalating landfill disposal fees, and stringent emission regulations will
continue to provide companies with economic incentives to take preventive
measures. 382
Because of the conceptual value and potential industrial use of life-cycle
assessment, EPA and the private and academic groups that are currently re-
searching the methodology should continue their studies. As the methodology
develops and standardizes, and as peer review mechanisms formalize, life-cycle
applications could broaden in the future. In the interim, however, serious data-
gathering and valuation problems make life-cycle analysis, at least in its
broadest application, an inappropriate tool for third-party product evaluation
and advertising purposes.
1991) [hereinafter LCA UPDATE].
379. SETAC, supra note 17, at 119-21. The final phase of SETAC's approach, not as relevant for
product evaluation purposes, is an "improvement analysis," which would recommend new industrial
processes that would consume fewer resources and produce less waste. Id. at 2.
380. Since 1990, as part of its pollution prevention mandate, EPA has been developing technical
guidelines for standardizing life-cycle assessments. EPA's life-cycle assessment program is a joint effort
of the Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, the Office of Pollution Prevention and Evaluation, the
Office of Solid Waste, and the Office of Research and Development. EPA has created a peer review group
consisting of representatives from state and federal agencies, consumer groups, environmental organizations,
industry, academia, and professional groups. Telephone Interview with Timothy Mohin, Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards, Environmental Protection Agency (Jan. 23, 1992).
381. See infra notes 383-401 and accompanying text.
382. Telephone Interview with Frank Consoli, Manager of Packaging Technology, Scott Paper Company
(January 2, 1992).
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2. Limited Tool
The inventory analysis is the only phase of the life-cycle assessment that
has already undergone significant development. Nevertheless, the following
problems make it too dependent upon assumptions for making consistent and
reliable interbrand product comparisons.
Boundary Definition. Defining the boundaries of the life-cycle inventory
is a difficult and highly subjective process,383 and modifying these boundaries
can dramatically affect the results of a study. In theory, a life-cycle assessment
could incorporate full inventories for every component of each machine used
in a given manufacturing process, including the environmental effects of
transporting the components to the place of manufacturing.3" For example,
if parts are delivered by truck to a manufacturing facility, the analyst must
decide whether the inventory should include the inputs and outputs associated
with the manufacture and use of the truck, such as those related to the harvest-
ing of rubber for the wheels or the extraction of petroleum for fuel. As another
example, in constructing an inventory for cloth diapers, the analyst would need
to decide whether to include the energy required to produce the fertilizer used
to grow the cotton, and if so, whether to assume hydroelectric or coal-based
power. The analyst must make hundreds of such screening decisions during the
course of an inventory, weighing accuracy against cost and practicality.385
Data Gaps. Life-cycle inventories are necessarily dependent upon data bases
that vary greatly in detail and sophistication. Data gaps are often caused by the
reluctance of manufacturers to release plant-specific information.386 The trade
secret problem is especially pronounced in industries that are not vertically
integrated, in which several different companies may be involved in the
production of a single consumer product. But even highly integrated companies
face data gaps because producers generally do not collect data from all
processes. While an analyst may have access to primary data for one process
of one company, she may need to use highly generalized, publicly-available
data for another.387 Government data generally are not site-specific, but are
based on industry averages, and are not updated frequently enough to reflect
adequately a world of changing technology.3 8 Complicating the picture
383. SETAC, supra note 17, at 26; LCA UPDATE, supra note 378, at 1; Telephone Interview with Dr.
James A. Fava, Roy Weston, Inc. (Jan. 5, 1992).
384. SETAC, supra note 17, at 46.
385. Telephone Interview with Bruce Vigon, Senior Research Scientist, Battelle (Feb. 18, 1992).
386. B. W. VIGON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 600/R-92/036,
LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT: INVENTORY GUIDELINES AND PRINCIPLES 29-30 (1992) [hereinafter EPA LIFE
CYCLE INVENTORY GUIDELINES].
387. Telephone Interview with Bruce Vigon, Senior Research Scientist, Battelle (Jan. 8, 1992).
388. Id. For a brief discussion of certain shortcomings of government data, see EPA LIFE-CYCLE
INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 386. at 30-33.
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further, emissions data are unavailable or incomplete for unregulated pollut-
ants.3 89 For example, carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas suspected as a primary
agent in global warming, is unregulated and is therefore rarely included in
emissions reports.390
Equivalency of Use. In order to compare products on a life-cycle basis,
ratios must be developed to account for varying consumer usage patterns. These
are called "functional equivalency" or "equivalent use" ratios. "9 For example,
if a researcher is to compare a solid, tallow-based bar soap to a liquid, petro-
leum-based hand soap, she must equate the two products on the basis of
numbers of hand washings. 392 Equivalent use ratios, however, are rarely accu-
rate in practice. For example, even though a manufacturer may concentrate a
brand of soap, a consumer will often use more of the concentrated product than
a predetermined calculation would indicate.
The comparison of cloth to disposable diapers poses another illustration of
the equivalent usage problem. The logical comparison would be between equal
numbers of diaperings over a certain period of time. One study argues, how-
ever, that cloth diapers are typically changed more frequently than disposable
diapers and they are often doubled.393 Because diapering practice varies
among parents, an accurate usage equivalency value cannot adequately be
encapsulated in a single ratio but rather should be represented by a range of
numbers.
Multiple Product Allocation. An additional problem emerges in allocating
resource use and wastes among different products that may be produced as part
of a single manufacturing or production process.39 4 Frequently, a manufactur-
ing process generates multiple secondary products or co-products.3 95 Extended
production sequences may involve hundreds of component processes. Because
it would be expensive and burdensome to install meters and record energy and
389. LCA UPDATE, supra note 378, at I.
390. E.g, EPA LIFE-CYCLE INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 386, at 65.
391. Id.
392. EPA's recent report, prepared by Battelle and Franklin Associates, provides the following example
of techniques for assigning usage equivalency ratios to liquid and solid soaps:
Because one soap is a solid and the other is a liquid, each with different densities and
cleansing abilities per unit amount, it would not make sense to compare them based on equal
weights or volumes. The key factor is how much of each is used in one hand-washing to provide
an equivalent level of function or service. An acceptable basis for comparison might be equal
numbers of hand-washings. Because these two products may be used at different rates, it would
be important to find data that give an equivalent usage ratio. For example, a research lab study
may show that 5 mm' of bar soap and 10 mm' of liquid soap are used per hand-washing. If the
basis for comparison were chosen at 1,000 hand-washings, 5,000 mm3 of bar soap would be
compared to 10,000 mm3 of liquid hand soap. Thus the equivalent use ratio is I to 2.
EPA LIFE-CYCLE INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 386, at 2.
393. For one comparison of the usage ratios of children's diapers, see FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES LTD.,
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S DISPOSABLE AND CLOTH DIAPERS, supra
note 10, at 1-2.
394. SETAC, supra note 17, at 39.
395. E.g., EPA LIFE-CYCLE INVENTORY GUIDELINES, supra note 386, at 56-59.
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resource use for every machine, companies generally maintain data on a per-
facility basis, rather than for single product lines. An analyst conducting a life-
cycle inventory for a particular product must apportion the aggregated data
among these smaller components.39 6
The difficulty of assigning the relative proportions of waste and energy data
to co-products is compounded when the product is one that a firm has little
economic incentive to produce. For example, co-products of beef include tallow,
cowhide, and bonemeal. When conducting a life-cycle inventory for tallow-
based soap, an analyst would need to find a method for partitioning the inputs
and outputs associated with tallow production from those of beef pro-
duction.3
Accounting for Recycled Materials. Accounting for the resource usage and
environmental releases associated with recycling activities is complicated by
the fact that there are multiple sources and routes for recycled materials, and
statistical information on new recycling activities is generally limited.398 The
problem is illustrated by a comparison of closed-loop and open-loop recycling.
In a closed-loop system, a product is recycled into a similar product (plastic
bottle to plastic bottle). In an open-loop system, a product may be recycled into
one of several alternative products (bottle to carpet, insulation, or even park
bench).3 99 Due to economics and market demand, product fluctuation between
closed-loop and open-loop recycling makes it extremely difficult to undertake
a relevant life-cycle assessment. An additional problem is that the life-cycle
inventory method may not accurately reflect recent innovations in recycling.
Even if a manufacturer produces a recyclable product, factors beyond that
manufacturer's control, such as the unavailability of local infrastructure or the
lack of consumer cooperation, can lower the product's recycling rate.
Beyond the Inventory: Impact Assessment. In theory, the impact phase of
a life-cycle assessment measures the environmental and public health conse-
quences of all the inputs and outputs of the inventory. Unfortunately, this phase
of life-cycle assessment remains in its infancy. 4°° To determine the environ-
mental and human health effects of a multitude of environmental wastes, an
analyst would need to confront the numerous problems associated with risk and
hazard assessment. Some of these problems include estimating toxicity and dose
396. Id.
397. Telephone Interview with Bruce Vigon, Senior Research Scientist, Battelle (Feb. 18, 1992).
398. SETAC, supra note 17, at 72, 84.
399. For a discussion of closed-loop and open-loop recycling, see EPA LIFE-CYCLE INVENTORY
GUIDELINES, supra note 386, at 89-91.
400. An engineer from SETAC's LCA Advisory Group testified before the FTC about the undeveloped
status of the life-cycle impact assessment: "[Miost, if not all, life-cycle studies conducted to date have
focused on the inventory component, and ... commonly accepted methodologies and peer-review mecha-
nisms do not yet exist for either inventories or impact assessments .... " DR. JAMES A. FAVA, WRITTEN
TESTIMONY OF DR. JAMES A. FAVA, SOCIETY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOxIcoLOGY AND CHEMISTRY, BEFORE
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 5 (July 17, 1991).
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responses, accounting for latent health effects, and adjusting for variability
among sites and subpopulations. The analyst may also face boundary setting
problems in determining whether to assess local, regional, or even global
impacts. In some cases, this determination may have political dimensions."
Assigning weights to various environmental effects introduces an additional
subjective element to the assessment process.
B. Limited Multiple-Attribute Analysis: A Practical Alternative
Although a complete summation and evaluation of environmental inputs and
outputs is not technically feasible, it is nevertheless possible to reward
manufacturers for environmental innovations in product design. A more limited
multiple-attribute assessment based on a number of predetermined,
independently verifiable tests is a practical alternative to a full life-cycle
analysis.
A product must surpass threshold levels established for several
environmental criteria in order to obtain certification. This methodology is
analogous to a doctor establishing physical health thresholds for a patient's
heart rate, cholesterol level, blood pressure, reflexes, vision, and hearing. These
criteria are relatively easy to measure. A patient passing the designated
threshold in every tested area could receive a certificate. Similarly, in product
evaluation, a product meeting pre-established thresholds for designated
environmental attributes would be certified. The certification logo would not
necessarily denote an environmentally ideal product, but it would at least
indicate that the manufacturer had reduced several of the negative
environmental impacts associated with the product. Canada has adopted the
limited multiple-attribute method, 2 and one U.S. environmental certifier
401. Those dimensions are apparent, for example, when the analyst must decide how to weigh
environmental costs that occur in other countries.
402. For example, the Canadian Environmental Choice Program's Draft Revised Standard for automo-
tive engine oil outlines several product-specific criteria that must be met before a producer can receive a
license for an EcoLogo.
Section 4. Product Specific Requirements
To be authorized to carry the EcoLogo the automotive engine oil must:
(a) satisfy the requirements of [the American Petroleum Institute's] service classification "SG";
(b) [satisfy the Society of American Engineers' energy conservation standard for passenger cars,
vans, and light-duty trucks];
(c) [comply with the viscosity requirements of the Society of Automotive Engineers];
(d) when measured using a weighted average over a one-month period, be manufactured using
a minimum of 75% re-refined oil in the base stock by volume, if either 5W or lOW grade, or a
minimum of 50% re-refined oil in the base stock by volume, if either 20W, 30W, or 40W grade;
and
(e) be packaged in a container which contains:
(i) prior to January 1, 1995, at least 25% recycled material by weight and a minimum of 10%
post-consumer material by total weight of the container.
(ii) on or after January 1, 1995, at least 25% recycled material by weight and a
minimum of 10% post-consumer material by total weight of the container.
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employs a similar method. °3
The limited multiple-attribute approach is not without shortcomings,
however. The principal concern is whether the standards selected will accurately
reflect those areas with the most significant environment impacts and potential
for mitigation by manufacturers. In other words, the question is whether the
4.1 The Base stock must:
(a) [comply with Canadian General Standards Board requirements];
(b) not be manufactured using a process that generates sulfuric acid sludge as a by-product;
(c) [meet the consistency requirements of the Lubricant Review Institute's military specifications];
(d) contain less than 5 ppm each of benzo(a)pyrene and benzo(a)anthracene [as determined using
EPA's electron capture detection technique for evaluating solid wastes].
ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, DRAFT REVISED STANDARD, AUTOMOTIVE ENGINE OIL (Oct. 1992).
Canada reviews and revises its environmental standards every three years to account for scientific
progress, technological advances, and market developments. ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICE PROGRAMS, DESIGN
STATEMENT 12 (Jan. 1993).
403. Green Seal's Environmental Standard for Tissue Paper requires the following criteria to be met
before products can be certified:
4. Product Specific Environmental Requirements
4.1 Recovered Paper Requirement.
4.1.1 The fiber in certified bathroom tissue shall contain 100% recovered paper material including
at least 20% post-consumer material.
4.1.2 The fiber in certified facial tissue shall contain 100% recovered paper material including
at least 10% post-consumer material.
4.1.3 The post-consumer material content of a product shall be determined by measuring the
average product fiber utilization over a period of no longer than three months.
4.2 De-inking of recovered paper. The recovered paper used to manufacture the product shall
not be de-inked using a solvent:
4.2.1 containing the element chlorine; or
4.2.2 listed by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency under Section 313
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.
4.3 Bleaching.
4.3.1 If a bleaching agent is used that includes chlorine or any of its derivatives (such as
hypochlorite and chlorine dioxide), the adsorbable organic halogen (AOX) content of the effluent
from the production location shall not exceed 1.0 kilogram per air-dried metric ton (ADMT) of
pulp.
4.3.2 On or after January 1, 1996, the recovered paper used in making a certified product shall
not be bleached using chlorine or any of its derivatives (such as hypochlorite and chlorine
dioxide).
4.4 Additional Ingredients. The product (not including packaging) shall not contain any added
pigments, inks, dyes, or fragrances.
5. Packaging Requirements
5.1 The core of a roll of toilet tissue or the box used to package facial tissues must be manufac-
tured from 100% recovered fiber.
5.2 A consumer package of bathroom tissue must contain at least four rolls unless the outer
wrapper has been manufactured from 100% recycled materials.
5.3 Toxics in Packaging.
5.3.1. Packaging must not contain inks, dyes, pigments, stabilizers, or any other additives to
which any lead, cadmium, mercury or hexavalent chromium has been intentionally introduced.
5.3.2 The sum of the concentration levels of lead, cadmium, mercury, and hexavalent chromium
present in any package or packaging component must not exceed 600 parts per million by weight.
5.3.3. Effective January 1, 1993, the sum of the concentration levels of lead, cadmium, mercury,
and hexavalent chromium present in any package or packaging component must not exceed 250
parts per million by weight.
5.3.4 Effective January 1, 1994, the sum of the concentration levels of lead, cadmium, mercury,
and hexavalent chromium present in any package or packaging component must not exceed 100
parts per million by weight."
GREEN SEAL, ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD FOR TISSUE PAPER 6-8 (Feb. 12, 1992).
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selected criteria will be sufficiently comprehensive to capture the notion of
environmental quality.
To increase objectivity in the selection of product evaluation criteria, the
process should be highly visible and draw upon the expertise of government,
industry, and the public interest community. The independent verifiability of
each tested criterion could make the limited multiple-attribute approach less
dependent upon assumptions than other evaluation techniques available at this'
time. Testing procedures under such a program could be designed to be
straightforward and comprehensible, opening the certification process to public
scrutiny and comment.'O To enhance clarity for consumers, certified
companies should present brief synopses of the selected evaluation criteria on
their product labels.' 5 Such summaries would help consumers understand the
limitations, as well as the breadth, of the environmental certification program.
Conclusion
Green buying can be an effective means of promoting genuine environmen-
tal improvements in the design of consumer products and packaging. Before
buying power will influence manufacturers' production decisions, however,
consumers need accurate information about the products that confront them in
the marketplace.
Two separate but interwoven problems currently jeopardize the ability of
consumers to vote with their pocketbooks. First, as discussed in Parts I and II,
the tendency of manufacturers to make misleading advertising claims prevents
buyers from distinguishing environmental superiority from marketing rhetoric.
Some firms have changed their labels but not their products, and the FTC
guidelines lack the precision and legal muscle to curb this trend effectively. The
current legal and regulatory framework fails to deter manufacturers from
404. Another advantage of this method is that it can incorporate product performance standards. For
example, Green Seal's Environmental Standard for Tissue Paper requires that certified tissue products meet
the following performance criteria:
Section 3. Product Specific Performance Requirements
3.1 The product must be made in accordance with reasonable industry practice with respect to holes,
tears, wrinkles, cleanliness, and foreign materials or dirt. It must have no disagreeable odor, either wet or
dry, in accordance with reasonable industry practice. Edges must be cleanly cut and not ragged. The tissue
must dispense properly from the box or fixture.
3.2 Each roll of bathroom tissue must contain at least 40 square feet of product (equivalent to
approximately 300-4.5 x 4.4 inch sheets). Each box of facial tissue must contain at least 70 square feet
of product (equivalent to approximately 175-8.0 x 8.0 inch sheets.).
GREEN SEAL, ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD FOR TISSUE PAPER 6 (Feb. 12, 1992).
405. For example, the Green Seal Environmental Standard For Tissue Paper includes several labeling
requirements, one of which mandates that licensed tissue products bear legible descriptions of the basis for
their certifications. The standard provides the following example:
"This product contains 100% recovered paper fiber and XX post consumer materials, and meets Green
Seal environmental standards for bleaching, deinking and packaging. It contains no added inks, dyes, or
fragrances. [where XX is the certified level of post-consumer materials]."
Id. at 8.
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making misleading claims.
Second, information about benign product attributes is frequently undercut
by competing information about harmful tradeoffs. The inability of consumers
to evaluate products on a multidimensional basis has spawned the development
of independent certification companies that award their logos to products with
several favorable environmental attributes. The current legal and regulatory
regime is ill-suited to protect against unmerited product endorsements by these
third-party certifiers.
A two-tiered approach is necessary to promote accountability in environ-
mental advertising and certification in the United States. First, Congress should
enact new legislation authorizing EPA to define terms and establish testing
protocols for environmental advertising. EPA expertise is essential because
current advertising practices implicate environmental policy concerns. The new
statute should include citizen and state enforcement mechanisms that would
bolster federal efforts. The law should also incorporate innovative procedures,
such as petition processes, that would further encourage state vigilance over
environmental advertisers.
The second step is to select an appropriate organizational structure and
develop a credible methodology for environmental certification. If operated with
integrity and openness, private certification enterprises may be able to insulate
the standard-setting process from undue industry pressure. This Article, howev-
er, extends a cautionary note: problems will inevitably arise if private certifiers
fail to publicize their procedures, to specialize in different product or functional
niches, or to create new structures for coordinating standards.
Developing an accurate and rigorous product evaluation methodology is
perhaps the greatest challenge to the future of environmental certification. Life-
cycle analysis, already embraced by some certifiers, is presently inappropriate
for use as a comprehensive consumer product evaluation tool. Data gaps and
boundary definition problems make the technique inadequately fine-tuned for
making consistent and reliable interbrand comparisons. An alternative technique
that employs a discrete number of independently verifiable testing criteria is
more practical. If private certification companies prove unable to maintain
uniform and rigorous standards, governmental oversight or direct participation
may become appropriate.
Environmental advertising and certification can be valuable services if they
honestly reflect the attributes of products and production processes. If
consumers are to select environmentally superior products, they will need
confidence that the information on which they rely is accurate. Adoption of the
strategies called for in this Article will help make consumers an informed
electorate when they vote green with their pocketbooks.

